THE THEOLOGICAL NATURE OF WORK AND WEALTH AS THE BASIS OF CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE MORAL FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

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By

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ABSTRACT

This thesis synthesizes a Catholic theological understanding of work and the responsibilities of wealth. This understanding serves as the conceptual basis for understanding an emerging dimension of justice called contributive justice. Contributive justice is defined in this project as a normative theory that concerns the right and obligation of every man to contribute his efforts, resources, and talents toward his own flourishing and the flourishing of others to develop societies whose measure of justice is how they advance every member's ability to contribute and flourish within a social framework that enables justice. Contributive justice is contemplated as a moral foundation for the renewal of the social contract, and a framework is offered for operationalization in the context of being co-workers with God.

DEDICATION

"Never stop reading … and remember to pray for me."
The late Father Edward Bodnar, SJ, Georgetown University

This doctoral thesis is the product of a heartfelt journey. It began with a sliver of faith and a fateful meeting with a retired Georgetown Jesuit classics professor. Sixteen years ago, I was a young and successful investment banker who was stopped in my tracks by an experience that I did not understand. Providence put Father Bodnar and me together sixteen years ago to help us both to make sense of two similar experiences of sharing a meal with a stranger. Father Bodnar told me that in time I would understand all that I need to understand, and that I should always keep reading and remember to pray for him. I understood the call to be patient and to read, but it was not until later that I understood the importance of his call to prayer. So all these years later, I dedicate this thesis to Father Bodnar and offer it as my answer to the questions of (1) why do we work, and (2) what are our responsibilities with regard to our wealth?

Father Bodnar and I met only twice, and he died in 2011 at age 91, four years before I came to Georgetown. But what I have come to find is that at Georgetown, you are never without faithful companions for very long. During my doctoral studies, I became familiar with the life and work of the Venerable Father Augustus Tolton. Father Gus, as his friends have known him, is thought to have been the first African American priest in the United States. Father Gus escaped slavery as a child to pursue his call to the priesthood. I first became familiar with Father Gus's life in my service to the Black and Indian Mission Office (BIMO).[1] During my research, I concluded that I could find no more fitting example, in a

[1] As a former investment banker, I was asked to provide service as a member of the Finance and Audit Committee, and then later as the Chairman of the Investment Committee of BIMO and its related entities. This work was done during my time as a doctoral student. This office is a conglomeration of a number of organizations that were created by the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, and that were the first efforts to evangelize to the African and Native communities after the American Civil War.

single man's life, of the witness to both the dignity and perversion of work and the most offensive and most beautiful expressions of how we can come to understand true wealth.

I am sure that Father Bodnar would not mind sharing this dedication.

Fathers Bodnar and Tolton, thank you for your friendship and lives of service. Through my work, may others come to know the timeless lessons of what God has to say about the nature of work and the responsibilities of wealth. I warmly dedicate this work to you both. Peace be with you.

Father Tolton's cause for canonization is currently underway. Father Tolton, pray for us:

O God, We give you thanks for your servant and priest, Father Augustus Tolton,
who labored among us in times of contradiction,
times that were both beautiful and paradoxical.

His ministry helped to lay the foundation for a truly Catholic gathering in faith in our time.
We stand in the shadow of his ministry.

May his life continue to inspire us and imbue us with that confidence and hope
that will forge a new evangelization for the Church we love.

Father in Heaven, Father Tolton's suffering service sheds light upon our sorrows;
we see them through the prism of your Son's passion and death.

If it be your Will, O God,* glorify your servant, Father Tolton,
by granting the favor I now request through his intercession:

Grant Us the Wisdom to Understand the True Nature of Work & the Responsibilities of Wealth

so that all may know the goodness of this priest
whose memory looms large in the Church he loved.

Complete what you have begun in us that we might work for the fulfillment of your kingdom. Not to us the glory, but glory to you O God, through Jesus Christ, your Son and our Lord; Father, Son and Holy Spirit,
you are our God, living and reigning forever and ever.

Amen

2010, Bishop Joseph N. Perry (*About Father Tolton*)
Imprimatur
Francis Cardinal George, OMI
Archdiocese of Chicago

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I would like to acknowledge and express my appreciation to all those who have supported and encouraged me on this journey.

First, I offer the humblest gratitude to the Holy Spirit, without whose constant companionship I would have not been able to navigate this odyssey. Second, I acknowledge my family, for without them, this endeavor would not have been possible; their love and support have lifted me up and given me the inspiration to keep moving forward. Third, I am appreciative of all of the dedicated faculty at Georgetown University who saw the value in my work, and I am especially indebted to the unfailing patience of my mentor and chair, and the readers who added tremendous value to this project. I could never have known when we started this adventure exactly how much your scholarly work would inform mine. I would certainly be remiss if I did not also acknowledge the support and mentorship of the Georgetown Office of Scholarly Publications and the prayers and guidance of Jesuits on four continents. Fourth, I thank those scholars from the Association of Graduate Liberal Studies Programs, the University of St. Thomas, the Catholic University of America, the University of New Haven, the Napa Institute, the International Association of Jesuit Business Schools, the Society for Business Ethics, the Colleagues in Jesuit Business Education (USA), the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at the University of Santa Clara, the Elm Institute at Yale University, the Georgetown Prison Scholars Program, and especially the Kalmanovitz Initiative for Labor and the Working Poor at Georgetown University for all offering me opportunities to share aspects of this project.

Finally, I wish to note my enduring gratitude to all of those who have ever offered me the opportunity to work: I offer humble apology for those times that I failed, and I am contented by those times where my work has been inspiring and fruitful. I pray that my contributions will one day outweigh my debts.

The Prayer of Saint Joseph for Workers

Joseph, by the work of your hands
and the sweat of your brow,
you supported Jesus and Mary,
and had the Son of God as your fellow worker.

Teach me to work as you did,
with patience and perseverance, for God and
for those whom God has given me to support.
Teach me to see in my fellow workers
the Christ who desires to be in them,
that I may always be charitable and forbearing
towards all.

Grant me to look upon work
with the eyes of faith,
so that I shall recognize in it
my share in God's own creative activity
and in Christ's work of our redemption,
and so take pride in it.

When it is pleasant and productive,
remind me to give thanks to God for it.
And when it is burdensome,
teach me to offer it to God,
in reparation for my sins
and the sins of the world.

(By Brian Moore, SJ, printed in "Devotions to Saint Joseph" and published by the Society of St. Paul)

With a spirit of thanksgiving and gratitude,

Dawn M. Carpenter

December 3, 2019
The Feast of Saint Francis Xavier, Co-Founder of the Society of Jesus

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ABBREVIATIONS

CA	*Centesimus Annus*
CCC	Catechism of the Catholic Church
CSDC	Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church
EJA	Economic Justice for All
GS	*Gaudium et Spes*
LE	*Laborem Exercens*
LS	*Laudato Si*
MM	*Mater et Magistra*
QA	*Quadragesimo Anno*
RN	*Rerum Novarum*
SRS	*Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*

INTRODUCTION

> Justice is conscience, not a personal conscience but the conscience of the whole of humanity. Those who clearly recognize the voice of their own conscience usually recognize also the voice of justice.
>
> Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
> *from A Letter to Three Students*[2]

This project begins with a question that has haunted the author's conscience: why do we work? For some, this question may seem nonsensical. For most, this question may never even arise, because the answer seems obvious. We work to live, or, said another way, we work to obtain the resources we need to live. On one level, this is true. However, the author believes that the answer is more complicated, because this question is really asking four questions: (1) who are we, (2) what is work, (3) what is the purpose of our work, and (4) what is the purpose of the wealth generated by our work?[3]

At its core, the question of why we work challenges us to commit to an understanding of who we are as humans, as unique individuals, and as members of families and communities. Arguably, the resources needed to address this question span many disciplines. Rather than narrow the scope of the question, the author has taken the approach of identifying the human values inherent in the question. This thesis is designed to build upon the key human values at the core of the question to develop new scholarly insights derived from diverse disciplines. This is the work of the discipline of Liberal Studies.

It could be argued that there are many human values involved in the question of why we work, such as commitment, prudence, diligence, excellence, creativity, and many others. The author will make the argument that the most fundamental human value at the center of the question of why we work is

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[2] Labedz (1971), 151.

[3] Wealth is considered in economic and non-economic terms. As an economic measure, wealth is defined as resources under one's control whether derived by the individual or as the result of work done by others. As a non-economic measure, wealth is considered man's contributions to his life and the life of others by his perfection of virtues and talents. These ideas are more fully developed in Chapter 1.

the value of contribution. This is because without contribution, none of the other values have a chance to percolate and mature. At its essence, to work is to make a personal contribution.[4] However, to contribute, one must be able to contribute, and at the heart of this issue is the value of justice. This project explores the core values of contribution and justice, and it links them to the corresponding aspirational value of human flourishing.[5]

This project begins with a Christian approach to anthropology. This point of departure is inspired by the arguments of Saint Gregory of Nyssa in *De opificio hominis* (*On the Making of Man*) (Gregory of Nyssa 2016). The saint offers a wholly Christian view of the nature of man and his place in the cosmos. Why begin here? The rationale is that every project must have a beginning, and this beginning is consistent with the faith and world view of the author. By identifying a specific world view in which to anchor this project, the author endeavors to situate her truth claims within the intellectual tradition of Catholic social teaching.[6] Working within a distinct framework provides a needed context from which to situate work so as to move beyond epistemology into ethics (see Appendix 3).

Chapter 1 begins by exploring the nature of man within the Catholic tradition with a view towards man's ontological end.[7] It considers man's role as co-worker with God, and it contemplates the

[4] Chapter 1 discusses this issue from a theological perspective, and it relies on the notion of work that is derived from the dignity of the person who is doing the work (the subjective value of work as expressed in Catholic social teaching). This idea is also predicated on the notion of freedom and not subjugation, and it would therefore exclude work done through force, such as in slave labor. Work is also synonymous with the concept of contribution.

[5] Human flourishing can be considered a litmus test for contributive justice, if by human flourishing we mean the Aristotelian notion of *eudaimonia*—doing and living well. In Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (1954) describes eudaimonia as a type of happiness that also includes self-sufficiency. Here self-sufficiency means a good in and of itself—one that is not a solitary type of self-sufficiency, but a good that man shares with those around him (see the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1097b).

[6] Catholic social teaching encompasses the Catholic doctrines on issues related to (1) the dignity of the human person, (2) man's place in human societies, and (3) man's universal call to seek the common good. This teaching draws on both scripture and reason. This thesis also draws support from scholars who fall outside the CST tradition but whom the author believes are instructive to her arguments or who are deemed have something of value to contribute to the underlying themes addressed in this work.

[7] The term "man" is used to refer to an individual who is a component of the larger "mankind," in reference to the species "*homo sapiens*." (Catechism of the Catholic Church [CCC], 159).

implications of this vocation. It offers a systematic presentation of Catholic social teaching on work and wealth. These concepts are examined through the pedagogical lens of Liberal Studies, in which the value of contribution is discussed and developed, and it is offered as a conceptual basis for understanding the new and developing aspect of justice called contributive justice. This aspect of justice is offered as the product of a Catholic theological understanding of the nature of work and the responsibilities of wealth that opens up opportunity for expansion for future scholarship in this area.

Chapter 2 explains that contributive justice is the byproduct of the normative ethics of living in accord with the theological understanding of work and wealth expressed in Chapter 1. It offers the first multi-disciplinary and comprehensive definition of contributive justice. It explains the extant understanding of the concept of contributive justice, and it relates it to the use of the term in disciplines as far ranging as social economy, economics, political economy, sociology, bioethics, information sciences, library sciences, and agroecology. Chapter 2 explores the implications of actualizing this conception of justice, and it discusses what a system of contributive justice could look like. The concept of ideology is raised as a precursor to the broader idea of contributive justice being a normative basis for a renewed social contract.[8]

Chapter 3 makes the argument that ideas were germinating in Western societies in the post-Reformation and post-Enlightenment periods that changed the way that man understood his relationship with the world around him. Philosophers were developing ideas that challenged the established ideas of the Church in areas ranging from scientific understanding to how society was to be governed. During this time, some philosophers and political thinkers offered ways to conceptualize society through the paradigm of a social contract as a means to explain how man could live a self-interested life in community. Chapter 3 suggests that during this period, the political and religious angst in post-Reformation society

[8] This thesis does not argue for a social contract theory of justice. It uses the "social contract" as a vehicle to describe an ideal system for social cooperation. This is similar to the methodology used by John Rawls (Boucher and Kelly 1994, 8) in *A Theory of Justice* (1971).

cut off opportunities to develop what this author would argue are more authentic pathways for understanding God's plan for work and wealth. This author does not argue that man should revert to a pre-Reformation or pre-Enlightenment period to become closer to God's plan for man's ideal functioning in society/community nor does this author argue that contributive justice is a social contract theory, per se. This dissertation will use the equalitarian approach of the social contract tradition to frame how contributive justice themes can be operationalized in society. However, Chapter 3 suggests that if the arguments about man's nature and vocation as a co-worker with God are true, it is reasonable to argue that society's social contract[9] should be re-examined to include broader theological insight. Chapter 3 examines whether contributive justice could provide a moral framework for such a re-examination and re-imagination. Using insights from social psychology, this thesis suggests that contributive justice adds new insight for how men can live in dignity and solidarity as unique and contributing members of one human family. This affirmation provides a framework for re-examination.

Chapter 4 takes on the challenge of more fully developing a rubric to support understanding contributive justice as both a right and an obligation. This framework sets perimeters on how to conceptualize contributive justice to begin to understand how it could be operationalized. The rubric developed in this chapter may inspire scholars from other disciplines to test its assumptions and to find opportunities for the application of contributive justice principles, perhaps even one day finding ways to measure and account for contributive injustices.

Finally, the Conclusion synthesizes the lessons learned through the work of this thesis, and it offers insights into how contributive justice could be used to understand injustices and to provide a framework for forward movement in social change. This discussion occurs in the context of revisiting the

[9] Using the idea of the social contract here implies a metaphor of how people come together in society that in one way is political but in other dimensions could be deemed cultural. By introducing the social contract idea in Chapter 3, the author seeks to situate the discussion about contributive justice in the context of offering a philosophical basis for moral and political rights and obligations where the ultimate authoritative relationship is between man and his Creator.

final Sunday sermon of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., entitled *Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution*. The elucidation of today's modern political and social challenges is beyond the scope of this project; however, King's inspiring final sermon rings just as true today as it did in 1968. King calls us out as "co-workers with God," and he admonishes us to live up to this call. This is also the lesson of this thesis.

CHAPTER 1

A THEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF MAN'S VOCATION TO WORK AND HIS CALL TO BE A FIDUCIARY OF THE MATERIAL WORLD

> Man must humanize the earth to prepare it, so that it is really worthy of its Creator and suitable for human life. Only when the face of the earth is stamped with the imprint of man's work does it become worthy of God, for it is man alone who is called to restore the earth to God.[10]
>
> Stefan, Cardinal Wyszynski
> *All You Who Labor: Work and the Sanctification of Daily Life* (54)

The central argument of this thesis rests on the premise that the social fabric of society[11] has frayed and is in need of repair and renewal, and that the foundation of that renewal can be found by understanding and assimilating a theological understanding of the nature and vocation of mankind. The argument is that a mere patch is not sufficient to remedy the challenges that face modern society. What is needed is a new paradigm. This thesis suggests that by re-introducing a theological framework in the matrix of social theory, new insight can be derived to address some of the most challenging aspects of social instability and alienation. Much is to be gained by re-evaluating the theological richness of the Catholic social tradition as a guide to understanding man's ontological role and calling as a fiduciary of the material world;[12] it is within this tradition that we can find a solid foundation for social renewal. Taking wisdom from the Gospel writer in Matthew 9:17: "Neither is new wine put into old wineskins; if it is, the

[10] The notion of "restoring the Earth to God" is a reference to Acts 3:21 when there is a time when God returns the Earth to its original state before the fall of man. It is also a reference to Romans 8:20-21: "for creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of him who subjected it in hope; because the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God."

[11] The terms civil society, society, and material world are used interchangeably to describe man's life in community.

[12] The concept of fiduciary in this context refers to how man fulfills his moral responsibility and duty to God in the context of being a member of and working in complex societies and within a myriad of different institutional and corporate structures. This concept has implications in all domains of human activity, including environmental sustainability, human rights, and economic endeavors.

skins burst, and the wine is spilled, and the skins are destroyed; but new wine is put into fresh wineskins, and so both are preserved." This wisdom calls for a wholesale rethinking of our approach to civil society. This thinking starts with a baseline understanding of the nature of man, himself, and it then considers his vocation as servant, steward, and fiduciary of the material world.[13] Pope Saint John Paul II lays the foundation for approach in his 1991 encyclical letter *Centesimus Annus* (CA), when he introduces this notion of human-centeredness:

> In addition to the irrational destruction of the natural environment, we must also mention the more serious destruction of the human environment, something which is by no means receiving the attention it deserves. Although people are rightly worried — though much less than they should be — about preserving the natural habitats of the various animal species threatened with extinction, because they realize that each of these species makes its particular contribution to the balance of nature in general, too little effort is made to safeguard the moral conditions for an *authentic "human ecology"*. Not only has God given the earth to man, who must use it with respect for the original good purpose for which it was given to him, but man too is God's gift to man. He must therefore respect the natural and moral structure with which he has been endowed. In this context, mention should be made of the serious problems of modern urbanization, of the need for urban planning which is concerned with how people are to live, and of the attention which should be given to a *"social ecology" of work* [emphasis added]. (38)

The argument in this thesis relates to seeking to develop a foundational approach to re-orienting society toward a deliberative, authentic human centeredness.[14]

This chapter considers the uniqueness of man and his bridge to the immaterial as a way of understanding the wholeness of the life of the world.[15] The argument of this thesis is that a holistic view

[13] The concept of material world used in this thesis is meant to denote the distinction between the *material* or created world that God gave to man and the *spiritual world*. A full discussion of the interconnectedness of these to concepts is beyond the scope of this project.

[14] The concept of human-centeredness or human-centered systems originated with the software engineer and trade unionist Mike Cooley (1989), whose work centers on the social impacts of technology, particularly in relation to preservation and enhancements of human skills. Using the term authentic is simply suggestive of being of genuine nature, which is to suggest deliberative.

[15] Wholeness of life in the world begins with where all life begins—at conception, the moment of first existence. Beyond this foundation, wholeness of life is suggestive of all aspects of man's life; this is his interior life as well as his interactions within systems of community as small as personal relationships to as broad as his experience as a

of man as a contributing actor in the world provides foundational insights into a new paradigm for social order. It then considers man's call to be a **co-worker**[16] with God in the world and the implications of this dynamic responsibility, in both the work of action and the work of contemplation, resulting in a new understanding of the notion of vocation.[17] The chapter is in conversation with the Catholic tradition in the examination of Scripture, the writings of the Church Fathers, and Magisterial teaching as it relates to understanding the theological nature of work and wealth. This examination considers the Catholic conceptualization of the universal destination of goods and the interconnection with a Catholic understanding of the role of private property and the social mortgage inherent in all the goods of the earth. The chapter then turns to an integration of the Catholic understanding of wealth in both its material and immaterial senses which assists in presenting the argument that man's spiritual call is to flourish, and that it is through his work and investment in the world that man and the world are renewed.[18] From here, the stage is set for an understanding of the ethical demands of such a world view, and how these ethical demands are met by a conceptualization of justice that is rooted in the call on man to work and to invest so that all may flourish: as an aspect of justice called contributive justice.[19] These insights are drawn from an examination of Scripture, the writings of the Church Fathers, papal encyclicals, and other Magisterial documents within the Catholic tradition of social justice. Chapter 1 sets out the theological foundation for

member of much larger communities. This expression is meant to convey both the immaterial and the material aspects of existence consistent with Pope Saint John Paul II's notion of human ecology.

[16] The concept of co-worker is central to the analytical framework of this thesis and is rooted in Saint Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians (3:8-9) when he discusses the work of the evangelists in terms of being God's "fellow workers" and as such being an example to all mankind. See Section 1.1 for further discussion.

[17] The concept of vocation is explored in the general sense of man's vocation as a co-worker with God; this is not vocation in the broader sense of the term.

[18] Work is understood as the action of man, his contribution. Investment in this context means the recycling of resources back into the process of work such that it provides opportunities for increased and expanded contribution, the goal of which is flourishing, which is meant to be the advancement of human capacity in all its facets.

[19] Chapter 2 derives a comprehensive definition of contributive justice that is based upon the theological discussion in this chapter and based upon a review of the use of the term contributive justice in other disciplines outside theology.

contributive justice. Chapter 2 develops a definition of contributive justice, and Chapter 3 establishes its importance as a moral foundation (see Appendix 2).

1.1 ONTOLOGICAL VIEW OF MAN—BODY AND SOUL

As Christian theologians and ethicists, we receive our first insights about man directly from Scripture. In Genesis 1:27, we are given a description of man as having been created in the image and likeness of God. The full richness of this description is fulfilled in the incarnation of God the Father, the first person of the Holy Trinity, in the second person of the Holy Trinity, God the Son, who took on flesh to become man—fully human and fully divine. It is through the incarnation that man can begin to grasp his own nature and the richness of the human experience.

French theologian, Marie-Dominique Chenu, OP (1895-1990) sought to explain the implication of man's creation in the image and likeness of God in his *Theology of Work* when he stressed that man is a "composite of spirit and matter" (Chenu 1963, 23).[20] The body and the soul belong together as one.[21] Just as we understand the consubstantial nature of the Father and the Son in our understanding of the Holy Trinity, Chenu reminds us that the body and spirit are "consubstantial, one through and in the other" (ibid.). This understanding of the consubstantiality of man's body and spirit is critical to an understanding

[20] Chenu uses the term spirit in the context of the classical theological use of the term derived from Saint Paul's usage in 1 Thessalonians 5:23: "May the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your *spirit and soul* and body be kept sound and blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (emphasis added). In this sense, as explained in CCC 367, the terms soul and spirit *do not suggest a duality in the soul*. Rather, these terms help to express the understanding that the soul gives life to the body (or matter) which is to say makes it alive. In this way, we can understand soul as the animating device in both humans and all other living things, whereas, the term spirit relates to the aspects of human life that do not depend on the human body, which itself is the channel through which the soul is opened to the supernatural life of grace and communion with God. Spirit, then, is the channel given to man to guide his soul toward God. This distinction relates to Plato's tripartite theory of the soul from Book IV of *The Republic*, where he relates reason, spirit, and appetite. This issue takes on particular significance in the role of the Incarnation in the plan of salvation. See the Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the World (*Gaudium et Spes* [GS], 22) from the Second Vatican Council (*Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World* 1965).

[21] In Pope Benedict XVI's 2005 encyclical letter *Deus Caritas Est*, 5, the term soul is used in a more short-hand way to capture the essence of what earlier theologians denote as spirit—or what might be expressed in modern language as a spiritual soul when he writes: "[t]his is due first and foremost to the fact that man is a being made up of body and soul. Man is truly himself when his body and soul are intimately united" This author does not argue that Pope Benedict XVI is making any change to major theological arguments with the use of the term soul. Therefore, this author uses the term in this context for ease of understanding for the modern reader.

of man's "consubstantiality of (spiritual) free will *and* [emphasis added] (material, technical and economic) determinism" (ibid.). Chenu continues, "work is a 'human' creation by the conjunction of developing techniques and an awareness of free will" (ibid.).

Here is where Chenu (1963) calls out Descartes and Newton for their failure to appreciate and understand the consequences of not seeing the innately composite nature of the body and the soul of man. Writing in the late nineteenth century, Chenu identifies these Enlightenment thinkers as "technocrats" who have "deprived the world of its divinities by making it inanimate" (63). Chenu has identified what this author argues is an important axial point in philosophy.[22] Chenu was responding to what Pope Pius X termed the heresy of Modernism in his 1907 encyclical *Pascendi Dominci Gregis* (Feeding the Lord's Flock: On the Doctrines of the Modernists).[23] Chenu's approach to going back to original sources (Scripture and the Church Fathers–or, in French, a pedagogy expressed in the term *ressourcement*)–is rooted in what Chenu calls the "fundamental relationship between man and nature." Chenu places primacy on the Greek notion of *techne*, as it endeavors to capture the relationship between man and nature in the metaphor of a "microcosm" in which "work" is understood as "an intrinsic function of the incarnate spirit" (112-13). On this point, Chenu supports and builds upon the argument of the seventh-

[22] Anthropologist David Graeber, author of *Debt: The First 5,000 Years*, and Time Magazine's 2011 Person of the Year for his role in organizing the Occupy Movement, has resurrected German existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers's notion of Axial Age. Graeber (2014, 223) explains the importance of this idea in *Debt*, when he describes how certain ideas are formed in response or in opposition to forces in history that are at play across diverse locations and geographic loci of interaction. This author argues that Chenu's ideas may well have arisen in light of the post-Modern backlash within the Catholic Church, or it could be argued by those of faith in providence that his work was simply in conversation with the Holy Spirit. However, history credits Chenu as being the father of the *Ressourcement* Movement and one of the important influences in the theological debates during the Second Vatican Council (Flynn et al. 2013).

[23] As is evidenced by Chenu's response, the Catholic Church was under tremendous pressure to address to the seismic rattling of a world in ideological transition. The Church was very critical of Chenu's hermeneutical approach of *ressourcement*, but this author recognizes as vindication the prominence of Chenu's ideas as the support for renewal to come in the course of the reforms of the Second Vatican Council.

century Eastern theologian Saint Maximus the Confessor[24] (c. 580-662) and his metaphor of man as a microcosm to explain the nature of man and the bridge to the immaterial.[25]

Pope Saint John Paul II, in *Laborem Exercens* (LE), expands upon this important point about human nature when he describes man as being "a subjective being capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of deciding about himself and with a tendency to self-realization" (6). This concept of self-realization is the key concept in understanding the role and importance of the theological concept of free will.[26] Using this logic, we can begin to see the very nexus of man's worth and dignity: his endowment of agency having been made in the image and likeness of his Creator who is pure will.[27] Just as God's actions as the Creator confer an understanding of an aspect of God the Father, there is something about man that is learned through his actions of doing. What is understood is man as co-worker (co-adjutor) and beloved, adopted son.[28] It is man's work that enables him to exercise his free will to determine how he will collaborate and cooperate with God. LE explains that "as a [man] he works, he performs various actions belonging to the work process; of their objective content, these actions must all serve to realize his

[24] He was known as Maximus the Theologian and Maximus of Constantinople as "one of the chief doctors of the theology of the Incarnation," and he is venerated by both the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches (Chapman 1911).
[25] For further discussion of how theology is the comprehensive science, see Chenu's *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century*.
[26] This connection is expressed in Eric Steven Dale's (1991) book *Bringing Heaven Down to Earth: A Practical Spirituality of Work* when he writes: "[I]t is our free will and rationality which reflects God in each and every person" (77). Cf. Article 3 of CCC: "Man's Freedom."
[27] Genesis 1:27.
[28] 1 Corinthians 3:9; Ephesians 1:5. See also Galatians 4:5 and Romans 8:15 and 8:23. It is in this relationship that man finds his dignity.

humanity, to fulfil the calling to be a person that is his by reason of his very humanity." (ibid.).[29] [30] It is through this freedom that man is also subject to his obligation and responsibility.[31]

1.2 MAN AND THE BRIDGE TO THE IMMATERIAL

Saint Maximus the Confessor's theology is anchored in the period and circumstances in which he wrote.[32] Saint Maximus offered an anthropological view of man not simply as a "being" but as a "microcosm" who reflects the composition of the created universe. Saint Maximus went on to explain that man is also a mediator as created in God's image whose vocation in Christ is to reunite the spiritual and the temporal into a harmonized unit. Pope Saint John Paul II explains this phenomenon in LE as one of "the fundamental truths about man, in the context of the mystery of creation itself … of the creator's original covenant with creation in man" (4).

Referencing an unknown twelfth-century French author, Chenu shares an understanding from Catholic tradition that explains that "[m]an is precisely the being who, indissolubly and consubstantially matter and spirit, is fitting thereby to carry into history the mystery of the spirit." He goes on to note that "[a]n old mediaeval theologian said that God, desiring to extend his love to all, in a creative expansion, could only do so through and in an original being who, united to matter, would carry love's destiny even

[29] Genesis 1:28.

[30] Pope Francis's 2015 encyclical letter Laudato Si (LS) seeks to address the idea of "dominion" to clarify the understanding of this term. In LS, dominion is understood in the context of man's role as steward and caretaker of the Earth. This understanding of dominion makes clearer man's obligation to God to exercise the right use of his intellect to care and utilize the gifts and fruits of the Earth for God's purpose: the common good (LS, 67). Pope Francis reminds us that the Earth belongs to God and that the command in Genesis 2:15 to "till" means to cultivate, plough, and work, and to "keep" means to care, oversee, protect, and preserve (ibid.).

[31] In the discussion of freedom and its responsibilities, CCC explains that "[f]reedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary. Progress in virtue, knowledge of the good, and ascesis enhance the mastery of the will over its acts." The idea is that God gave man free will so that "agency" would be available to him so as to provide for the "possibility of choosing between good and evil" (1734). The concept of agency is important to understanding the notion of subsidiarity, which is discussed later in this chapter and addressed in Chapter 2 as one of the core aspects of contributive justice.

[32] During the seventh century, theologians were grappling with understanding the nature of Christ as expressed in 451 AD at the Council of Chalcedon in which the Church expressed Christ as having two natures—being both fully human and fully divine—the denial of which would become known as the heresy of monophysitism (denial of two natures). This council also dealt with the Nestorian heresy that denied two persons of Christ. Later in 681, the 3rd Council of Constantinople dealt with the heresy of monothelitism (denial of two wills of Christ).

into matter" (Chenu 1963, 18). In the same vein, Chenu attributes to Saint Irenaeus (c. 130 AD) a formula that comports to this understanding of man suggesting that the formula for social evolution is that "God created matter in time, in order that man, nurtured in matter, should crown it with immortality" (104). These same notions are echoed by the Second Vatican Council's *Gaudium et Spes* (GS) and Pope Saint John Paul II in LE when noting that "by the subjection of all things to man, the name of the God would be wonderful in all the earth" (GS, 34; LE, 25).[33]

In his analysis of this issue, Protestant theologian Miroslav Volf takes as his starting point Genesis 2:5.[34] He explains the relationship between God's creation and human work, and he posits that "[t]he growth of vegetation demands cooperation between God, who gives rain, and human beings, who cultivate the ground. There is a mutual dependence between God and human beings in the task of the preservation of creation" (Volf 1991, 99). Volf also argues for interdependence between God and man as it relates to the workings of the material world. He posits not only that human beings are dependent on God (Psalm 127:1; Psalm 65:11-13), but also that God the Creator (in a way) "chooses to become 'dependent' on the human helping hand and makes human work a means of accomplishing his work in the world" (ibid.). Volf offers an interesting metaphor of Martin Luther's to emphasize his point, quoting Luther as saying that human work is "God's mask behind which he hides himself and rules everything magnificently in the world" (ibid.). In this way, we can begin to understand how man's transforming of the material goods of the Earth not only can perfect the Earth, but also can perfect man,[35] and in so doing,

[33] The idea of subjecting all things to man relates to Chenu's notion of man being nurtured by matter, in that by giving man agency over matter/things of the Earth, God enables man to use the things of the Earth for his own perfection—man's perfection being the beatific vision, true human flourishing.
[34] Genesis 2:5: "when no plant of the field was yet in the earth and no her of the field had yet sprung up—for the Lord God had not caused it to rain upon the earth, and there was no man to till the ground."
[35] Perfection in this sense is understood as an endpoint of the process of improvement, a continual process whose end is only ultimately realized in the beatific vision.

enables him to grow and work to perfect his capacities. This, then, sets up the scenario in which man maximizes his potential to flourish.[36]

Ultimately, Chenu (1963, 24) argues that when "God is made man; all that is human is material for grace. If work takes on human consistency, then (but only then), it becomes part of, enters in the economy of grace." This suggests that there is a two-fold entry, "first as the work of man, and secondly as the origin of a community which is itself a matter for grace. The continuing incarnation; the Mystical Body of Christ; such will be the future classic theme of a spirituality in which the world of work will find its level and its place in Christianity, and not by the acquisition of merits alone" (ibid.). This idea is powerful and transformative, and it is instructive in understanding the power and dignity of work. This insight provides the basis for linking the immaterial to the material through the actions of humanity in the world.

1.3 WORK AS THE KEY TO THE SOCIAL QUESTION

In Genesis 2:15, we find one of the founding principles of human life: the duty to work.[37] This is the place in Scripture where we learn that God put man in the Garden of Eden and commissioned him to work, not as a burden, but as a source of dignity. The commission is to fulfill God's command on the sixth day of creation, in Genesis 1:28, when God mandates that man and woman "[b]e fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it" This was a direct call to care for and cultivate the earth as a fiduciary.

LE explains that to understand the notion of subduing the earth, we must consider its meaning to reflect "all the resources that the earth (and indirectly the visible world) contain and which, through the conscious activity of man, can be discovered and used for his ends" (4). Pope Saint John Paul II emphasizes that the process of subduing the earth through work is a universal process that "embraces all human beings, every generation, every phase of economic and cultural development, and at the same time it is

[36] In this way, we see that "work tends to give new values to things, that it adapts them to our needs. *Appropriateness and usefulness* are therefore the stimuli to work, just as they are the criteria of its worth" (Wyszynski 1995, 9) [emphasis added].
[37] Genesis 2:15: "And the Lord God took man and put him in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it."

a process that takes place within each human being, in each conscious human subject" (ibid.). It is important to remember, however, as Wyszynski points out, that man is a creature in God's service. "He [God] is, in this way, binding us to the earth and at the same time obliging us to work and cooperate with Him, so that the earth will really be subject to man, and through man, to God" (Wyszynski 1995, 52). As such, "[m]an is the image of God partly through the mandate received from his creator to subdue, to dominate, the earth. In carrying out this mandate, man, every human being, reflects the very action of the creator of the universe" (LE, 4).

Just as we know of God the Father through this work of creation, so too do we know man in his vocation as a worker. It is not until the third chapter of Genesis that work is ever described as a chore or toilsome. Although sin banished man from Paradise, it did not exempt him from his duty to work, because work is inherent in his nature.[38]

1.4 WHAT IS WORK?

The Introduction to the 1981 papal encyclical LE offers a broad definition of work, and it describes work as "any activity by man, whether manual or intellectual, whatever its nature or circumstances; it means a human activity that can and must be recognized as work, in the midst of all the many activities of which man is capable and to which he is predisposed by his very nature, by virtue of humanity itself" (1). What LE teaches is that the Catholic Church recognizes that all aspects of man's activity in the world

[38] After the fall, work becomes a challenge "which is the normal consequence of the corruption of the mind and the will through sin" (Wyszynski 1995, 24).

constitute a broad and comprehensive definition of what it means to work. ***Simply said: work is man's life and action in the world.***[39] [40]

In referencing Vatican II's GS, LE points to the notion that the awareness of man's participation (through his work) should "permeate … even the most ordinary everyday activities" (LE, 25, quoting GS, 34). Pope Saint John Paul II reiterates this idea in his 2001 letter to the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace when he stresses that "[a]s long as man exists, there will be the free gesture of authentic participation in creation which is work. Work is one of the essential components in realizing the vocation of man who, in fulfilling himself, always discovers that he is called by God to 'dominate the earth'" (Pope Saint John Paul II 2001). It is through his own acts of being and doing that man exercises his freedom to be a human being. Pope Saint John Paul II stresses that "[d]espite himself, he [man] can never cease to be 'a subject that decides about himself' (LE, 6). To him God has entrusted this supreme and demanding freedom" (ibid.). In this way, we can understand how Pope Saint John Paul II could reach the conclusion that "work is the key to the social question" (LE, 3). ***Man will be enabled to fulfill his capacity to contribute to the life of the world.***[41]

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[39] Defining "work" this way enables the capture of two important ideas. First, the concept of "life" is important to this definition because it emphasizes the importance of the notion of existence; this is important in later discussions about the value of contribution. Second, the concept "action in the world" is a way of expressing the idea that *action* does not necessarily mean physical motion. It simply refers to the movement or effectuation of the will. This definition is established so as to recast the definition of work in a way that would incorporate the importance and value of leisure. In this conceptualization, "leisure" could be defined as "work" in the sense that it is a state in which man is exercising his will to direct his *action for his own benefit* (i.e. the replenishment of mind and body). In this way, man is rejuvenated to make other types of work more fruitful. The ultimate expression of this idea is God's gift of the sabbath (Mark 2:27).

[40] German Philosopher Josef Pieper in *Leisure and Its Threefold Opposition* (1989, 137-38) warns of the "overvaluation" of the "social function of work." He is addressing the false notion of work put forth in the ideology of Adolf Hitler, where Hitler professes the ideology that "[a]ny activity is meaningful, even a criminal activity; all passivity, in contrast is meaningless" (Ibid). For Pieper, there is a danger in thinking this way. By putting the emphasis on the will and the spiritual dimension of wealth, this author seeks to address Pieper's concern. However, this author credits Pieper for offering great insight into this and other dangers, including the risk of inadvertently providing a justification for any manner of labor abuses.

[41] The term "life of the world" is used to express the idea of the collective lives of all of humanity in the here and now: the temporal understanding of *telos* and human flourishing. Although beyond the scope of this project, the concept of life of the world leaves open for later discussion the expression of life in the world in terms of being able to distinguish between the ultimate *telos* of man being the beatific vision. This leaves a space to discuss to explore the spiritual dividend afforded by a life of virtue.

In contributing to the workings of the world, man is inherently united with others, because in work there is a "social power: the power to build a community" (LE, 20).[42] In our work, we share in a common workbench: our work sustains us and those for whom we are charged to care, and our every effort is built upon the work of those who came before us.[43] The US Conference of Catholic Bishops, in its 1986 pastoral letter entitled *Economic Justice for All*, reminds us that any genuine respect for human dignity must "cultivate and strengthen the bonds of solidarity among us" (70). In LE, we are reminded that the mandate that man must work comes to man from God (and is for man) so that he may fulfill his obligations to others in terms of his family responsibilities, in terms of his obligations of solidarity as a member of a society, and as an heir to the work of those who have come before him. These responsibilities shape the moral basis for an obligation to work, just as they also imbue moral rights (LE, 16).

The Christian faith offers a powerful way of understanding this interconnectedness. As social beings we are members of one body: the body of Christ. Each person has immeasurable worth and dignity. Each person is endowed with his own uniqueness and purpose. As such, each is a necessary and worthy part of the whole body and creation. This bond of solidarity is best exemplified in the Eucharist.

> It is here, at the table, that the multi-hued church (the body of Christ) is brought together in fellowship. The shared bread and wine is the visible embodiment of the bandied-about slogan: unity in diversity. Coming from diverse cultures and walks of life Christians are unified by sharing from the one loaf. By partaking of the body of Christ each Christian, and all of them (us), becomes, in truth, part of that very body. "You are what you eat." The Eucharist is the sharing, actually and symbolically, of the fruits of our labor. (Dale 1991, 79)

[42] Conversely, it could be argued that work also has the power to diminish or harm communities. Work becomes additive when done in the spirit of contributive justice—as discussed in Chapters 2-4 of this thesis.

[43] In his work on the spirituality of work, Eric Steven Dale (1991, 78) notes that "[t]here is a relationship between people that needs to be cultivated and strengthened because it is part of our very nature as humans. We are social beings. You cannot be human by yourself. It requires others; other persons."

In fact, we are instructed by the author of the Epistle to the Colossians in 3:23 "[w]hatever your task, work heartily, as serving the Lord and not men." After all, it is the fruit of the vine and work of human hands that becomes God among us.

1.5 AN EARLY CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF WORK

Even before the Incarnation, man knew of God's role as a worker. Not only did man know God as the creator of the universe, but also the author of the psalms reminds us of the loving work of God and our call to give thanks and praise for His works.[44] However, in the Incarnation, when Jesus was asked about the work of God, he replied that "the work of God is this: to believe in the one He has sent" (John 6:29). As the second person of the Holy Trinity, God's work was that of redemption. Jesus reminds us that the work of God never ends: " My Father is working still, and I am working" (John 5:17).[45] As a carpenter and during his ministry, he worked in the world, and he knew the world. This experience enabled Him to teach man about God and the plan of salvation through the knowledge of a lived experience in the world. In this way, each of his parables reflects a keen understanding of how man experienced working in the world so that the lessons of God's redemptive love could be better understood.[46]

In choosing his disciples, Jesus chose men of work—fishermen, a tax collector, a zealot, a thief, and later a scholar and tentmaker. These were the men whom God chose to continue his work of evangelization and the spreading of the Good News. By their example, the early Christian communities

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[44] Psalm 111:2-3.

[45] In this way, Jesus gave humanity the divine teaching on work through living what we have come to call the "works of mercy" that guide our "charitable actions" whereby we give both *material* and *spiritual* aid to our neighbor (CCC, 2447, cf. Isaiah 58: 6-7 and Hebrews 13:3). The material aid is referred to as "corporal works of mercy" and includes "feeding the hungry, sheltering the homeless, clothing the naked, visiting the sick and imprisoned… burying the dead." (ibid., cf. Matthew 25:31-46). One additional corporal work of mercy is highlighted as being most important and efficacious; this act is "giving alms to the poor." This work is so important that it is also highlighted as a "work of justice." (ibid., cf. Tobit 4:5-11, Sirach 17:22, and Matthew 6:2-4). The spiritual aid is referred to as the "spiritual works of mercy" and consists of "[i]nstructing, advising, consoling, comforting… and "forgiving and bearing wrongs patiently" (ibid.).

[46] Through the Incarnation, Jesus teaches man that the nature of his work is renewed. He explains this in Matthew 6:25-34, when he implores us not to be anxious about our lives. Jesus understands man's fragility but calls on a deep faith so as to live in a new and radical way.

could witness God's plan for life and work. We learn in the Apostle Paul's letter to the Ephesians that we should work not only for our own sustenance, but also so as not to steal (or have to steal) and to fulfill the obligation to care for the poor among us.[47] Paul also admonishes against idleness in his Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, when he suggests that if you are not willing to work, you should not eat.[48] In this way, the apostles were living examples of how we should fulfill our obligations to live in the image and likeness of God.

One of the most transformative contributions to social life offered by the early Christians was the cultural elevation of work. We see this expressed in the command to all Christians in James 2:17 to have a faith witnessed by action: "So by faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead." It is a call to work and a call to action. This is in stark contrast to the philosophy of the Roman pagans, who despised the idea of work for fear of taxing or hurting the body, not in any way contributory to personal or social development.[49] [50] So radical was this idea that whole new ways of life began to emerge. The Christian world emphasized the importance of uniting spiritual and physical work. We see, as an example, Saint Pachomius (c. 292-348) in fourth-century Egypt, whose cenobitic monastic practice focused on life in community; his spirituality was rooted in the notion of service in support of the poor.[51] Pachomius taught that the "community's

[47] Ephesians 4:28.
[48] 2 Thessalonians 3:10.
[49] This idea is expressed in the philosophy of Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE). Mary Beard, in *SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome*, explains that "Cicero turned his scorn on those who worked for a living: 'The cash that comes from selling your labour is vulgar and unacceptable for a gentleman … for wages are effectively the bonds of slavery.'" Beard explains that wage labor was considered dishonorable because in Roman culture a gentleman was to live off of the profits of his estate and not by his labor. Her argument rests on the Latin vocabulary " the desired state of humanity was *otium* (not so much 'leisure', as it is usually translated, but the state of being in control of one's own time); 'business' of any kind was its undesirable opposite, *negotium* ('not *otium*')." (Beard 2015, 76)
[50] In *Through the Eye of A Needle: Wealth, the Fall of Rome, and the Making of Christianity in the West, 350-550 AD*, historian Peter Brown offers a history of the impact of wealth on the development of the early churches in the Latin West. His is a study of not only history and religion but also "material culture" (xxviii). He posits that Roman culture shifted significantly in the first five centuries of the Christian era with some of the change attributed to theological issues introduced by Christianity and some attributed to the reality that the wealth of the era was still derived from land, and with a growing population the ability to convert land into food and rent brought not only wealth, but also privilege and power (P. Brown 2012, 3-30).
[51] Further discussion can be found in Veilleux (1981).

possessions really belonged to God; the community itself possessed nothing. Thus, sharing with the poor is not a virtue, it is the normal thing to do" (Brésard and Wood, 5, IV). By the sixth century, Saint Benedict had developed his monastic rule, which stresses that manual labor and contemplation are complementary under the mantra of "*ora et labora*."[52] In this way, Christianity lifts up work and links it with God. From this linkage flows the whole blessing of work—as the Psalmist in 128:2 proclaims: "You shall eat the fruit of the labor of your hands; you shall be happy, and it shall be well with you." Such an inspiration sparked others to join in the monastic way of life, including, by the twelfth century, Cistercians and their lay brethren in agricultural work (Bouchard 1991), and in the thirteenth century, the Humiliati in the early trade guilds (Epstein 1991).

Ever since Jesus' time on Earth, the call to action (work) in faith has been a struggle. Recall the two sisters Martha and Mary from the Gospel of Luke.[53] In this story, we see a juxtaposition of the action-oriented Martha with the contemplative-oriented Mary—each with a different orientation as to how they work and serve. Jesus' reaction to these women showed that each mode of service is praiseworthy and interrelated.[54] Volf (1991, 70) agrees, and he contends that "we treat them as two basic, alternating aspects of the Christian life that may differ in importance but that cannot be reduced one to another, and that form an inseparable unity."

However, Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) maintained a more pessimistic and reductionist view of work. He suggests that the only real reason to work is to have all the necessities of life, which then makes the contemplation of God possible (Aquinas n.d.b, II-II, Q. 179, A. 2; see Aquinas, n.d.a, III 135, 13).

[52] For Saint Benedict, the idea of "*ora et labora*" was a way of expressing a way of living a Christian life in community. However, it can be argued that Benedict had a broad understanding of work. Although the mantra of his community was *ora et labora*, this was a distinction without a difference when considering the idea of spiritual work expressed in Chapter 47 of the *Rule of Saint Benedict*. Here the term "work of God" (o*pus Dei*) is used when referring to the abbot's responsiblity to call the brothers to the "work of God in choir and to appoint chanters and readers" (Hebermann 1913).

[53] Luke 10:38-42

[54] In the story of Martha and Mary, Jesus emphasizes that Mary's decision to stop and listen to Jesus, even amidst her obligations of hospitality, was the right and good decision (Luke 38:42) and admonished Martha not to be anxious in her work (Luke 38:41).

He argues that in having the necessities, man can quiet himself and direct "the internal passions of the soul," because "it is impossible for one to be busy with external action and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation" (Aquinas n.d.b, II-II, Q. 182, A. 3, 4). Unfortunately, this position would render it difficult for the poor and marginalized to participate fully in the work of loving and serving God, because their efforts are expended in just managing to survive daily life. On the other hand, Aquinas may also be making a strong point for the importance of economic and social justice by saying that when others take care to elevate people from precarious positions, it enables the marginalized to direct their thoughts and concern more fully toward God.[55]

1.6 WORK, CHARISMS, AND A PNEUMATOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF WORK

One of the axial points in history that distinctly impacts our Christian understanding of the ontological nature of work came in Martin Luther's *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* (Luther and Helfferich, 2018, 48-57). One of the three main points of this work was to criticize the then-prevalent notion that there was a chasm between the sacred and the secular. This division was represented, in the medieval Church, by the view that a vocation or a calling referred to official church work.[56] Luther was endeavoring to capture and make practical the call to the idea of a priesthood of all believers (1 Peter 2: 5-9). Later in 1520, Luther followed up with another work entitled *On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church* (Luther and Steinhaeuser 2018), in which he made some of his sharpest criticisms of the Catholic Church and the sacraments, but in which he also affirmatively acknowledged and lifted up the dignity and spiritual nature of all work when he wrote that: "the works of the monks and priests, however holy and arduous they may be, do not differ one whit in the sight of God from the works of the rustic laborer in the

[55] Saint Thomas was warning of the stress and distraction of subsistence living. By the sixteenth century, the Jesuit charism had begun to address an aspect of this idea by integrating the active care and concern for the well-being of our neighbors with our common call to love God.

[56] In his *Callings: Twenty Centuries of Christian Wisdom on Vocations*, William Placher (2005) explains that the term vocation in the early Church referenced man's call to be Christian. However, as Christianity gained more dominance in medieval times, the connotation evolved to the question of what type of Christian a person was called to be, and vocation at this time referred to either the priestly or the monastic life.

field or the woman going about her household tasks, but that all works are measured before God by faith alone" (Luther and Steinhaeuser 2018, 61).

In this way, Luther was challenging the medieval idea that vocation was a call to a particular type of religious life. His priesthood of all believers approach democratized vocation such that it could be seen as manifest on two levels. First, every Christian had a universal and internal/spiritual vocation to enter the Kingdom of God. Second, each Christian had an external vocation that corresponded to his station in life and that manifested itself in that person's unique work in serving man to the glory of God. In this way, man could use his efforts to love his neighbor—whether in the Church, the home, or any work that God has called him to do.[57]

Luther's conception of vocation has had a significant impact on the dialog about the spiritual understanding of work. It has given rise to some legitimate challenges worth noting, particularly in light of what might be construed as a Thomistic stance against an ontological view of work. For example, Volf (1991, 107-8) criticizes Luther's conception of vocation because it can lead to (1) an "indifference toward [the] alienation of work," (2) a "dangerous ambiguity about Luther's notion of vocation" that risks linking too closely *call* to *vocation* and vocation to *occupation* so as to set up a "consecration of the vocational-occupational structure," (3) a suggestion that "every employment is a place of service to God," which seeks to "ennoble dehumanizing work" instead of offering a mechanism for change and improvement, and (4) a conception of vocation that is not relevant to a "mobile industrial and information society."[58] [59]

Volf (1991, 108) has called out a very important argument against a vocational approach to work, opining that having multiple jobs or sources of employment is inconsistent with Luther's "one irrevocable

[57] Placher discusses this issue when in *Callings* he explains that the legacy of Luther on vocation is that God has called all of us to work of some kind as an opportunity to be of service to our neighbor. (See Mark 12:31: "The second is this, 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.' There is no other commandment greater than these.")
[58] Volf's criticisms each seem to have an inherent warning against marginalization and discrimination.
[59] Part of this argument also relates to the time period of Luther's writing when vocations were seen to relate to the place and station in life that a person was born into.

external calling."[60] The consequence of this, Volf argues, is that the notion of vocation has been reduced to the concept of gainful employment. Volf argues that this line of logic is dangerous, because "[t]he reduction of vocation to employment, coupled with the belief that vocation is the primary service ordinary people render to God [has] contributed to the modern fateful elevation of work to the status of religion" (109). Dale (1991, 84) argues that what has been lost in Luther's view of work as vocation is the loss of "the proper relationship between the end and the means of human life. Growing toward perfection came to be judged by growing abundance and material possessions rather than growing in grace and inner transformation." This is especially the case with the Calvinists.

An alternative approach is to introduce the notion of charisma as it relates to a holistic theological understanding of work. The notion of charism offers a pneumatology that elevates work and locates it within the sphere of the Holy Spirit.[61] Work is normalized as part of a calling on humanity to "live in accordance with the kingdom [manifested] in the multiple gifts of the Spirit [given] to each individual" (Volf 1991, 113).[62] The Second Vatican Council offered an approach similar similar to this in GS, when admonishing that "the gifts of the Spirit are diverse.… He summons … [people] to dedicate themselves to the earthly service of men and to make ready the material of the celestial realm by this ministry of theirs" (38). In this way, mankind identifies, nourishes, and develops its own capacities and gifts of the spirit to

[60] Volf (1991, 113) argues that there is only a "general calling to enter the kingdom of God," and that the accompanying "calling to live in accordance with the kingdom branches out in the multiple gifts of the Spirit to each individual."

[61] Charism denotes an aspect of work as an endowment given by the Holy Spirit. When man can understand work in the context of a charism, he can then begin to understand how the notion of grace can permeate his actions (CCC 799). We are introduced to this idea in the messianic prophecy of Isaiah 11: 1-3: "There shall come forth a shoot from the stump of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots. And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and the fear of the Lord. And his delight shall be in the fear of the Lord. He shall not judge by what his eyes see, or decide by what his ears hear." This prophecy points to Jesus Christ as the model for the work of mankind (*work, as action*). Saint Thomas Aquinas elaborates further in the *Summa Theologica*, when he specifically enumerates (1) wisdom, (2) understanding, (3) counsel, (4) fortitude, (5) knowledge, (6) piety, and (7) fear of God as distinct and specific gifts and forms of charism.

[62] These are supernatural aids (habits or dispositions) to assist man in his perfection. They are meant to help man as he matures in the theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) and the moral virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance).

contribute to the Kingdom in ways uniquely its own that are manifested uniquely during all phases of life. In this way, we more richly discover the universal call of human solidarity. In this way, we may live the reality that each man is unique and different and complementary and necessary in the functioning of the whole—each a member of the Body of Christ in which we live by the truth that "[i]f one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored, all rejoice together" (1 Corinthians 12:26). In this way, we honor the solidarity of all mankind.

1.7 THE VARIOUS NATURES OF WORK

The Catholic social tradition is clear that work is in the very nature of man. "Work bears a particular mark of man and of humanity, the mark of a person operating within a community of persons. And this mark decided its interior characteristics; in a sense it constitutes its very nature" (LE, 1). Pope Saint John Paul II, in LE, teaches that work has three dimensions: subjective, objective, and social. Each dimension offers insight into not only what work is, but also how work should be approached. The subjective dimension of work is simply the work, itself, is considered as an activity of the human person. LE reminds us that "[a]s man, through his work, becomes more and more the master of the earth, and as he confirms his dominion over the visible world, again through his work, he nevertheless remains in every case and at every phase of this process within the Creator's original ordering. And this ordering remains necessarily and indissolubly linked with the fact that man was created, as male and female, 'in the image of God'" (4). As a subjective being, man is uniquely capable of "acting in a planned and rational way," thus being capable of self-realization and actualization (6). Man is "the true subject of work with an initiative of his own" (15). In this way, work "must all serve to realize [man's] humanity, to fulfill the calling to be a person that is his by reason of his very humanity" (ibid.). From this perspective we see that work is very good for man, because "through work man not only transforms nature, adapting it to his own needs, but he also achieves fulfillment as a human being and indeed in a sense becomes 'more a human being'" (LE, 9). Irrespective of its lesser or greater objective value, work is an expression of the person doing the

work—an *actus personae* (act of the person). In this way, the human person is the measure of the dignity of work. LE reiterates that "human work has an ethical value of its own, which clearly and directly remains linked to the fact that the one who carries it out is a person" (6). LE makes the argument that "[o]n the basis of his work each person is fully entitled to consider himself a part-owner of the great workbench at which he is working with everyone else. A way toward that goal could be found by associating labor with the ownership of capital" (14). It is from this premise that work is given its ethical nature.[63]

In contrast, the objective dimension of work refers to the work itself—as opposed to the person doing the work. This objective dimension of work is what LE asserts as the "contingent aspect of human activity, which constantly varies in its expressions according to the changing technological, cultural, social and political conditions" (6). This is the aspect of work that is derived from the call in Genesis 1:28: "… Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it." As we have moved from an agricultural-- to an industrial society-- to a more technologically based society, the core idea behind the objective dimension of work still holds true. The multiplying, filling, and subduing is being done with greater speed, broader diversity of inputs, and with a wider range of sophistication.

Finally, the social dimension of work relates to the reality that a person's work is fundamentally connected with that of other people. The fruits of work give rise to opportunities for interaction, relationship, and encounter with others. In CA, Pope Saint John Paul II reminds us that "work is work with others and work for others" (31). In such a way, work makes "it possible to found a family" and, as such, to "influence the whole process of education in the family for the very reason that everyone 'becomes a human being' through, among other things, work, and becoming a human being is precisely the main purpose of the whole process of education" (LE, 10). This points to the virtue of industriousness. As such, work is good for man, and it leads to fulfillment and flourishing (LE, 9).

[63] The subjective nature of work is given its ethical nature by virtue of the fact that this is the aspect of work rooted in man himself. This is because we understand ethics to be standards of human behavior—the actions of man himself through his own volition. See *Laborem Exercens* (LE), 6.

In each of these aspects, man is challenged to use his place in nature and the material world for his own development and flourishing, and to facilitate the flourishing of others. To assist in this call, God gives man the goods of the Earth.

1.8 UNIVERSAL DESTINATION OF GOODS[64]

From Scripture, we learn that all creation is sacred, because "[i]n the beginning God created … and God saw everything that he had man, and behold, it was very good" (Genesis 1:1-31), and it is here in the world that God places mankind. Wyszynski (1995, 51) offers the image of the "created world [as] God's workshop." The Catholic social tradition teaches that the Earth, God's workshop, is a gift for all, and it warns of the potential indifference to this important issue as man discovers and relies upon his "own capacity to transform and in a certain sense create the world through his own work" (CA, 37). CA warns us of man's proclivity to self-reliance, rooted in the sin of pride, and it calls us to vigilance in recalling that man's capacities are "always based on God's prior and original gift of the things that are" (ibid.).

The idea that all of creation is a gift from God who loves us has three important implications. First and foremost, it means that God has a "loving plan in which every creature has its own value and significance" (*Laudato Si'* [LS], 76), in which plan all gifts have a social or shared purpose, as "the world is a gift which we have freely received and must share with others, [such that] … solidarity is not optional but is rather a basic question of justice" (159). Second, the realization that God is the gift-giver and thus the Creator implies that we are creatures, and we ourselves are part of the natural environment, and thus we need to recognize with humility our limits and our dependence on nature, on each other, and on God.[65]

[64] The concept of the universal destination of goods is a theme throughout the theological discourse on the ontological view of man throughout the Magisterial teachings of the Church. However, we discuss it here as a distinct matter, because it is highlighted as a core theological concept in Tradition. Although it relates to man's vocation as a co-worker with God (see Section 1.1 of this thesis), it is sufficiently elevated in Catholic social teaching as a unique term that this author asserts that it warrants distinct consideration here.

[65] In particular, our happiness and flourishing are only realized within God's loving plan, neither independent of nor in opposition to it. Accordingly, Pope Francis warns against any "claim to absolute dominion," against an attempt at "try[ing] to impose [man's] own laws and interests on reality" (LS, 75).

Third, God's design involves a particular role for man, who possesses a "uniqueness which transcends the sphere of physics and biology" (LS, 81), as "each of us has his or her own personal identity and is capable of entering into dialogue with others and with God himself" (ibid.), giving each human person a certain "pre-eminence" in creation, with a basic and fundamental dignity "which all human beings share in equal measure" (LS, 90). However, our unique role given to us by God is primarily that as stewards rather than owners (LS, 67), as each person is given freedom that comes with a responsibility (i.e., a duty) of "caring, protecting, overseeing and preserving" (ibid.).

When the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC; Catholic Church 2007) references the "original gift of the earth to the whole of mankind," it is referring to the concept of the universal destination of goods. So important is this concept that it has been elevated by the Magisterium to one of the eight core principles of Catholic social doctrine, as explained in the 2005 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace's *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (CSDC, 75-80). The principle, as such, was first formally enumerated by the Second Vatican Council in Article 69 of GS, which discusses the common purpose of all created things. GS emphases God's intention that the Earth and all that it is in it should be of use and benefit to every human being. The challenge, however, is that it is up to man to devise how this is to occur, but GS reminds us that this task should be done by exercising the virtues of both justice and charity (69). Therefore, in speaking of destination, the Magisterium is making reference to the universal aim for which created goods are intended. In referencing Saint Thomas Aquinas's teaching, the Second Vatican Council writers remind us that "[i]n using them, therefore, a man should regard his lawful possessions not merely as his own but also as common property in the sense that they should accrue to the benefit of not only himself but of others" (GS, 69).

It is important to make clear that the universal destination of goods does not suggest that there is no private property or that all things should be shared equally. What it does require is a solid understanding that each person is born with the right to use the goods of the earth. How this is to be

done, from a practical perspective, is the purview of "national and international agreements, and a juridical order that adjudicates and specifies the exercise of this right" (CSDC, 76). What the universal destination of goods does insist, however, is that "the ownership of goods be equally accessible by all" (CA, 6). This idea is foundational in the Church's view of international development.[66] The *Compendium* reminds us that the "principle of the universal destination of goods is an invitation to develop an economic vision inspired by moral values that permit people not to lose sight of the origin or purpose of these goods, so as to bring about a world of fairness and solidarity, in which the creation of wealth can take on a positive function" (CSDC, 76). As each man's work is bound together with the work of all of those who have come before him, it is also connected to those who will come after. In this way, "[t]here is a sort of special 'communion of saints' in and through work. This is the historical bond [of solidarity]" (Wyszynski 1995, 32).

Pope Saint John Paul II, in CA, reminds us that when man uses his labor and intelligence, he can transform the earth and exercise his dominion. This basic command of God to work is what CA calls "the origin of individual property" (31). The challenge, however, is to understand that the call to work and to exercise dominion was not meant to enable an understanding of private property as an absolute right. GS underscores that the "principle of the universal destination of goods is an affirmation both of God's full and perennial lordship over every reality and of the requirement that the goods of creation remain ever destined to the development of the whole person and of all humanity" (69).

[66] Pope Paul VI introduced the notion of "integral human development" in his 1967 encyclical *Populorum Progressio*, 14. This idea is expressed in CCC, 2441: "[a]n increased sense of God and increased self-awareness are fundamental to any *full development of human society* (emphasis in original). This development multiplies material goods and puts them at the service of the person and his freedom. It reduces dire poverty and economic exploitation. It makes for growth in respect for cultural identities and openness to the transcendent." It is also expressed by Pope Saint John Paul II in *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (1987), 32 and in CA, 51, where he notes that "The Church renders this service to human society *by preaching the truth about the creation of the world,* which God has placed in human hands so that people may make it fruitful and more perfect through their work; and *by preaching the truth about the Redemption* (emphasis in original), whereby the Son of God has saved mankind and at the same time has united all people, making them responsible for one another. Sacred Scripture continually speaks to us of an active commitment to our neighbour and demands of us a shared responsibility for all of humanity."

In coming together as human societies, the challenge becomes how to enable each to use the goods of the Earth to fulfill his capacity and to flourish without impeding others, but rather encouraging and supporting others.

1.9 THE ORIGIN AND ROLE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY

In Genesis 1:26-29, we learn that God entrusted the earth to mankind. Stewardship is man's unique calling, and this calling requires his labor and his love. By man's labor, the earth is transformed, and it becomes productive.[67] By man's love, there is fruit and communion. Man's calling necessitates the provision of private property to enable the reaping of the fruit of his labor and the sharing of that fruit in communion with others.[68] [69] This symbiotic, sharing relationship is how theologians understand man's place in both the material and spiritual realms. So central is the notion of private property that God commanded that man shall not steal.[70] Said in another way, man shall not rob another man of his opportunity to fulfill his calling. Similarly, God commands man not to covet to protect him from expending his energies in the sinful desire in his heart to steal.[71]

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[67] This idea takes its inspiration from Genesis 2:5: "when no plant of the field was yet in the earth and no herb of the field had yet sprung up—for the Lord God had not caused it to rain upon the earth, and there was no man to till the ground." God intended man to transform the material of the world and to make it productive. Conversely, due to man's neglect and abuse, the material of the world can be distorted and set to ruin.

[68] The English philosopher John Locke (1986, §27) has argued that because God gave the Earth to all of mankind, the individual acquires personal property rights as he joins his labor to resources. This logic has been incorporated into Catholic Social Teaching in *Quadragesimo Anno* [QA], 52-53, *Mater et Magistra* [MM], 112, and LE, 12 and 14. The Second Vatican Council in GS, 26 reminds us that beyond this private property right, we must never forget that "there must be made available to all men everything necessary for leading a life truly human, such as food, clothing, and shelter; the right to choose a state of life freely and to found a family, the right to education, to employment, to a good reputation, to respect, to appropriate information, to activity in accord with the upright norm of one's own conscience, to protection of privacy and rightful freedom even in matters religious."

[69] Recall that man's calling to be a co-worker with God pre-dates the fall of man. In this pre-fallen state of nature, human positive law was not necessary, and man could fulfill his mission of being a co-worker with God with full recourse to all of the common goods of the Earth. However, after the fall, man finds himself in competition with man in ways that often offend this truth. The concept of private property is a tool given to man so as to assist in his use of the common goods of the earth in a framework suitable for human justice in a fallen world.

[70] Exodus 20:15 and Deuteronomy 15:19.

[71] Intent in the heart is found in the discussion about lust in Matthew 5:28. The use of the term "in his heart" is meant to confer the idea of interior disposition of the type of coveting found in Exodus 20:17, Deuteronomy 5:21, and Luke 12:15.

In CA, Pope Saint John Paul II explains that "[i]n this way, [man] makes part of the earth his own, precisely the part which he has acquired through work; this is the origin of individual property" (31). However, the CCC reminds us that "the right to private property, acquired or received in a just way, does not do away with the original gift of the earth to the whole of mankind" (2403). The *Compendium* explains that because the Church places such preeminence on the universal destination of goods, the Magisterium has been clear to enumerate both "the nature and characteristics of this principle" (CSDC, 76). The Magisterium describes private property, through the understanding of the universal destination of goods as an "inherent" right in that it is "inscribed in human nature" so as to be clear and not confused or misinterpreted as a positive right such that its nature could be subject to changing "historical circumstances" and interpretations (ibid.).[72] Pope Paul VI explains in his Encyclical Letter *Populorum Progressio* that "[a]ll other rights … must be subordinated to this norm [universal destination of goods]; they must not hinder it, but must rather expedite its application. It must be considered a serious and urgent social obligation to refer these rights to the original purpose" (22).[73]

Matthew Habiger, in his 1986 dissertation entitled *Papal Teaching on Private Property: 1891 to 1981,* addresses the issue of the origin of private property rights in Magisterial teaching. He works with the question of whether private property rights emanate from the social contract logic of John Locke or the obligatory logic of Saint Thomas Aquinas. He addresses this question because during the 1980s, there was liberal criticism that the Magisterial teaching was not consistent with an authentic Thomistic understanding of the Church. Habiger (1986, 339) concludes that "John Locke's theory of private property

[72] In this way, we understand that private property is a tool for man to fulfill his obligation to flourish, but it also insures the obligation to use private property to promote the opportunity of others likewise to be fulfilled.

[73] In GS 69, Pope Paul VI earlier admonished us that "the right of having a share of earthly goods sufficient for oneself and one's family belongs to everyone… and that [i]f one is in extreme necessity, he has the right to procure for himself what he needs out of the riches of others. Since there are so many people prostrate with hunger in the world, [we must remember] the aphorism of the Fathers, 'Feed the man dying of hunger, because if you have not fed him, you have killed him'."

is not that of *Rerum Novarum*."[74] The reason that this argument is important is that Locke's version of private property (1) does not have an obligation to share with the poor, (2) does not provide for parental obligations, and (3) does not consider the recurring needs of man for material goods based upon the virtues of justice and charity (ibid.). The consequence of Locke's logic is that "productive land-owners [should] acquire even more property … and in doing so … champion laissez-faire capitalism and unlimited acquisition" (Habiger 1986, 340).[75] [76]

The understanding of a natural law[77] [78] right to private property, then, is a way to understand the function of property in the life of man.[79] Not only is man well suited to private property, but he is also in need of it for his own fulfillment and survival—materially and morally. By using his intellect and energy, man makes material things his own. Metaphysically speaking, man also must have some private property

[74] A more robust discussion about the social contract theory of John Locke can be found in Chapter 3. This issue points to the uniqueness of the contributive justice-based moral theory developed in this thesis, as it is a contractarian model rooted in Christian theology and Catholic social teaching. It addresses this specific issue raised by Habiger.

[75] Political economy theorist, C. B. MacPherson, argues that modern political liberalism is rooted in a concept he calls positive individualism that dates back to Thomas Hobbes and revisions by John Locke. For MacPherson, positive individualism is the notion that the individual is conceptualized as "essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.… The individual … is free in as much as he is proprietor of his person and capabilities" (MacPherson and Cunningham 1962, 3). This conceptualization is at odds with the Magisterial call to respect the principle of the universal destination of goods that imposes moral responsibility toward not only investing in the development of one's own capacity for promoting the common good, but also the inherent call to aid in the building of the capacities of others. This is a debt (see the Social Mortgage discussion in §1.10 of this document) owed to God and to our fellow man.

[76] The rationale for introducing John Locke's argument here is to aid the discussion in Chapter 3.

[77] Natural law is explained in CCC as the "original moral sense which enables man to discern by reason the good and the evil, the truth and the lie." This idea enables "[m]an to participat[e] in the wisdom and goodness of the Creator who gives him mastery over his acts and the ability to govern himself with a view to the true and the good" (1954).

[78] Natural law is the expression of what Thomas Jefferson would call self-evident truths (1776) that reflect the idea that political theorist Benjamin Wright (1931, 333) reminds is the notion that the "laws of nature are the laws of God." The natural law concept is closely associated in Catholic tradition with Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, where Aquinas explains that the natural law is "nothing other than a certain kind of participation in eternal law" (n.d.b., I-II, Q. 91, A.2). Natural law encapsulates the idea that we live in a "purposeful universe and at least a part of that purpose is accessible to human reason" (Pearson 2017, x). See Romans 2:14. Further discussion of this issue can be found in Chapter 3.

[79] Although there is a right to private property inherent in natural law, it does not necessarily mean that that right must be exercised as, for example, in relation to monastic rules. However, this author would argue that in relation to the religious state of life, it is still necessary to control private property, either individually or collectively. In this way, there is still the ability to use material goods to facilitate agency.

to manifest his own capabilities and potentialities.[80] It is because of these attributes of private property that the Magisterium has come to understand private property as a natural right.

In the writing of the Church's first encyclical on social matters, *Rerum Novarum*, Pope Leo XIII understood property in the context of the nineteenth century as being land and real estate. Over time, however, private property has taken on a broader meaning. For example, by 1961 in *Mater et Magistra* [MM], Pope Saint John XXIII understood that there is a social aspect of private property that includes not just land and real estate, but also "productive goods" (19). This has come to mean that private property can include any material good that creates new wealth. Again, in MM, society is called to "modify economic and social life so that the way is made easier for widespread private possession of such things as durable goods, homes, gardens, tools requisite for artisan enterprises and family-type farms, investments in enterprises of medium or large size" (115).

1.10 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY

In *Quadragesimo Anno* (QA), Pope Pius XI explains that the right of property has both an individual *and* a social character: the social character relates to concerns of the common good. The social nature of private property ensures that "the goods which the Creator has destined for the human race may truly serve [His] purpose" (QA, 45). Pope Pius XI warns that it is very important to balance the emphasis of both the individual and the social character of private property, because an imbalance of understanding can have serious consequences. For example, if the individual character of private property is over-emphasized, it can lead to extreme "individualism" that manifests in unregulated liberal capitalism. On the other hand, if the social character of private property is over-emphasized, it can lead to extreme "collectivism" that manifests in socialism, fascism, or communism (QA, 46). For the German Jesuit

[80] It is important to recognize that the holding of private property in community is a way that some monastic and religious orders also fulfill this requirement. Others in religious life have been called to live a life of holy poverty, in which case they are in total reliance of the providence of God and the charity of others—others who have resources with which to exercise the virtue of magnanimity.

economist Heinrich Pesch (2004), there are real problems in what he calls the "extremes" of both capitalism and socialism, in that they distort the understanding of property and man's destiny on earth. He argues that with capitalism, every motivator except egoism is excluded from economic life, and with socialism (what Pesch calls the historical sequel to capitalism), there is a "destruction of the powerful psychological incentive for economic activity" (164).

The *Compendium* reminds us that the universal destination of goods confers an obligation on how goods are used by their "legitimate owners" (CSDC, 178). The onus is to be mindful of how resources are used not only by the owner and his family, but also for the common good. In this area, the Magisterium teaches that there is a "duty on the part of owners not to let the goods in their possession go idle and to channel them to productive activity, even entrusting them to others who are desirous and capable of putting them to use in production" (ibid.).

So important is the social function of property that Pope Saint John Paul II in *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* describes what he terms the "social mortgage" (42). This is the debt owed to God and our fellow man for the use of the goods of the world. This concept suggests that use of the world's resources is bound up with responsibility towards the rest of humanity. This is embodied most fully in Pope John Paul's encyclical LE, when he writes that (regarding the right to private property) "Christian tradition has never upheld this right as absolute and untouchable. On the contrary, it has always understood this right within the broader context of the right common to all to use the goods of the whole of creation: The right to private property is subordinated to the right to common use, to the fact that goods are meant for everyone" (14).

Pope Francis explains this notion in LS, when he reminds us that the social mortgage is the "principle of the subordination of private property to the universal destination of goods, and thus the right of everyone to their use, is a golden rule of social conduct."[81] Pope Francis asks us to recall that Pope

[81] Pope Francis reiterates in LS 93 the same idea of the "golden rule of social conduct" expressed by Pope Saint John Paul II in LE, 19. However, Pope Francis expressly extends the idea to all of goods of the Earth, whereas Pope

Saint John XXIII takes us back to this core principle that Pope Leo XIII made so clear in *Rerum Novarum* that "[t]his is the heart of the matter: whoever has received from the divine bounty a large share of blessings, whether these be corporate or external gifts of man, has received them to use for his own perfection, and, at the same time, as the minister of God's providence, for the benefit of others" (LS, 93). In participating in, structuring, and administering civil society, man is challenged to balance the need for the use of the goods of the world and the reality that resources are limited.

1.11 PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE

In MM, Pope Saint John XXIII pointed out that the "State, whose purpose is the realization of the common good in the temporal order, can by no means disregard the economic activity of its citizens" (20). To do this, Pope Saint John XXIII called on the state to "promote in a suitable manner the production of a sufficient supply of material goods, 'the use of which is necessary for the practice of virtue'" (ibid.). Pope Pius XI offered earlier support of this notion when in QA he wrote that "when civil authority adjusts ownership to meet the needs of the public good it acts not as an enemy, but as a friend of private owners; for thus it effectively prevents the possession of private property, intended by nature's Author in his wisdom for the sustaining of human life, from creating an intolerable burden and so rushing to its own destruction. It does not therefore abolish, but protects private ownership, and far from weakening the right of private property, it gives it new strength" (49). This new strength is derived, said Pope Pius XI, as "civil power is more than the mere guardian of law and order" (QA, 25). Pope Leo XIII set the foundation for this firm position, when in *Rerum Novarum*, he first instructed us that man is "to make sure that the laws and institutions, the greater character and administration of the commonwealth, should be as of themselves to realize public well-being and private prosperity" (26).

Saint John Paul II was using the term (albeit the same idea) in the context of a discussion of fair and just wages and social benefits.

This work is all the more important as the world becomes ever more interconnected and interdependent. The role of the state in Catholic social teaching is tempered and checked, however, by the principle of subsidiarity[82], which Pope Saint John XXIII references in MM while quoting Pope Pius XI in QA: "[subsidiarity] is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry [and vice versa] … [i]nsomuch as every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should never destroy or absorb them" (MM, 53). The principle of subsidiary also has an impact in this institutional context. The state (in its role as the coordinator, convener, and administrator of public activity) plays an important tempering function. By "[p]racticing subsidiarity … [the state affords] each person … room for personal initiative and creativity and [each person] receives help from others to develop their particular skills and moral character, which comes with a corresponding duty to help others towards the same end" (Cremers 2016, 64). Subsidiarity supports cooperation in solidarity, allowing everyone to contribute better.[83]

Pope Benedict XVI explains in *Caritas in Veritate* that the role of the state includes being a counterbalance to what have become influential economic institutions in society and notes that "[e]conomic activity cannot solve all social problems through the simple application of commercial logic. This needs to be directed toward the pursuit of the common good, for which the political community in particular must also take responsibility" (36). Because political authority "involves a wide range of values,"

[82] The essence of subsidiary is the concept of human agency. As a principle, subsidiarity expresses the notion that each individual person is endowed with both the right (having been made in the image and likeness of God) and obligation (as a duty in justice to God) to exercise his free will to effectuate agency. It is a principle that helps to protect man from being absorbed by the body social.

[83] Subsidiarity is often thought of as a way to preserve the autonomy of the human person in all levels of society. It could also be thought of as a principle to protect against discrimination and marginalization. In such an understanding, man is offered an opportunity to contribute based upon his abilities and not on his power position in society.

an “integrated economy of the present day does not make the role of State redundant, but rather it commits governments to greater collaboration with another” (41).

It is this sense of common good that is instructive in thinking about both the administration and the purpose of work and the fruits of human labor. “The church’s teaching has always expressed the strong and deep conviction that man’s work concerns not only the economy but also, and especially, personal values. The economic system itself and the production process benefit precisely when these personal values are fully respected” (LE, 15). The argument of this thesis is that any fundamental improvement in the social fabric needs to incorporate the ontological view on man and his calling to work and engage in the world. It is at this root source that we “learn the deepest meaning and value of all creation” (LG, 36). From this vantage point, we can see a deeper call toward “justice, charity, and peace” (ibid.). Pope Saint John Paul II reminds that “by their competence in secular fields and by their personal activity, elevated from within the grace of Christ, [people should] work vigorously so that by human labor, technical skill, and civil culture, created goods may be perfected according to the design of the creator and the light of his word” (ibid.). The Church challenges us to establish societies based upon values that uplift human dignity and flourishing. This is the call on our work and the fruits of our work—wealth.

1.12 WEALTH AND ITS PURPOSE

In *The Instructor (Paedagogus)*, Saint Clement of Alexandria (c. 182-202 AD) defines true wealth as something that resides in the heart. He offers the image of a rich person, piling up gold for no purpose (except for his own pleasure) as “like a dirty purse.” He teaches that only good people possess good things, and that these things are the source of genuine wealth, and they can never be taken away. He explains: “Holiness is true wealth, and the Word is more valuable than all treasure; these are not increased by cattle or fields but are given by God. They cannot be taken away for the soul alone is such a man’s treasure” (Clement 1885a, Chapter 6). For Saint Clement, this is wealth in its truest sense. In following, one could say that true wealth resides in the disposition of the heart, and in the fullest Christian sense, this is in living

an authentic Christian life of love and service: this love and service is the sharing of the Gospel and the building up of God's kingdom through the Body of Christ.[84]

In *Who is the Rich Man that Shall be Saved*, Saint Clement (1885b) was one of the earliest Church Fathers who expressly addressed an allegorical interpretation of the notions of wealth and poverty.[85] However, this dualistic (material and spiritual) understanding of wealth and poverty has long been part of Catholic (early Christian) Tradition. Recall when King David describes himself as "poor and needy,"[86] suggesting that the word poor is meant to describe anyone who is in distress of any kind—material or spiritual. Pope Saint Leo the Great (c. 400-461) in his *Homily on the Beatitudes*, agrees. He notes that when Jesus explained that "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven," he was not suggesting that "poverty by itself would appear sufficient to win the kingdom of heaven which many suffer from hard and heavy necessity." What he is saying is that "the kingdom of heaven must be assigned to those who are recommended by the humility of their spirits rather than by the smallness of their means." (Gregory the Great, 1895)

Wealth is often best understood by defining its opposite: poverty. Simply stated, poverty is the state in which one has no more *(and often much less)* than one needs, and if one is poor in the purely Christian sense, one wishes for no more than one needs.[87] This description helps us to understand both the material and spiritual dimensions of poverty. Correspondingly, wealth then is having more than one needs—yet still feeling unsatisfied. The Oxford English Dictionary offer three basic definitions of wealth (1) "the condition of being happy and prosperous; well-being," (2) "spiritual well-being," and (3)

[84] Writing almost four centuries later, Boethius addresses the transitory nature of fame and wealth in the *Consolation of Philosophy* (523) In his dialog with Lady Philosophy, he learns that happiness comes from within and that this happiness is derived from virtues and not wealth.

[85] This is a homily given by Saint Clement (Titus Flavius Clemens). This text is thought to be the only one preserved of his popular teachings, as his other writings available to us are theological texts.

[86] Psalm 40:17

[87] This conceptualization is rooted in the teaching of Matthew 5:3, "[b]lessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." Here poverty is explained as the fullness of human need, the kingdom of heaven. Also, in Proverbs 30: 8-9, man is instructed to pray for just enough so as not to be tempted to steal and not to forget God: "give me neither poverty nor riches, but give me only my daily bread" (Proverbs 30:8).

"prosperity consisting in abundance of possessions; 'worldly goods', valuable possessions, esp. in great abundance: riches, affluence" (Simpson, 1989, 41). A large percentage of Scripture focuses on right and wrong uses of this latter kind of material wealth, while always subordinating material wealth to spiritual wealth.[88]

In temporal terms, wealth is intended first to satisfy our personal needs. Wyszynski (1995, 37) reminds us that "[t]his is not selfishness, but charity properly apportioned. Yet we are not entitled to the whole of these fruits. We share them with our family and with those close to us to whom we are bound by the duty of charity and justice. Within the boundaries of the family we include not only children and relations but then the entire household, everybody who works with us and helps us to achieve the fruits of our work." This explanation echoes the primacy that the First Epistle to Timothy gives to the importance of taking care first of the family: "If anyone does not provide for his relatives, and especially for his own family, he has disowned the faith and is worse than an unbeliever" (1 Timothy 5:8).

Wyszynski (1995, 42) writes that "[w]ork leads to possession" and concludes that "[t]he aim of possession is the satisfaction of our own needs and those of our family and the sharing of what is left over with our neighbors. Possession becomes ennobled through the duty of charity,[89] and through this both man and his work are ennobled and cleansed from selfishness and the desire for personal profit." So in

[88] The right use of wealth is an important part of the Gospels. We are taught to be content with our "daily bread" (Matthew 6:11), but we are also instructed to be generous (Matthew 5:42) with a preference for caring for the poor (Luke 14: 7-24). However, Mark 4:19 warns of the deceitful nature of wealth, and that its wrong use can be a cause of forfeiting eternal life (Mark 8:36). This notion is reiterated in the Gospel of Luke, when Luke offers a stern warning against the accumulation of wealth without thought of God or the destitute. The consequence, again, is eternal damnation: Luke 12:16-21; Luke 16:19-31.

[89] Wyszynski highlights the notion of duty. Duty in this context is duty to God, but also duty to our fellow man. This idea points to the importance in Chapters 2 and 3 of situating morality in the context of being a duty: contract theory tradition. The fundamental contract at issue is not first with man and our earthly governors, but rather it is with man and his Creator—the terms of which are written in man's heart and evidenced by man's decision to abide in God's love and law.

this way, we are called to use our wealth to build up the capacity of those closest to us,[90] so that they may also be afforded the opportunity to grow in love and flourish.[91]

In GS, we see that the purpose of work and wealth is capacity building.[92] GS proposes that "[j]ust as human activity proceeds from man, so it is ordered toward man. For when a man works he not only alters things and society, he develops himself as well" (35). In this way, man cultivates his resources to promote personal growth and capacity enhancement. This development of capacity is the precondition to be able to flourish. "Rightly understood, this kind of growth is of greater value than any external riches which can be garnered.… Hence, the norm of human activity is this: that in accord with the divine plan and will, it should harmonize with the genuine good of the human race, and allow people as individuals and as members of society to pursue their total vocation and fulfill it" (ibid.).

Once our obligations to ourselves and our family have been fulfilled, we are called, then, to a broader call to the common good of our fellow man. In QA, we are called in very clear terms to help others to flourish: "if, when our own needs have been satisfied according to our station in life,[93] there are still goods left over [savings, capital, and similar commodities] we do not have complete freedom to do what

[90] The idea is that charity begins at home. This idea does not suggest in any way a diminishment of duty to love and care for our neighbors; rather, it is an acknowledgment of the primacy of the family. See Section 1.13 for a discussion on the exercise of the virtue of prudence related to wealth.

[91] Saint Irenaeus, the bishop of Lyons (second century, precise birth and death dates are unknown) taught in *Against Heresies* (185) that the "glory of God is man fully alive" (Book IV, Chapter 20). For Irenaeus, being alive is a life of divine grace—incorporating the living Christ and subordinating the self in the love of our brothers and sisters as modelled by our savior Jesus Christ. For Irenaeus, this was the height of flourishing.

[92] Capacity building is linked to flourishing in GS in its explanation that "technical progress may supply the material for human advancement, but it is powerless to actualize it" (35). This is a way of explaining that work is one part of a progression— (1) work and its fruits satisfying basic needs and (2) the fruits of that work enable the development of capacities to grow in virtue and aids in the perfection of gifts. GS offers a proviso, however, stating that volition and grace are the forces for actualization.

[93] The term "stations in life" is a concept with a deep tradition in Catholic social teaching, and it is meant to describe the providential estate that each person is born into. This is not to suggest that man should not seek to improve this material condition, but the theological reason to do so is to be able to take care of the self so that one can serve one's fellow man better. This is the way to understand the motivation of someone like Saint Francis to "witness against riches, not poverty" (Woodhead 2004, 318) This is also why Pope Leo XIII in RN emphasizes those mechanisms in society that can seek to uplift man's ability to build up his capacities and power to mobilize through trade unions and to withhold his labor through striking. This issue is important to the argument in Chapters 2 and 3 related to the relationship between contributive and distributive dimensions of justice (ibid.).

we like with them; we have a duty to employ them to create new possibilities of work for our neighbor" (53-54).

1.13 A SOBER APPROACH TO WEALTH

One of the distinct contributions of this thesis is the connection that it draws between work and wealth—both wealth derived by an individual's own work and wealth derived from the dividends of the work produced by others. We understand our own individual call to work as for the purpose of our own flourishing and for the purpose of participating in the flourishing of others, to "bring about a world of fairness and solidarity" (CSDC, 174). In this way, we are called to a wholly new attitude toward wealth. To understand this concept, we look to the guidance of Scripture. It is most instructive to look to the wisdom of Jesus in the four gospels. His approach to wealth can be viewed in the framework of four key themes: (1) prudence, (2) diversion, (3) impediment, and (4) a measure of faith.

In the gospels of both Mark and Luke we find the distinct call to prudence. The gospel writers ask a poignant question: "What does it profit a man to gain the whole world and forfeit his life?" (Mark 8:36; Luke 9:25). This question presupposes an orientation toward the gospel promise of eternal life. Its underlying presupposition is that it would be imprudent for a man to take short-term gains at the expense of much richer long-term returns. This simple question offers a beacon to guide all managers of wealth. Similarly, the gospel writers point out the foolishness of storing up treasures for yourself (Matthew 6:19-21), particularly at the expense of being rich toward God (Luke 12:21). In this sense, being rich toward God means investing in both yourself and others, particularly those who are most vulnerable (Matthew 5:40). This is so that "[r]iches [can] fulfil their function of service to man when they are destined to produce benefits for others and society" (CSDC, 329, referencing *The Shepherd of Hermas*[94]).

[94] This is an early second century text that is believed to have been written by a Christian freedman named Hermas, who had formerly been a Roman slave in a Christian household. For more information on this text and its origin, see Osiek (1999), 8-10.

One of the most profound warnings about wealth offered in the gospels is the idea that man cannot serve both God and mammon (Matthew 6:24; Luke 16:13). This admonishment warns against the diversion that wealth creates. With wealth often comes status, comfort, and stability. In and of themselves, these things are not bad. However, Jesus warns that these can cause the illusion of not being in need of God and, in an extreme sense, that man is a god. The idea is that if man puts his faith in his wealth, he leaves little room for God. The Gospel of Luke makes this point clear when pointing out that the wealth exalted by men is actually an abomination before God (Luke 16:14-15). The gospel writers warn that this diversion toward status, comfort, and stability that wealth can create risks "chok[ing] the word" (Mark 4:19; Luke 8:14).

The challenge comes when a diversion becomes an impediment. The gospel writers warn that wealth becomes an impediment to faith when man becomes so distracted and consumed by the having or acquiring of wealth that he loses his innate dependence upon God's provision, thereby making himself a god and the false provider of all things (Luke 12:22-34). This is why we are warned that it is difficult for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven (Mark 10:23-25; Luke 18:24-27). In these cases where wealth has become a god or the owner of wealth sees himself as a god, the prescription has been to "sell all you have and give it to the poor" (Matthew 19:21; Luke 12:33). In this way, you can have treasure in heaven (Luke 18:18-23).

Ultimately, wealth becomes a test of faith. The Gospel of Luke points us to an important realism: if we are not faithful with someone else's wealth, we will not be faithful with our own (Luke 16:12). In this way, we are called to be fiduciaries not only for God, but also for mankind, and our actions are a testament to our fidelity. It follows, then, that if we are not faithful in earthly wealth, we will not be entrusted with true wealth (Luke 16:11; Matthew 25:14-30). For our encouragement, the Gospel writers give examples to follow. Such is the testimony given in the actions of the poor widow who contributed more than the wealthy because she contributed out of her poverty, whereas the wealthy contributed out of their

abundance (Mark 12:43-44). So too was the example of Zacchaeus when he promised to give half of his goods to the poor (Luke 19:8-9).[95] For God, where your treasure is, so is your heart (Matthew 6:19-21).

1.14 WEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

If wealth is considered in the context of being *all that is considered of value*, it is fitting to consider its ramifications and responsibilities in a social context. Our earliest calls to social justice (distribution of wealth, opportunities, and privilege in a society) come from the Old Testament.[96] There is a clear admonition against seeking profit from the poor. We see the first mention of the poor and our call to action against usury in Exodus 22:25 and Leviticus 25:35-37. The Old Testament also sets forth the Sabbath laws, where fields are to be worked for six years, and the seventh is given to the animals and the poor (Exodus 23:10-11). The people were also called to forgive the debts of the poor in the seventh year (Deuteronomy 15: 7-11). In this way, there would be a pathway out of servitude and poverty[97]

Later in Deuteronomy, we are warned against one of man's most grievous sins—cheating a man of his wages: a sin that cries out to Heaven (Deuteronomy 24:14-15). CCC reminds us that the "just wage is the legitimate fruit of work" (2434), "and that to refuse or withhold it can be a grave injustice" (ibid., referencing Leviticus 19:13, Deuteronomy 24:14-15, and James 5:4). This section of the *Catechism* points

[95] Zacchaeus was a descendant of Abraham, and he was the City of Jericho's tax collector; he was seen by his peers as a sinner. "Behold, Lord, the half of my goods I give to the poor, and if I have defrauded anyone of anything, I restore it fourfold" (Luke 19:8). Through the actions of Zacchaeus, who gave away half his goods to the poor and who generously compensated those he cheated, we are given an example of the kind of generosity that characterizes those whose hearts have repented and whose lives have been transformed by the gospel.

[96] Despite its scriptural conceptualization as far back as the Old Testament, Friedrich Hayek attributes the term social justice to Luigi Taparelli d'Azelio in *Saggio teoretico di dritto naturale* (Palermo, 1840), but he contends that the term has been made more generally known by Antonio Rosmini-Serbati in *La costituzione secondo la giustizia sociale* (Milan, 1848). See Hayek (1976), 176-77. Political scientist, Robert Kraynak (2018, 3) contends that "[Blessed] Rosmini arrived at his idea of social justice by developing Thomistic natural law theory into a novel view of the common good that balances two principles: (1) the equal rights and dignity of persons as ends-in-themselves, a version of 'personalism' influenced by Kant and Christianity; and (2) unequal rewards for those who contribute most to society, a version of Aristotelian 'proportionalism' based on the social nature of man."

[97] In a special way, Leviticus 25 sets forth a plan of distribution and management of lands and debts. In this plan, there is developed the concept of the "Jubilee Year." This is the time when prisoners and slaves would be set free, debts would be forgiven, and special graces would flow from God.

out that not only should a man be paid for his work, but it should also be at a level requisite with a "dignified livelihood" for not only himself, but also his family. This conceptualization, the *Catechism* asserts, should consider well-being on the "material, social, cultural and spiritual level" (CCC, 2434).

We gain further insight into how wealth and social justice are connected from the New Testament. Here there are ample warnings about the pursuit and use of wealth. In the Gospel of Luke, we find the parable of the Rich Fool, in which Jesus warns about the foolishness of storing up surpluses to facilitate idleness, suggesting that there is a better course of action in sharing with those in need and relying on the providence of God (Luke 12:16-21). Also in the Gospel of Luke, there is the parable of the Unjust Steward, which suggests that wealth needs to be managed prudently and gives the ominous warning that man cannot serve two masters—God and mammon (wealth) (Luke 16:1-13). Also in this Gospel, we find the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, admonishing the rich man to be generous and kind in life, because in death there is no recompense (Luke 16:19-31). These parables echo the social mortgage that Pope Saint John Paul II introduced in *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, emphasizing again that goods that are accumulated (wealth) are not meant to be set aside or hoarded, but they are "meant for all" (42).

These principles are seen in action throughout the New Testament. As an example, there is Zacchaeus the tax collector, who had spent a career cheating and abusing the poor, but once he found his faith, he made restitution and showed that ill-gotten gains must be repaid (Luke 19:1-10). This is in contrast to the rich ruler who was unable to part with his wealth when tested by Jesus (Matt. 19:16-30; Mark 10:17-31; Luke 18:18-30). The call to serve others is seen when Christians are called to put their faith in action by witnessing with their deeds (James 2:14-26). We can see this type of generous response in people such as Joseph of Arimathea, who paid for the tomb of Jesus (Matthew 27:56-61, Mark 15:42-46 and Luke 23:50-53), in Joseph (called Barnabas), who sold his land for the benefit of the work of the gospel (Acts 4:36-37), and in the actions of Lydia to host the Church in her home (Acts 16:13-15, 40). Each of these examples of heroic generosity points to the important truth that we are all called to live in solidarity.

In this spirit and in an effort to find ways to live this solidarity, we are continually called to remember that "[a] person is more precious for what he is than for what he has. Similarly, all that people do to obtain greater justice, wider brotherhood, and a more humane ordering of social relationships has greater worth than technical advances. For these advances can supply the material for human progress, but of themselves alone they can never actually bring it about" (LE, 26 quoting GS, 35). We must remember that social justice is simply justice as experienced in the social sphere. In this context, Christian theology inspires us to use the gift of wealth as a way to uplift our brothers and sisters, as part of one human family. Our task is then to bring about those conditions, by means of the use of our material and non-material wealth, to promote and foster human contribution and human flourishing.

1.15 THE VALUE OF CONTRIBUTION AS THE FOUNDATION FOR CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The nexus between work and dignity and between work and wealth is well established in Scripture and in the Magisterial teachings of the Catholic Church. This thesis, however, suggests that there is still a need for a clearer understanding of these concepts as they relate to a robust understanding of their relevance to a system of justice. The value of contribution is key to understanding the link between work and wealth as it relates to man's vocation as a fiduciary of the material world.

Five years after LE, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, in its 1986 pastoral letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the US Economy entitled *Economic Justice for All* (EJA), sought to address the challenges of living the Catholic faith in an American society amidst growing deterioration of the social safety net and a political culture that was preferencing economic individualism over community and solidarity. This pastoral letter called for an understanding of the interconnectedness of the economic forces impacting all people and stressed that these forces manifest in all domains of life.

This document enumerated three dimensions or types of justice: *communitive*, *distributive*, and *social*. The bishops wrote that c*ommunitive justice* "calls for fundamental fairness in all agreements and exchanges between individuals or private social groups" (EJA 1986, 69). They wrote that d*istributive justice*

"requires that the allocation of income, wealth, and power in society be evaluated in light of its effects on persons whose basic material needs are unmet," (EJA 1986, 70)[98] and wrote that *social justice* "implies that persons have an obligation to be active and productive participants in the life of society and that society has a duty to enable them to participate in this way" (EJA 1986, 71). This thesis contends that this justice schema fails short in penetrating the richness of understanding that comes from a broader and deeper conceptualization of *contribution* and its nexus to a systematic understanding of the theological nature of work and the corresponding moral responsibilities man has toward wealth (see Appendix 2).

Communitive justice is a concept that is understood to have derived from a need for a sense of fairness in exchange and its principles set for expectations on rule making. When rules are unfair, they are unjust. However, this author contends that to be able to make fair and just rules, the parties to the process must adhere to what this author will argue in Chapter 2 are contributive justice principles.[99] With distributive justice, there is a recognition of the need for equity in the distribution of the resources needed to make a contribution,[100] and social justice relates to the personal obligation to contribute to the life of society and society's obligation to provide an environment to be able to do so.[101]

[98] Although there is a long and deep tradition of distributive justice themes in CST, a full discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. In political philosophy and ethics, the concept of distributive justice is attributed most notably to John Rawls and is found in his book *A Theory of Justice* (1971).

[99] These principles engage with notions of diversity, inclusion, and agency and are more fully developed in Chapter 2.

[100] This author contends that one of the most challenging aspects of distributive justice is the tension between the provider of the resources and the recipient or recipient group. This author argues that a contributive justice concept can assist in synthesizing the competing demands for solidarity and the respect needed for the effectuation the principles of subsidiarity. Chapters 2-4 seek to elucidate the notion that the most fundamental contributions man makes are (1) his existence and (2) the use of his will to develop his own internal capacity to contribute to his own development so as to be able to be in a position to benefit from the distribution of resources needed to develop higher-order capacities.

[101] As conceived by the bishops, social justice seeks to be a way to frame justice principles in a social context. However, this author contends that the contributive justice paradigm more fully discussed in Chapter 2 articulates a new dimension of justice that is relevant to all dimensions of life, not just public, social life. This author will argue that contributive justice principles can provide a moral foundation for ethics in all domains of life: family life, religious life, economic life—and political life (see Conclusion and Epilogue).

In each of these conceptualizations of justice, there is an inherent dimension of the *value of contribution*. However, this author contends that each definition could benefit by enlightenment from this new fourth dimension of justice—contributive justice. Chapter 2-4 discuss these issues in greater detail and assert that contributive justice is a new dimension of justice that has the potential to inform and enrich each of the dimensions of justice outlined in EJA.[102]

The spirit of contributory justice is subtly hinted at in Pope Benedict XVI's 2009 *Caritas in Veritate*, when he reminds us that all human activity, including economic activity, must be ethically structured, because there is profound dignity in all human beings (36). Pope Francis (2013) calls on this idea when, in speaking to the Centesimus Annus Pro Pontifice Foundation, he instructs that "[w]e must return to the centrality of the human being, to a more ethical vision of activities and of human relationships without fear of losing something." The Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace later refers to "contributory justice" as one of the three strands of justice during a 2012 forum on Sustainable Water Solutions (Pontifical Council 2012, 13). Pope Francis explains that "[h]uman beings cannot be expected to feel responsibility for the world unless, at the same time, their unique capacities of knowledge, will, freedom and responsibility are recognized and valued" (LS, 118). Here the Pope suggests a connection between building human capacities and contributing to the common good.

The chapter that follows develops a definition of contributive justice that incorporates the theological insights discussed in this chapter on work and wealth. It captures the important principle of the primacy of the human person, the notion of subsidiarity, and the call to solidarity, while also incorporating the principles of the universal destination of goods and the social mortgage. This definition incorporates the aspects of contributive justice that relate to its function as both a principle of right and obligation. Chapter 2 further discusses the understanding of contributory justice as it has been expressed

[102] The bishops assert that within the social justice framework there is a "contributive" notion (EJA 71). Also, Chapter 3 explains that political philosopher and ethicist John Rawls contends that his distributive justice concept has a contributory principle. Unfortunately, Rawls was not able to complete this aspect of his work.

in the literature of other disciplines—including sociology, business, and development economics, and it compares and contrasts these conceptualizations with the more robust definition offered in this thesis. It draws insights from the existing literature to begin to make a case that diverse disciplines have drawn similar conclusions about the notion of contribution as it relates to the plan and goal of human flourishing, which suggests that a consensus is emerging that contribution plays a significant role in our comprehensive notion of justice. The consequence of this insight has significant implications for how we organize our societies and the institutions that support our public and private lives.

CHAPTER 2

TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

> The aim of contributive justice is different as it seeks to change the perception of what makes life good by focusing on what we can contribute to society instead of what we can receive from society. Whilst the opportunities to contribute to society can potentially be made unlimited, the goods we can receive from society will always be in limited supply. (Timmermann and Félix 2018, 93)
>
> Cristian Timmermann and Georges F. Félix
> "Contributive Justice: An Exploration of a
> Wider Provision of Meaningful Work"

Chapter 1 began by using Christian theology to revisit the origin of man for the purpose of elucidating man's vocation: his purpose of being and his purpose of action. As also described in Chapter 1, this approach has been taken in an effort to draw insight into what makes man uniquely human, and what characteristics of life are best suited to enable him to fulfill his mission and his unique human calling. An understanding of this calling to be a co-worker with God is derived from understanding that man is made in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:27), the Creator. Man is seen a creature with a unique call to assist in the work of creation through his call to subdue, till, and keep the earth (Genesis 1:28; Genesis 2:15). Theologians have come to understand that work has been made for man, and that because work is an act of man, it is imbued with dignity. This chapter will be grounded on the understanding that all are called to contribute by virtue of their co-workership with God. How this is to be worked out in the world is a matter for man in his practice of the virtue of justice.

So far, this study has shown that work, and what can be more broadly conceived as *action*, is part of man's nature. The fruit of this action is what is considered wealth, both in a material and a non-material sense. Through the principle of the universal destination of goods, man has both the right and the duty to use the goods of the earth, but because access to resources is limited by a variety of constraints, the earth

through man is encumbered by a perpetual social mortgage, which obligates him morally to invest in the community to enable the flourishing of his fellow man. This cycle of resource utilization and work/action is held morally and ethically in balance by the ideal of contributive justice that imbues both a right and an obligation for everyone to contribute to this cycle. This relationship is best understood through theology, because this relationship is written into human nature through God's plan for man as co-worker. However, this relationship can also be understood in a secular sense through a natural law theory of justice called contributive justice.[103]

Chapter 2 explores this emerging theory of contributive justice, which has derived from and is related to man's relationship with work and wealth, and which began to take shape in various secular disciplines beginning in the late twentieth century. This chapter begins by proposing a new and more comprehensive concept of contributive justice, and it then explores the way the concept has been used in other social science constructs. It explores contributive justice in the context of both facilitating rights and imposing obligations and duties. In this context, this chapter explores the demands and criteria of this emerging theory of justice, concluding by reasserting the proposed definition of contributive justice. This study traces the roots of this theory back to theological insights, as discussed in Chapter 1, but it shows that this theory of justice has taken root in secular disciplines as diverse as economics, sociology, information sciences, library sciences, bioethics, and political economics. After this normative framework is discussed, there is a reflection on the actualization of this theory in the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum as it relates to their development theory of human capabilities and with regard to the development work of the United Nations in its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Contributive justice

[103] This idea is embedded in the command of Saint Paul in 2 Thessalonians 3:10 connecting work and sustenance and respectful of the admonishments against laziness and sloth found in Proverbs 18:9, Proverbs 19:15, and Ecclesiastes 10:18. This, however, is balanced with the mercy expressed in the command in James 1:27 to care and support those who cannot or have a diminished capacity to care for themselves.

and its actualization are then discussed in its ideological context, and this is followed by a discussion in Chapter 3 of the prospect of using this insight to provide the moral basis of a renewed social contract.

2.1 UNDERSTANDING CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

At this point, there is no scholarly consensus on the definition of contributive justice, as it has evolved through work in a myriad of different intellectual disciplines. However, each discussion and attempt at a definition shares recognition of the human value of contribution and, to a certain extent, the underlying goal of human flourishing. Based on insights from the theological understanding of work and wealth established in Chapter 1, the following definition emerges:

> ***Contributive justice*** is a normative theory that concerns the right and obligation of every man to contribute his efforts, resources, and talents toward his own flourishing and the flourishing of others to develop societies whose measure of justice is how they advance every member's ability to contribute and flourish within a social framework that enables justice.

Contributive justice is a normative theory, because it seeks to establish criteria for what is morally right and wrong, and it is instructive as to what personal and institutional actions are just.[104] This conceptualization of justice acknowledges both rights and responsibilities.[105] The concept of "every man" means all of mankind, from the most well-endowed to the most vulnerable.[106] When referencing "efforts, resources, and talents" this conceptualization captures the diverse resources from which man can draw

[104] This conceptualization of contributive justice is within the shared-value tradition of social theory. Its deontological approach stresses man's duty to respect and love his fellow man.

[105] The expression *Nullum jus sine officio, nullum officium sine jure* (No right without its duties, no duty without its rights) is attributed to historian and political economist Francis Lieber. See Gilman, Peck, and Colby (1905). Leiber writes in the *Manual for Political Ethics* in 1838 that "it is natural, therefore, that wherever there exists a greater knowledge of right, or a more intense attention to it, then to concurrent and proportionate obligation, evil ensues … the very condition of right is obligation; the only reasonableness of obligations consists in rights" (383).

[106] It is important to emphasize the universality of this aspect of justice. It recognizes that the most fundamental type of contribution is of the self, in whatever form or state it is found. This is the recognition of the universal dignity of all mankind.

to make a contribution. The teleological end is of this conceptualization of justice is human flourishing.[107] It places a call to flourish on the individual, and it imparts the obligation to assist his fellow man in flourishing. This dual call is designed to capture both the individual *and* the social nature of man. This is done in the course of both personal and societal relations. This conceptualization recognizes man's natural need to establish institutions for the structure and development of a shared life in community.[108] This conceptualization insists that man be mindful of creating opportunities to contribute, placing an emphasis on the rights aspect of the notion of contribution. This conceptualization places human flourishing as the measure of justice. This conceptualization recognizes that contributive justice is not an absolute, but it is a unique measure for each man in accord with his own dignity, as it recognizes that each man is unique and unrepeatable. [109]

The impact of the conceptualization of contributive justice offered by this thesis is the notion that values have a place in social theory. Contribution is identified as a natural right deriving from human nature that places upon each a debt due to others. Contribution and human flourishing are then elevated to social values by which justice can be measured.[110] Inherent in this definition are the concepts of the universal destination of all goods and the social mortgage, both addressed in the theological discussion in Chapter 1, Sections 1.8 and 1.10.

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[107] See Note 5 in Chapter 1 for a definition of the Aristotelian notion of *Eudaimonia*. A more robust discussion is found in Chapter 4 where it is discussed under the rubric of contributive justice.

[108] This idea is rooted in the wisdom of Ephesians 4:15-16: "Rather speaking the truth in love, we are to grow up in every way into him who is the head, into Christ, from whom the whole body, joined and knit together by every joint with which it is supplied, when each part is working properly, makes bodily growth and upbuilds itself in love."

[109] See Pope Saint John Paul II's *Redemptor Hominis* (1979), 13: "The object of her care is man in his unique unrepeatable human reality, which keeps intact the image and likeness of God himself." Cf. Genesis 1:26: "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.'"

[110] The argument is that the first step toward measurement is recognition. Measurement tools will need to be established based upon a shared understanding of the human values at issue—in this case, contribution and human flourishing. These issues are explored further in Chapter 4.

Underlying this conception of contributive justice is a strong sense of a shared common good. In 1937, Pope Pius XI's *Divini Redemptoris* introduces obligation into the concept of the common good crafted in Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum*. In this way, Pope Pius XI explains that "the very essence of social justice [is to] demand from each individual all that is necessary for the common good" (*Divini Redemptoris*, 4).[111] In this sense, the common good is human flourishing. Bourke (1982) contends that "justice is equitable reciprocity in interpersonal relationships" (27). This point emphasizes that justice is not simply for the good of others, but it must also include the good of the agent of action. Therefore, any conceptualization of contributive justice should include the domain of normative value when constructing a standard of justice (ibid., 31).

2.2 CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

In the field of social economy, scholars look to two Jesuit economists, the German Heinrich Pesch, SJ and the American Bernard Dempsey, SJ, as the fathers of solidarist economics. Within the economic framework, there is an understanding that "enterprise and property, while remaining private, must be used responsibly and with an awareness of the duties that individuals have to the whole society" (Waters 1993, 277). In this context, contributive justice is understood as requiring "each person to participate in the construction (more often referred to as reconstruction or restoration) of social institutions to improve solidarity" (ibid.). Pesch develops the notion that social interdependence or a type of reciprocal dependence should be the norm of economic behavior. This is solidarism. Dempsey (1946, 13) concludes that the "principle of social or contributive justice furnishes the basis for genuine government of economic life."

Social economists such as Pesch and Dempsey conceive of contributive justice as an "obligation of a person to the group to which he or she belongs" (O'Boyle 1991, 51). They often think of contributive

[111] For a more detailed discussion of the Catholic social teaching on social justice, refer to CCC, 1928-1948,

justice as a duty. Walters describes this duty in terms of a reciprocal obligation as the result of having previously received support from a given group (Waters 1993, 585; O'Boyle 2011, 286). Waters sees this idea manifest in such expressions as "doing my fair share," "pulling my load," "paying my dues," and "sacrificing my lesser good for the group's greater good" (585). Bourke conceives of this idea as emanating from a private individual for a public good (Bourke 1982, 28; Murnion 1989, 848). In this way, contributive justice is about making sure that people are personally responsible, and they avoid "free-riding on others' labor" (Sayer 2009, 3).

This type of contributive justice recognizes only the duty aspect of the contributive justice framework; it fails to recognize there may be contributive injustices that preclude a person from contributing to his full potential or even at all.[112] Such injustices may include poor health, inadequate or deficient education, or even an unsafe environment.[113]

Sociologists tend to rely on Paul Gomberg's conception of contributive justice as it relates to meaningful work as a link toward addressing racial and other inequalities. For Gomberg, contributive justice is key to understanding how society can move toward more universal inclusion. For Gomberg (2016, 31), "contributive justice proposes that each flourishes by advancing the flourishing of others." At its most basic conception for Gomberg, contributive justice regards what people are expected *and able* to contribute in terms of work. In this conceptualization, contributive justice takes on elements of being both a duty and a right. This dual conception of contributive justice is also seen in the US Conference of Catholic Bishops' *Economic Justice for All* (1986, 71), which notes that contributive justice places requirements on both the individual by way of participating and society by way of ensuring that the

[112] Contributive injustice is the position of being contrary to contributive justice. It is either a direct contradiction of one of the tenets of the definition of contributive justice or in opposition to ideas that support the spirit of the definition.

[113] Contributive injustices demonstrate instances where distributive justice principles are assistive in thinking about remedy. This is an important point because this thesis contends that contributive justice does not fundamentally require distributive justice as a pre-cursor.

conditions exists whereby an individual can be free and able to contribute. Gomberg's work on contributive justice has spawned interest in the study of the importance and value of meaningful work. This line of research in meaningful work has been expanded by Chilean philosopher Christian Timmerman, who notes that contributive justice discussions have provided an important tool in the quest for human capacity building. He opines that contributive justice has "the potential of a normative framework …. to defend a fairer provision of meaningful work" (Timmermann and Félix 2018, 85).

In an effort to grasp the transformative power of contributive justice better, Timmermann and Félix argue that we must first address the idea of meaningful work. Like other scholars, they view work as a primary vehicle for the development of capabilities, and it is through actualization of capacities than one can fully contribute. They contend that "[s]ince work is the key means for the improvement of people's welfare, skill development and receipt of recognition, having the freedom to attain meaningful work is not only of interest to those who are obliged to work to cover their basic needs, but for all human beings" (Timmermann and Félix 2018, 87). Timmermann and Félix see a transcendental element to work, as well. In this way, meaningful work also includes "participating in the advancement of science, conserving cultural heritage, assisting people in need, protecting wildlife, [and] honouring any religious or spiritual commitments" (89).

In understanding the nature of work this way, Timmermann and Félix set out six key demands of contributive justice: (1) opportunities to participate, (2) opportunities to develop skills, (3) opportunities to learn to be productive, (4) fair competition of ideas, (5) duty to share according to capacity, and (6) meaningful work and tedious tasks should be distributed more evenly (ibid., 95). With regard to the distribution of both meaningful and tedious tasks, scholars contend that this lack of distribution perpetuates discrimination and contributive injustices, as it perpetuates unequal opportunities for growth and development (Gomberg 2007; Sayer 2009, 2011; Timmermann and Félix 2018).

Gomberg's conception of contributive justice is very encouraging. It acknowledges both the right and the duty aspect of the concept. While Gomberg and Timmerman relate their conceptualizations of contributive justice to the end of capacity building, Gomberg's conception of contributive justice maintains a strong emphasis on the goal of promoting the flourishing of all.[114] What is missing from both Gomberg and Timmerman is that they only see contributive justice in the context of the narrow world of work, and they do not suggest that it is a dynamic principle of justice that should be developed and implemented beyond the scope of the workplace. This may be, perhaps, a function of their roles within narrow academic disciplines.

Social theorist and political economist, Andrew Sayer, has also contributed a great deal in the area of using contributive justice principles to understand and to promote the value of meaningful work in much the same manner as Gomberg and Timmerman. However, Sayer works with a slightly narrower definition of contributive justice. He opines that contributive justice is "a normative theory concerning the division of labour between jobs of different qualities that provide their holders with unequal possibilities for realizing their potential" (Sayer 2011, 7). One of the challenges with this definition, however, is the singular focus on jobs. Sayer seems to see contributive justice solely in the context of the workplace and workplace roles. He does, however, recognize that contributive justice "concerns what people are allowed, expected or required to do or contribute" (ibid., 9). This idea is consistent with Gomberg's (2007) notion of contributive justice as being justice with regards to what people are expected and able to contribute in terms of work.

The issue of contributive justice is new, but it can also be seen in the bioethics literature as it relates to balancing the demands of contractual justice with the all-too-prevalent reality of limited resources. For Morreim, contributive justice relates to the conception of fairness. Contributive justice

[114] As discussed, the teleological end of contributive justice is human flourishing. This concept is more fully discussed in Chapter 4.

seems to pick up where health care contracts are unclear or incomplete. Morreim (1995, 248) uses contributive justice as a way to measure out justice where distributive justice leaves off. For him, distributive justice addresses the concerns of the "entire distribution of benefits and burdens throughout society." Contributive justice concerns the "fairness to the large number of people whose financial contributions comprise the resource pool from which individual needs are then served" (ibid., 250). For Morreim, contributive justice seems to be a way to have a meritocracy-based distribution of resources, where distribution is not based upon need, but rather is based upon contribution.

Morreim's understanding is a serious distortion of the conceptualization of contributive justice offered in this study. In Morreim's usage, contributive justice is a measure of how to distribute benefits or resources better, measured by proportionate inputs. His approach is not consistent with the shared value theory approach of the model discussed in this study, and it is more consistent with exchange theory and reliant more on notions of individualism. This work is instructive in offering examples of how a distorted or limited understanding the human value of contribution can morph into arguments inconsistent with this notion of justice.

Contributive justice concepts may also play an important role in understanding the future of the information sciences. In referencing the work of Britz and Lipinski,Timmermann points out that when only a limited population of people can fully develop their capacities, there is a natural diminishment of diversity that impacts scientific and cultural advancement (Timmermann and Félix 2018, 95). Gomberg and Sayer also make this point, and they suggest that when a society limits access to education and development, the most significant losses occur not in the diminishment of technological developments, but rather in the human and social developments that are stifled due to a lack of investing in the capacities of all (ibid.).

Social theorists Gomberg, Sayer, and Timmerman point out a very important aspect of contributive justice. They reinforce the importance of capacity building in the contributive justice

paradigm. They are able to show that contributive injustice has consequences. Timmerman shows that the diminishment of diversity not only leads to losses with the work at hand (information sciences), but also that there are other impacts on cultural and human developments. These scholars offer an avenue for further research on the consequences of discrimination and marginalization, both of which are arguably among the most significant contributive injustices.

Researchers in the library sciences have also used the concept of contributive justice to assist in understanding the contributory role that libraries and those who use and support libraries add to the development of just and well-ordered communities. Researchers in Spain have used Gomberg's conception of contributory justice to help to frame their understanding of the importance of libraries to Spanish society. Merlo-Vega and Chu (2015, 303) point out that there "needs to be both duty and opportunity to contribute, because without contributions there isn't anything to distribute." In drawing on contributive justice ideas, Merlo-Vega and Chu conclude that "it is not about the benefits people receive (who gets what or distribution); rather, justice is achieved by what one gives to others (who gives what or contribution)" (ibid.).

In this instance, Merlo-Vega and Chu use contributive justice in the unique context of evaluating a capacity-building institution: a library. There is in this usage an acknowledgement of both the right and obligation to contribute—in a way that expresses the type of reciprocity that is akin to the sentiment expressed by Lieber.[115] Further research on other capacity-building social institutions could further expand our understanding of the importance, from a contributor justice perspective, of these organizations in the development of societies that promote human flourishing.

Even the new discipline of agroecology has found merit in using the principles of contributive justice. Timmermann and Félix (2015) use Gomberg's definition of contributory justice, which is also seen in Sayer. They argue that "contributory justice demands a work environment where people are stimulated

[115] See Note 105 on Leiber.

to develop skills and learn to be productive" (526). They also suggest, as others have, that a just work environment must also include a share in the distribution of tedious work (Gomberg 2007; Sayer 2011; Timmermann and Félix 2018). For Timmermann and Félix (2015, 523), it is important to point out that there are "capabilities and types of social relationships [that] are sustainably promoted and reinforced by agroecological farming practices." They conclude that these capabilities and social relationships contribute to enhanced bargaining power, which then facilitates self-determination (ibid.).

Again, in this example from the agroecological literature, contributive justice is seen in the context of discussions about meaningful work, as is seen also in the work of Gomberg and Sayer. What Timmermann and Félix offer that is new to the discussion is the notion of self-determination. This is an important aspect of the call to self-flourishing in the conceptualization of contributive justice offered in this study. This idea points to the importance of first taking care of the responsibility to be the best version of yourself to be able to maximize opportunities to contribute. This notion of self-development should not be confused with egoism. It is an obligation to offer the first fruits of the self to be in the most robust and just position to contribute to the flourishing of others.[116]

As each of these examples highlights ways to think about and apply notions of contributive justice, some scholars have chosen to also consider what contributive *injustice* might look like.[117] Sayer (2009, 14) opines that "contributive injustice limits what some people can do." He addresses this notion in terms of the juxtaposition between meaningful and tedious work generally, but also in the context of gender discrimination in the household and in the workplace. The significance of this, he argues, is that by limiting contribution or participation, one is diminished in one's capacity to develop abilities and functioning

[116] The notion of first fruits has its origins in Old Testament scripture, where in Deuteronomy 26:1-10, the Israelites were instructed to offer the first fruits of the harvest to God before any other harvesting. In the New Testament, the notion of first fruits is understood in a symbolic way; Christ is seen as fulfillment of this call, being the "first fruits of those fallen asleep" (1 Corinthians 15:20). Ultimately, we can understand first fruits as God's harvest of souls and our call to charity and liberality.

[117] See Note 112.

further, which then results in a diminished capacity for fulfilment, a reduction in respect, and a deterioration of self-esteem—all critical elements of human flourishing.

O'Boyle considers contributive injustice from an institutional perspective. For example, he considers actions such as industrial spying and corporate sabotage as ways in which persons violate their obligations to contribute to their own organization by seeking to undermine the business activities of others. He considers computer tampering an effort to misuse the Internet, which he describes as a community asset, as in so doing, the agent impinges on others' ability to use that shared asset to contribute. O'Boyle (2004, 52) also references product tampering, insurance fraud, insider trading, trade dumping, and tax evasions as similar injustices.

2.3 CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS A RIGHT AND OBLIGATION

O'Boyle (2004, 44) subscribes to the Thomistic notion of justice as a virtue of rendering to another that which is owed. Inherent in this idea is the obligation of one man to another. However, to satisfy this obligation, there must be a means to do so. A means of satisfying a debt of justice, then, suggests that a capacity must be called upon. This suggests that each man has a right to the conditions consistent with development of capacity so that he has a reasonable chance to use his volition to act in justice. In this way, contribution is not only an obligation; it is also a right.

To actualize this idea, O'Boyle sees the Catholic social teaching of the social mortgage as the normative basis for contributive justice. He draws this conclusion because he understands the social mortgage as drawing the attention of property owners to support and maintain the community (O'Boyle 2014, 121). The idea behind this concept is that the social mortgage can remedy the disparate levels of access and benefit from community resources such as healthcare, education, transportation, police and fire protection, etc. The rationale is that some members of the community disproportionately benefit so that those with lesser access benefit less. He suggests that contributive justice is the ethical means to give to each what is due not by distribution, but through man's own choice and initiative, should he decide to

take advantage of resources that aid his capacity to contribute. O'Boyle suggests that this idea is an elaboration of the idea put forth by Pope Saint Paul VI in 1967 in *Populorum Progressio* that suggests that when sharing the resources in society that build capacity, "[y]ou are not making a gift of what is yours to the poor man, but you are giving him what is his" (23). For O'Boyle, public mandates such as a minimum wage and universal health insurance evidence yet other examples of a debt owed to others as means of fulfilling the call to remedy the injustice of not all having access to adequate means of production, which in turn limits opportunities for contribution (129).

Sayer (2011, 7) recognizes this relationship as he points out the Aristotelian "emphasis on the development of dispositions and abilities through practice." However, although it is important to recognize the universal call for all to contribute to the common good, with some share of it going back to individuals, we must still recognize that not everyone can contribute to the same degree (*Rerum Novarum*, 34). Murnion (1989, 849) concludes that "contributive justice demands of everyone a contribution to society in accordance with one's ability." It seems that the measure of contribution rests in the conscience of men: the individual making the contribution and the individuals responsible for the institutions of society that facilitate the mechanisms for building the capacity for each to contribute.

2.4 CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEMANDS OF CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

In approaching justice, Bourke (1982, 18-19) toggles between the Thomistic approach of justice as a virtue and a habit of the will of the individual and the Rawlsian notion of justice being rooted in fairness as mediated by institutions. Ultimately, he opines that justice is in need of a twenty-first century update. His preconditions, or criteria, for update include the following: (1) working out an explanatory definition [of justice], (2) accepting that fairness is not an adequate measure of justice, and (3) acknowledging that the dichotomy of the individual versus institution is not appropriate or sufficient (ibid., 26).

Therefore, from Bourke's perspective, any new theory of justice must explain how it is understood in both an individual and collective (institutional) experience. He also suggests the establishment of an alternative human value other than fairness upon which to rest a new theory, as fairness has been the dominant value in the distributive justice theories that have dominated the past century. Finally, he suggests that any new theory should be easily explainable. Contributive justice offers the core values of (1) contribution, (2) justice, and (3) flourishing. It also recognizes the rights and obligations imbued to the individual while simultaneously recognizing the value and contribution of the individual to a community governed by institutions that also are obligated to facilitate these values. These ideas, arguably, satisfy Bourke's requirements.

2.5 TOWARD A NORMATIVE APPLICATION OF CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE PRINCIPLES

In looking to how the principles of a normative theory of contributive justice have been explored, one must consider the transformative work of the Nobel Prize-winning developmental economist Amartya Sen and the political philosopher Martha Nussbaum. First addressed in his 1979 Tanner Lecture on Human Values entitled *Equality of What*, Sen challenged the operation of rights in civil society by challenging the purely utilitarian notion of value. He argued for a basic capabilities equality (Sen 1979). In this way, governments should be judged based upon the real capabilities of their citizens, and not simply the amount of economic growth of a country.[118] In developing his capability approach, Sen (1992) focused on the quality of life that a person could actually achieve—through both functionings and capabilities. Sen's objective has been to develop evaluative tools to measure and incrementally to improve human development. Sen's work has been instrumental in the creation of development indices used by the

[118] Sen (1999, 74) posits that in a good theory of well-being "account would have to be taken not only of the primary goods [as in distributive justice theories] the persons respectively hold, but also for the relevant personal characteristics that govern the conversion of primary goods into the person's ability to promote her ends. What matters to people is that they are able to achieve actual functionings, that is the actual living that people manage to achieve." This is the approach taken by the United Nations in the creation of its Human Development Index, which measures three dimensions of human development: (1) a long and healthy life, (2) being knowledgeable, and (3) having a decent standard of living (http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi).

United Nations to compare development progress. Working through a similar capabilities framework, Nussbaum has sought to develop a theory of justice based upon the value of human dignity as expressed through capability.

Unlike Sen, Nussbaum has sought to enumerate a very specific set of capabilities that she opines are specific enough to be determinative of justice yet broad enough to be applicable cross culturally. However, she asserts that her capabilities approach is "resolutely pluralist about value: it holds that the capability achievements that are central for people are different in quality not just in quantity" (Nussbaum 2011, 18). She asserts that the approach understands each person as an end and not as part of an aggregate. This is because the approach focuses on the notion of individual choice and freedom, "holding that the crucial good societies should be promoting for their people is a set of opportunities … which people then may or may not exercise in action" (ibid.). For Nussbaum, the ultimate choice of action resides with the individual person. She argues that what is at the heart of this system of justice is the question of "what each person is actually able to do or to be" (ibid., 14). Nussbaum contends that the capabilities approach she has developed is ultimately concerned with "entrenched social injustice and inequality, especially capability failures that are the result of discrimination and marginalization" (ibid., 19).

For Nussbaum, capacities are what Sen calls "substantial freedoms," which Nussbaum defines as "a set of (usually interrelated) opportunities to choose and to act" (ibid., 20). She explains that these capabilities are not just abilities residing inside a person, but they are also "freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and [the] political, social and economic environment" (ibid.). In constructing her system of justice, Nussbaum insists that it is in response to the central question of social justice: "what does a life of human dignity require?" (ibid., 32). Nussbaum enumerates ten "Central Capabilities:" (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) freedom of expression, (5) emotional freedom, (6) liberty of conscience, (7) freedom of affiliation, (8) respect for environment, (9)

recreation, and (10) control over one's environment including political participation and meaningful work (ibid., 33-34).[119]

As it first developed, the capabilities approach was for Sen rooted in the value of freedom—freedom to develop and freedom to choose how best to benefit from that development. For Nussbaum, the approach is similar, but it is rooted in the value of capability and it is comprised of very specific criteria. If the central values of contributive justice are contribution and human flourishing, it stands to reason that contributive justice is one further rung on the ladder just above that of capability; *it is the actualization of capacity with a call to action and reciprocity*. Contributive justice requires those same development capacities, but it also calls on man to maximize the fruit of the functioning for himself and for others: man as both principal and agent. Man must seek to develop himself while working always for those conditions that encourage and enable others to do the same, no matter what their stage of development.

2.6 ACTUALIZATION OF CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Timmermann and Félix (2015) argue that contributive justice theory has been and needs to be continually rooted in social agreements and human rights declarations. They specifically point to the United Nations' (1948) *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UNUDHR or Declaration). This document was created in the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II. Four specific freedoms were memorialized as part of the development of the United Nations' Charter: (1) freedom of speech, (2) freedom of religion, (3) freedom from fear, and (4) freedom from want (Roosevelt 1941, §§82-86) These are the fundamental freedoms that the international community has recognized as fundamental to justice and human

[119] Several of Nussbaum's central capabilities are akin to the natural rights described by John Locke in his *Second Treatise on Government*. These natural rights find prominence in the US Constitution, and they include life, liberty, and property.

flourishing.[120] In Articles 22-27 of the *Declaration*, the authors enumerate more specific conditions that actualize these freedoms (United Nations 1948):

- Article 22: Economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality;
- Article 23: Right to work, without discrimination, equal pay for equal work, a dignity wage—or a wage supplemented to be so, and the right to participate in a labor union;
- Article 24: Right to rest and leisure and periodic holidays with pay;
- Article 25: Right to an adequate standard of living for self and family including health, housing, clothing, necessary social services, social safety net, and special protections for the vulnerabilities of motherhood and childhood, no matter the circumstances of conception
- Article 26: Right to an education;
- Article 27: Right to participate in the cultural life of the community and right to intellectual property.

In both Nussbaum's capabilities and the UNUDHR, we see attempts to enumerate the fundamental capabilities (to use Nussbaum's language) needed in a society to promote an adequate standard of living and a dignified life. What this discussion suggests is that to stimulate and facilitate contribution, there need to be certain preconditions and certain capabilities that ignite functioning and that give man the moral choice of action.

2.7 WHAT A SYSTEM OF CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE COULD LOOK LIKE

With the blueprint of theology and the insights of a myriad of social sciences, a picture of contributive justice begins to emerge. The premise of this thesis is that man has a unique calling to work in the world; this call relates to his relationship with God, with whom he is a co-worker. Therefore, man is obligated to take constructive action in the world for the sake of his own flourishing and for the flourishing

[120] Although the United States is a signatory to the non-binding UNUDHR, there are provisions in the US Constitution that are representative of its principles. For example, the 1st Amendment of the US Constitution is akin to Articles 18 (religion), 19 (speech), and 20 (association). The 5th Amendment is akin to Article 9 (arbitrary arrest). The 6th Amendment is akin to Article 10 (fair trial). The 8th Amendment is akin to Article 5 (cruel and unusual punishment). The 13th Amendment is akin to Article 4 (slavery). The 14th Amendment is akin to Article 2 (non-discrimination), Article 3 (life, liberty, and security), and Articles 6 and 7 (equal protection). Finally, the 15th, 19th, 23rd, and 24th Amendments are akin to Article 21 (voting). However, the US constitutional system does not provide for the right to an adequate standard of living, as the principles enumerated in the UNUDHR seem to imply.

of his fellow man. The theology attributes this to man's call to love of God and to love of his neighbor. To love requires man's action. Following on the theological premise that each man is unique and unrepeatable (Jeremiah 1:4-5; Jeremiah 29:11; 1 Peter 4:10-11), it stands to reason that each has something unique to contribute to the world and the life of others. Like the pebble dropped in the pond that sends ripples out through the water, each man's life (whether he is conscious of it or not) places an imprint that forever changes the course of the world.[121] The importance of this process cannot be overstated. The principle of contributive justice is understood both to perfect each man's ability to recognize and utilize his own uniqueness and to call on him to emphasize his obligation to take action in the world. Again, contributive justice can be understood this way:

> ***Contributive justice*** is a normative theory that concerns the right and obligation of every man to contribute his efforts, resources, and talents toward his own flourishing and the flourishing of others to develop societies whose measure of justice is how they advance every member's ability to contribute and flourish within a social framework that enables justice.

This creative call drives his socialization, the development of capabilities based upon his own uniqueness, and it morally obligates him to participate in the institutions of society that develop and govern the community in which he lives. The key value in this enterprise is *contribution*—the call to contribute and the obligation to facilitate opportunities for the maximum development of the capabilities of himself and others so that each man can ultimately exercise his moral responsibility to maximize his contribution to the life of the world. The way this process manifests itself depends upon a myriad of inputs. First, there must be a social recognition of the inherent human dignity and the sanctity of human life. Second, there must be a universal recognition that every human life has something meaningful to contribute to the

[121] German philosopher Johann Gottleib Fichte (2000) writes in *Die Bestimmung des Menschen (The Vocation of Man)*, originally written in 1799, that "you could not remove a single grain of sand from its place without thereby … changing something throughout all parts of the immeasurable whole." This idea has taken root in the work of Edward Lorenz (d. 2008), the founder of modern chaos theory. Lorenz, who studied the physics and mathematics of weather, is credited with the concept of the butterfly effect. This is the idea that small changes can have large consequences.

world—from the most vulnerable to the most well-endowed.[122] Third, work is understood (in its most basic sense) as being man's action in the world, and that each man by virtue of his personhood has a right and obligation to work (contribute).[123] Fourth, the result of man's work is the creation of wealth—or bounty. This wealth has both a material and a spiritual dimension. Fifth, a social mortgage has been placed upon this wealth, which morally obligates man to make a contribution for the use of the resources of the world to perfect himself and to initiate a cycle of reinvestment in the flourishing of his fellow man. Sixth, each is responsible for contributing to social decision-making to establish and maintain societies that promote contributive justice (see Appendix 1).

Both Timmermann and Félix (2018) and Gomberg (2007) suggest that the theories of distributive and contributive justice are intertwined. They suggest that the relationship is such that "[w]hilst distributive justice may help to justify the mechanism for distribution, contributive justice argues why goods such as educational resources and resources to improve the experience of work … have to be distributed" (Timmermann and Félix 2018, 93). This idea suggests that contributive justice has a broader scope than distributive justice, because contributive justice seeks situations where people pursue social institutions that will support not only their own capacity building, but also that of others with the goal that all flourish. Even John Rawls (1999, 374), the father of distributive ethics, understands this. To capture this idea of universality of flourishing, Rawls describes what he terms the "Aristotelian Principle": "other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities … and that this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized or the greater the complexity." Rawls notes that there is also a "companion effect" to this principle:

> As we witness the exercise of well-trained abilities by others, these displays are enjoyed by us and rouse a desire that we should be able to do the same things ourselves. We want to be like those persons who can exercise the abilities that we find latent in our nature. (375-6)

[122] This is the recognition that the most basic contribution is the giving of the self—even if it is in mere existence.
[123] In its simplest understanding, man's action in the world is his contribution.

Ultimately, contributive justice is manifest in the cycle of capacity-building, work, and reinvestment. The fuel to keep this cycle going comes from refreshment and renewal, from rest and leisure; this concept is given through the commandment to rest and keep the Sabbath. It is important to note that man's first full day of existence was a day of rest and regeneration.[124] Contributive injustices, then, are those instances where capacity is stifled or diminished by lack of opportunity or discrimination, work is inhibited or marginalized, reinvestment is non-existent or inadequate, and rest and renewal are not valued and upheld.

Timmerman and Félix (2018, 107) suggest that the "true potential of contributive justice may rest in becoming a societal aspiration at which people aim, in their both professional and personal lives." Contributive justice requires contribution—first in *will*; then in *action*. Contributive justice is a normative theory, an ideal. For contribution to be a true facet and an important basis of justice, it must not be forced or coerced, because ultimately, the true contribution is that of the will, as evidenced through action. Without the consent of the will, there will never be valid and meaningful contribution in the moral sense.

2.8 THE IDEOLOGY OF CONTRIBUTION

Murnion (1989, 848) argues that "every modern theory of social justice is ideological." His assertion seems straightforward, because certainly social justice theory relates to both political and economic theory and policy, so de facto, it relates to ideals.[125] For Murnion, social justice is simply a way

[124] In Genesis 1:26, God made man on the sixth day, and on the seventh day, He rested. Genesis 2:2-3: "And on the seventh day God finished his work which he had done, and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had done. So God blessed the seventh day and hallowed it, because on it God rested from all his work which he had done in creation." This day of rest and regeneration is a gift from God meant for man to work on his soul, his inner self, and his relationships. The German Catholic philosopher Josef Pieper (2009) explains that leisure (what we might consider the activity that happens on rest/Sabbath) is a condition of the soul that fosters a capacity to perceive the reality of the world. It is a state of quietness that provides fuel for man to recharge and renew himself.

[125] The term "ideals" in this usage is meant in the sense offered by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) who coined the term "ideology" to mean a "science of ideas" (Kennedy 1979, 353). Historian Emmet Kennedy offers fuller history of how Napoleon's feud with de Tracy evolved into the term ideology being used later by Karl Marx as a pejorative (ibid., 353-368).

to rationalize class interest. Within this framework, Murnion establishes a dichotomy between contributive justice and distributive justice, with contributive justice relating solely to "each individual's duty to contribute to the common good," and distributive justice taken to mean the duty to find fairness in the distribution of goods–solely in a material sense (ibid.). The challenge with Murnion's perspective is that it only takes into account the duty aspect of contributive justice; it ignores the right inherent in allowing all to contribute to facilitating the conditions that would allow for all to contribute. Sayer (2009, 1) recognizes this error when he points out that "ignoring contributive justice [in its expanded demand of a 'right' to contribute] tends to support legitimations of distributive inequality."

Murnion situates his discussion about the ideology of social justice within a matrix structured by juxtaposing motivations for contributions and distribution. He uses choice and ability to motivate contribution and merit and need to motivate distribution.[126] He explains the four political/social ideologies this way (Murnion 1989, 849):

> Libertarian: "From each according to choice, to each according to merit."
> Liberalism: "From each according to ability, to each according to merit."
> Anarchism: "From each according to choice, to each according to need."
> Communism: "From each according to ability, to each according to need."

For discussions of contributive justice, it is challenging to reduce contribution to choice or ability, because choice is often stifled by lack of opportunity or marginalization, resulting in an artificially diminished ability. In this way, we are not able to capture volition.[127] Without volition or with diminished volition, how can we assess a true ideal or ideology? Perhaps Marx and Engels (1964, 95) were closer when they suggested what could be considered a precondition to ideology when they opined that "the

[126] Murnion does not attempt to use his own duty to the common good standard in consideration of contribution. Perhaps he assumes that the concept of duty is inherent in the very idea of social justice. However, this concept is not considered. Instead, Murnion uses ability and choice as proxies for understanding contribution. This author believes this approach is flawed.

[127] The concept of volition captures the idea of a conscious choice or decision, whereas the concept of choice relates to an option or alternative.

free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." Once capacity is realized, true choice and contribution can be made.

This study suggests that it is challenging to put contributive justice within the ideological framework laid out by Murnion. The primary challenge arises from the conception of contribution. This author sees a fundamental ideological challenge to the dichotomy of choice and ability, because individual ability is a derivative of capability. In this way, without a certain threshold of individual ability derived from realized capabilities, choice is not real choice. It is merely a fallacy of composition—suggesting that because some have ability, all have ability, and suggesting that because some have a choice, all have a choice. Sayer (2009, 13) contends that "an unequal social division of labour of the kind that has developed in modern societies makes the contributive principle of each according to their ability impossible to achieve."

2.9 ROLE OF SOCIALIZATION

What we are able to do (or contribute) in life is the product of a myriad of factors. According to existing conceptions of contributive justice, "what people become is strongly influenced by the dominant social relations and practices in which they take part, particularly those early in life" (Sayer 2011, 10). Sayer contends that socialization is a vital component in human development. He also argues that who and what one becomes determines the range of available ways to contribute. He reminds us that "[w]hat we do influences the kind of person we become" (ibid.). He takes the Aristotelian view that virtues and vices are acquired through repeated action, and they result in embodied dispositions that impact everything from skills and abilities to our attitudes about life. Socialization plays a major role the shaping of each person, and it influences his ability to respond to opportunities to develop capacities to the extent to which they are available. The first institution that influences the socialization process is the family, and this is the reason that contributive justice is addressed in the context of the family in more detail in Chapter 4.

2.10 TO LOVE GOD AND OUR FELLOW MAN

In this chapter, we have come to recognize that the theological framework for understanding work and wealth (as developed in Chapter 1) captures many of the critical components of the working understanding of what scholars from a myriad of secular disciplines are calling contributive justice. What is missing in the secular understanding of contributive justice, however, is the answer to the question of "why" contributive justice. This author believes that the best answer to that question is the theological call to love God and our fellow man. In response to mankind's universal call to assist in the creative transformation of the world through work/action, man is called to contribute. In obedience and love of God, he must work. In response to mankind's call to love his fellow man, he is obligated to develop societies and institutions that provide the circumstances and resources that allow all men to contribute to the fullest extent possible. What is also missing in the secular understanding of contributive justice is the explicit call to reinvest, through the contribution of time, talent, and treasure, in the flourishing of our fellow man by investing in his increased capacity to contribute. This issue is addressed somewhat by the sociologists who discuss the scourge of discrimination and marginalization, but there is no explicit call, prescription, or vision of the full potential of contributive justice outside of the context of the workplace. The aim of this project is to imagine what contributive justice could look like in the context of (1) the family, (2) the governance of society, (3) the economy, and (4) religious practice within the moral framework of a new social contract.

CHAPTER 3

CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS THE MORAL FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

> If the secular part of our culture derived grave errors from its worship of reason and nature, rather than the worship of God, it compounded those errors by its extreme voluntarism, which was blind to the workings of providence in history and thought that men could create both governments and communities by the "social contract."
>
> Reinhold Niebuhr
> *Theology and Political Thought in the Western World (260)*

This study began by exploring the ontological nature of man and his role as a co-worker with God in the fulfillment of the material world. Man's actions, *or work in the world*, create both material and immaterial wealth. Christian theology and Catholic social teaching instruct that man is called to use this wealth as a means of not only providing for his own subsistence, development, and flourishing, but also satisfying his unique debt under the social mortgage. This debt is a mechanism for reinvestment in his fellow man, which God has called man's duty to love his brothers and sisters; part of this act of loving is giving man his due.[128] This dimension of justice was introduced in Chapter 1 as contributive justice (see Appendices 1 and 3).

The author argues that the theological understanding of work and wealth leads to a conceptualization of justice that has been contemplated in a variety of disciplines but that is best understood as rooted in the theological understanding nature of work and wealth. Chapter 2 offered a comprehensive definition of contributive justice, and it benchmarked this definition against other uses of the notion developed in a variety of social science disciplines. The definition offered in this study is then evaluated against a criteria and a rubric for understanding the demand of this dimension of justice

[128] Saint Augustine (1887) explains in Chapter 21 of the *City of God* that "justice is that virtue which gives everyone his due."

developed by those who seek to use it in the area of the sociology of work.[129] Chapter 2 also considered issues that relate to a normative application of contributive justice, which included a discussion of what the application of contributive justice principles could look like. This chapter seeks to use the contractarian construct (1) to provide a structural framework to capture a duty relationship between man and God within the context of community, (2) to establish an argument within an egalitarian ideal, and (3) to provide a metaphor for understanding the collective agreement of how to understand how man can live in harmony in community.[130]

Chapter 3 considers the notion of the social contract as a mechanism for man's agreement on how he will live in community; the idea of the social contract is a metaphor for understanding man's life in community. Conceptually, it is meant to capture the rights and duties of citizens and to enumerate the perimeters of public authority. This chapter considers how the social contract construct has been developed, and it contemplates the role contributive justice could play as a moral foundation for social renewal within the context of the social contract construct.

This chapter begins with a reflection from American Protestant theologian and ethicist Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), who has identified[131] what could be considered two of the most consequential issues facing modern life: (1) man's displacement of God and (2) man's inability to understand that God is in control.[132] Granted, this observation takes a distinct philosophical and theological position, and this is by design. First, Niebuhr is pointing out that modern society is secular and is so by virtue of what he calls

[129] To date (outside this study), this is the only available rubric offered to evaluate contributive justice conceptualizations.
[130] This author recognizes the challenge of situating this argument against the traditional social contract theory paradigm. The intent is to make clear that however inelegant this may appear, it is meant to convey the importance of understanding the evolutionary context in which dealing with contributive justice in the social sphere finds itself in the uniquely American experience.
[131] See the quote at the start of this chapter.
[132] This idea is found in Proverbs 19:21: "Many are the plans in the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the Lord that will be established." It is also understood from Jeremiah 29:11: "For I know the plans I have for you, says the Lord, plans for welfare and not for evil, to give you a future and a hope."

the "worship of reason and nature."[133] He also contends that man has adopted a philosophy that places his will as the creator of destiny, and that man has consequently abandoned the idea that God is at work in the world. For Niebuhr (1957, 260), the result is an inadequate contrivance: the social contract.[134]

Niebuhr wrote in the twentieth century, but he could easily have been writing at any time after the Enlightenment.[135] In man's quest for understanding the laws of nature, he has embraced an acceptance of a distortion of his own nature as a creature made in the very image and likeness of his Creator (Genesis 1:27). In this process, man has lost not only his identity as a creature but also his purpose in being God's co-worker. Without this shared understanding of identity and purpose, mankind is challenged to find a common moral compass. Philosopher Immanuel Kant writes in his essay, *What is Enlightenment?* (1959), that "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another." In one simple phrase, Kant morphed man into his own creator: *sapere aude* (dare to know). This self-proclaimed motto of the Enlightenment would influence centuries of philosophical thinking. Man is free to know, and the way of knowing is through science and empiricism. Post-modernist philosopher of religion John Caputo (2006, 52) argues that it is precisely the "reduction of human values to scientific objects" that occurs in modernity. This is the danger that Niebuhr identifies as man thinks about his role and relations.

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[133] What is meant by secular is the pronounced lack of (or diminishment of) association with religious organizations, religious traditions (for faith-based reasons), and sometimes even religious values. Modern-day political systems tend to separate civic and religious organizations and leaders, and people tend to associate more typically based upon a non-religious classifications such as being human, a member of a particular nationality, or another affiliation (race, gender, sports affiliation, etc.). In the cultural context, secular is understood as the world view of materiality and science.

[134] Niebuhr was, however, optimistic about man's experience with democracy, writing in *Children of Light and Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defense* (1944): "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary" (Foreword).

[135] Historian Brad Gregory (2012, 7) argues in *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* that the ideological pluralism of Western society is a complicated product of Western Christianity. He reasons that the radical shifts in Western Christianity in the Reformation Era resulted in not only doctrinal, but also social and political disagreements about what is true and how man ought to live. He argues that prior to this time, Christianity was an integrated part of all of life, and not the religion of the modern day, which is more separate and apart from the rest of life (ibid., 2).

The social contract to which Niebuhr refers[136] is a man-made conceptualization of how and why man agrees to live with and among others in a society.[137] Niebuhr's criticism is that the modern social contract does not reflect man's dignity as God's co-worker. In fact, for Niebuhr, the modern social contract is operationally devoid of God. Niebuhr, as both a theologian and an ethicist, finds this idea untenable. Post-modernist philosophers like John Caputo (2006, 68), the father of weak theology, argue that "philosophy and theology are different but companion ways to nurture … the passion of life."[138] This author finds Caputo's notion insufficient. The aim of this study is to remedy the deficiency of not being able to recognize, acknowledge, and honor God's place in the world; the author imagines a world in which political philosophy and theology inform each other.[139]

This chapter considers the origins and development of social contract theory as the beginning of an argument that will show that by introducing God's plan for man's role of co-worker, it is possible to construct a moral framework for society that seeks the contribution of all with the common and universal goal of human flourishing.

3.1 ORIGINS OF SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY[140]

Social contract theory has its roots in the wisdom of the ancients. In its essence, social contract theory was conceived as a way to describe man's moral and political obligations. Socrates, in his dialogue

[136] See the quotation at the start of this chapter.
[137] Conceived after the tradition of the ancient Sophists, Enlightenment political philosophers used this construct as a way of rationalizing and understanding civic activities. These ideas are explored in more depth later in this chapter.
[138] John D. Caputo (b. 1940) is a recognized scholar in the philosophy of religion, and he is influenced in his work by the post-modern movement, in particular the work of Jacques Derrida. Caputo is credited as the father of weak theology after his 1997 work entitled *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida.* In weak theology, God is understood as a force that does not interfere with nature. As a post-modern philosopher, Caputo may appreciate the theological, but his theology is in stark contrast to the moderns and pre-moderns who understand God to be an active participant in the world.
[139] The use of the term deficiency here is intended as a strong affirmation of the position that philosophy and theology are genetically linked, having the inherent responsibility to deal with the same matter.
[140] The purpose of Sections 3.1 through 3.5 is not to argue that justice derives from social agreement. Rather, the purpose is to trace a loose line of thinkers in the contractarian tradition to demonstrate the point argued by

with *Crito*, describes how Socrates respects and upholds the laws of Athens, and he explains that his life flourishes because he is dependent upon the laws of Athens for his very existence–concluding that injustice should not be answered with injustice (i.e., Crito's offer to finance Socrates' escape from justice). By remaining in Athens to face justice, Socrates was demonstrating the implicit agreement (*social contract*) inherent in living in community (Plato n.d.a).

Later, in the *Republic*, Plato also references the notion of social contract, but from a slightly different perspective. In the *Republic*, Plato argues that the concept of social contract is directly related to an understanding of the nature of justice itself. In this dialogue, Glaucon argues that man's true desire is to live in a society where he is free to commit injustices to others without fear of retribution, but his greatest fear is living in a society where that is true—where *he* is the subject of injustice. So to avoid this dilemma, man choses to submit to a social contract that keeps these desires in balance (Plato n.d.b, 359a). Interestingly, however, Socrates rejects this dialectic in favor of a simple conception of justice that reasons that justice is worth having for its own sake because it makes man happy (Plato n.d.b, 358a). Here Plato conflates the social contract with the human value of justice.

Plato writes that a just man is one who obeys the laws of his community. In this sense, there is consensus on a conception of a social contract theory. According to Plato, Socrates would argue, however, that a social contract is not the *source of justice*. Socrates argues that justice is a state of well-being of the soul, and it is a good necessary to be authentically happy. Socrates argues this through a description of a city (in modern parlance both the economic and political aspects of society), and he argues this through references to education and the building up of human capacity. He also talks about his conception of the gods and the importance of good role models.[141] In the end, Socrates does not accept that the original

political scientists Boucher and Kelly that the social contract tool is a useful device for a theorist because it can be used to describe any number of types of relationships, including religious duty (1994, 2).

[141] Socrates notes that one of the main goals of the city is the education of all of its citizens to their full capacity. (Plato n.d.b, 368d)

source of justice *is* a social contract.[142] He believes that justice is rooted in something more ethereal.[143] For the time being, Socrates calls simply on a notion of a larger otherness. For Socrates, justice is the health of the soul (Plato n.d.b, 444c-e).

3.2 POLITICAL POWER AND OUR DISCONTENTS

As societies evolved, philosophers began to consider the dynamics of how people live together in community, particularly concerning the moral and political rules that govern their behavior. As society was emerging from the Renaissance, a search began for a competing theory of political legitimacy that could offer an alternative to the patriarchal approach that resulted in the doctrine of the divine right of kings.[144] [145] This was both a philosophical and a practical exercise. The analytical tool for this work evolved around the concept of the *social contract*—rooted in the basic framework of the social contract theory of the ancients. In Western thought, three of the leading contract theorists are Thomas Hobbes (1589-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)—each with his own understanding of

[142] This author acknowledges that we cannot say for certain exactly what Socrates thought because documentation has been lost to history. However, we do know that Plato uses Socrates as his spokesperson as he explores political and philosophical ideas. These ideas can be understood to be a mixture of Plato's original ideas and ideas that were derived from lessons from Plato's teacher, Socrates.

[143] Although Socrates did not have a Christian conception of God, he did have a pagan conception of divinity and most importantly, of the immortality of the soul. History recalls that Socrates, the first philosopher-martyr, was executed for the charge of impiety in 399 BC by Athenian authorities. Socrates lived in a polytheistic, pagan culture that took seriously the notion of impiety.

[144] Although the term divine right of kings would not be formally introduced into political theory until later, the theory is associated with a famous defense by England's Richard I (Richard the Lionhearted), having been accused by Henry VI (the Holy Roman Emperor) of a myriad of crimes in 1193. Richard the Lionhearted is quoted as having professed: "I am born in a rank *which recognizes no superior but God, to whom alone I am responsible* for my actions; but they are so pure and honourable that I voluntarily and cheerfully render an account of them to the whole world" (emphasis added) (Duncan 1839, 290). Duncan records these words as the word of Richard I during his trial before the diet of Henry VI, Holy Roman Emperor; however, Duncan does not attribute his source. A similar quote: "*I am born of a rank which recognizes no superior but God*" (emphasis added) is documented in the Oxford Book of Royal Anecdotes (Langford 1989, 85).

[145] Historian Glenn Burgess (1992, 837) points to what he calls John Neville Figiss's "most significant claim" from his "pioneering" study in 1896 *entitled The Divine Right of Kings*. Figiss claims that "the divine right of kings had an essential place in the development of Western political theory: it enabled the establishment of the proper theory of sovereignty. It was 'necessary as a transition stage between medieval and modern politics' because it served as 'the popular form of expression for the theory of sovereignty.' The divine right of kings made the theory of sovereignty concrete, thus facilitating its growth" (ibid., 838).

man and society, but with the shared understanding that life without laws or rules governing behavior would not be tolerable. Under social contract theory, man would consent to be governed by a political authority, and he would agree to surrender aspects of his freedom in exchange for protection of life, property, and aspects of liberty enforced by authority. How much of his freedom he was willing to forego and under what circumstances are questions at the heart of political theory.

Writing in the early seventeenth century amidst the chaos of the English Civil War, Thomas Hobbes was heavily influenced by the burgeoning theories emerging from the Scientific Revolution unleashed by Johannes Kepler and Galileo Galilei, among others.[146] For Hobbes, man, like the universe, is in a constant state of movement. He contends that everything that man does is for the purpose of moving forward and advancing in power, status, and the satisfaction of his own desires.[147] Hobbes's understanding of human nature is rooted in his understanding of what he sees as the state of nature—man's original position in the world. Hobbes (1946, XIII.9) sees man's position quite starkly as a life that is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." For Hobbes, life is an epic endeavor for conquest in a harsh and unrelenting environment. Hobbes was living during a very dangerous and brutal political environment in his home country, which undoubtedly influenced his ideas.[148] For Hobbes, it was only rational to think that it is in man's best interest to forego his own liberties for safety and order. It is this reasoning that leads

[146] English philosopher and political theorist, Michael Oakeshott writes in his 1946 Introduction to the *Leviathan* that from 1634-1637 Hobbes made his third trip to the continent. He explains that this is when Hobbes first met Galileo in Florence (Hobbes and Oakeshott 1947, viii). German Astronomer Frank Horstmann's (1998) research explains how Hobbes's "mechanistic philosophy was influenced by Johannas Kepler" (135). Hobbes's interest in the newly emerging sciences was also evidenced by time he spent during his 11 years in Paris, where he served as a mathematics tutor to Charles, the Prince of Wales.

[147] Hobbes expresses this idea in Chapter 13 of the *Leviathan* when he writes that "everyone is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time, which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live" (Hobbes and Oakeshott 1947, 85).

[148] This was the time of the English Civil Wars. The first was from 1642-1646; the second was from 1648-1649 which ultimately lead to the execution of Charles I; the third was from 1649-1651. These wars established the environment that developed England's parliamentary monarchy form of government (a monarchy with the consent of Parliament).

Hobbes to conclude that surrendering autonomy to an absolute ruler was the implicit contact that man must make to ensure this safety and general prosperity. This thinking pervaded the regimes of the era.

Writing nearly a generation later and with the backdrop of a parliamentary monarchy in England, John Locke joined the voices calling for the separation of the church and the state. For Locke, man was a blank slate upon which the daily learnings and the big ideas of the day could be written.[149] Unlike Hobbes, Locke believed that the state of nature in which man lived was reasonably good—except that property was not secure.[150] Liberty was limited only in that man did not inhibit the liberty of others: life was peaceful. For Locke (1986), the only reason that man would leave this state of nature was to secure property, because in Locke's state of nature, if there was not private property, there were no laws, judges, or institutions/persons needed (Chapter 19, §222). For Locke, entering the social contract was not surrendering all rights to an absolute power; rather, it was an exchange of certain liberties for the maintenance of order and the enforcement of the laws of nature.[151] Under Locke's social contract, man had the right to life, liberty, and property. Protecting these rights was the purpose of government (Chapter 19, §229). So long as this was the action of government, the government was legitimate—if not, it could be overthrown (Chapter 19, §243).

[149] John Locke writes in *An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding* (written in 1690): "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, *white paper*, void of all characters, without any ideas:—How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the MATERIALS of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE" (emphasis in the original) (Locke 1986, Book 2, Chapter 1, 2). This notion, *tabula rasa*, is not new, and it can be attributed in Western philosophy to Aristotle in *De Anima* (written c. 350 BC). In this work, Aristotle describes the mind as a tablet upon which nothing yet is written (Aristotle n.d., 429b29–430a1).

[150] Locke writes in *The Second Treatise of Government* (1986) of the "state of nature" that "all men are naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possession and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man" (Chapter II, §4).

[151] Locke writes in *The Second Treatise of Government* (1986) that the "state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions" (Chapter II, §6).

Nearly three quarters of a century later, Swiss philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau set out to revisit these ideas at the height of the Enlightenment. Like Locke, Rousseau contended that life in the state of nature was benign. However, Rousseau reasoned that life changed with the increase in population that resulted in the development of communities and the division of labor.[152] Also like Locke, Rousseau sees private property as having influenced the course of human development. For Rousseau, leisure time and the increase of private property fostered the conditions for man to succumb to the vices of greed and envy, and it was this sense of discord that prompted man to leave the state of nature. In doing so, man surrendered his rights to the community as a whole—to what Rousseau termed the *general will*: the source of all of the legitimate laws of government (Rousseau and Gourevitch 2019, Book 1, Chapter 6, §9). For Rousseau, the general will was tantamount to the collective will of the society, which is "constant, unalterable, and pure" (Rousseau and Gourevitch 2019, Book 4, Chapter 1, §6).

Each of these social contract theorists would go on either to influence the creation of new nations or to bear witness to the revolutions that transformed world powers. This was the social contract theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As the world developed, so did social contract theory in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For this next period, social contract theory seemed less about the legitimacy of political power than it did about the intersection of political and moral philosophy–particularly in a world that is suffering greater and greater inequality.

3.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

By the mid-twentieth century, moral and political philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002) had set out to derive a normative political theory to determine the distribution of both civil liberties and social and economic goods. For Rawls, the social contract must derive from notions of justice that solve the

[152] Rousseau writes in *Of the Social Contract or Principles of Political Right* (written in 1762) that "the social order is a sacred right that serves as the basis for all others. Yet this right does not come from nature; it is therefore founded on conventions" (Rousseau and Gourevitch 2019, Book 1, Chapter 1, §2).

dilemma of the competing values of freedom and equality. Like his modernist progenitor Immanuel Kant, Rawls (1999, 514) saw the utility of beginning his theory from the vantage point of man's capacity to reason from a common point of view, which in turn enables man to be impartial in his capacity to reason morally.[153] Kant (2012, §437) describes this phenomenon as the "categorical imperative"; it discounts individual purpose or bias in favor of a moral imperative to act so that all are treated under the same ethical standards. For Rawls (1999, 11), moral equivalency or neutrality is derived by suggesting that man derive his moral philosophy with a presumed lack of knowledge of his own place or circumstance. He called this notion the "veil of ignorance." Both of these constructs are intended to provide an impartial frame on which to hang normative theory.

Unlike the state of nature construct of the early contract theorists, Rawls seeks to abandon the artificial notion that there could ever have existed an original nirvana; instead, he reasons from the greater good of freedom. Rawls is attempting something different; he is trying to reconcile two challenging values—freedom *and* equality. For Rawls, there must be a mechanism to exorcize bias so that equality could have a greater chance of finding a place in modern society. To do this, Rawls draws on the notion of justice, being an understanding of giving one his due. For Rawls (1999, 55), justice in the social sense has two principles: (1) the maximization of basic civil liberties such that that maximized liberty is equal for all, and (2) social inequalities are only justifiable if the least advantaged in society are better off than they would otherwise have been.[154] What is unique in Rawls is that considerations of justice are elevated to constraints on the social contract that set limits of how society should be constructed.[155] Rawls offers a normative approach to the social contract. For Rawls (1999, 96), justice is fairness.

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[153] Rawls (1999, 514) calls this the "original position." Rawls further explains that "[t]he principles of justice identify certain considerations as morally relevant … while the conception of the original position defines the underlying idea which is to inform our deliberations."

[154] This is a concept that Rawls calls the difference principle. Discussion of this principle is beyond the scope of this project. A detailed discussion can be found in *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls 1999, 65-70).

[155] For Rawls, this is a social ideal. He explains that a "social ideal in turn is connected with a conception of society, a vision of the way in which the aims and purposes of social cooperation are to be understood" (Rawls 1999, 9).

Writing at the height of the consumerist 1980s and in response to Rawls, political and moral philosopher David Gauthier endeavored a new take on the Hobbesian theme of self-interest in his 1986 book *Morals by Agreement*. Unlike Hobbes, however, Gauthier argues that morality can be achieved without the dominating force of a sovereign. He demonstrates, through game theory, that reason can lead a man both to cooperate and to honor agreements: a social contract without political authority. Using the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma, Gauthier is able to show that self-interest can coexist with cooperation. This is because when each prisoner's fate is linked to the fate of another's action, acting for the benefit of the other is also acting in one's own self-interest. When put in situations where the actions of others impact one's own outcome, Gauthier's theory of morals by agreement suggests that it is rational to constrain one's own utility.[156] This challenges centuries of political and moral theory based upon the view of man as a self-interested utility-maximizer. Gauthier's (1986, 4) work highlights the human value of cooperation, and it begins to show how a social contract can be internalized by morality.[157]

If Gauthier is correct, the social contract could be much more than an abstract notion of compromise aiming to legitimize the balancing act of competing self-interest by civil society. The social contract could be the mechanism to frame a shared morality that recognizes the value of contribution and that requires the cooperation of all members of society. The fairness in this approach, to address the justice concerns of Rawls, is that each member of society is ennobled with the dignity of making a contribution, and that to be able to do so, society must recognize each man's inherent dignity and invest in building his capacity to flourish. This is a new type of social contract—one in which everyone is recognized and no one is left out.

[156] Gauthier (1986, 184) argues that "[w]hen we correctly understand how utility-maximization is identified by practical rationality, we see that morality is a central part of maximization."
[157] Gauthier (1986, 4) argues that "to choose rationally, one must choose morally."

3.4 RECOGNITION AND THE NEXUS TO CONTRIBUTION

Gauthier's notion of a shared morality involves an important assumption. There is an implicit demand for participation and contribution inherent in the idea of shared morality. The first step in participating and contributing is to be recognized as an actor/participant. Recognition must be the first step, because without it, people are excluded, and exclusion sets up the conditions for discrimination and marginalization that were discussed in Chapter 2 as examples of contributory injustice.

Writing a generation or so after John Locke, German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel sought to "relate individuality to community … individuation to association … and individual freedom to social integration … and how to render each of these compatible with their respective counterparts" (Spiess 2007, 289).[158] What was so innovative about Hegel's work was that he argued that public life was not the remnant of what is left over after a compromise of limiting personal freedoms; rather, public life offered a mechanism for actualization of individual freedom. Hegel's project was to develop a political philosophy that embraced the social nature of man and that advocated for an "intersubjective recognition and the social integration of individuals" (Spiess 2007, 290). Swedish sociologist Carl-Göran Heidegren (2004, 365) opines that Hegel's unique insight is his attempt to "distinguish between different basic modes of recognition and [his] envisaging a multidimensional struggle for recognition." Hegel's work strongly suggests that there is something very important in the idea that each of us is dependent upon each other—not only for recognition of who and what we are, but also in the actualization of who and what we can become.

Christian bioethicist Christian Spiess (2007, 294) identifies three key ethical modes of recognition: "love, law, and solidarity." He draws on the work of political and moral philosopher Axel Honneth as he considers the three levels of recognition that provide guidance into how man can recognize himself and

[158] For further insight into this topic, reference should be made to the first three chapters of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977) where he writes with a post-Kantian sensibility about a philosophical way to view all of human life and mankind's interconnectivity within our diverse spheres of social existence.

others through relationship. First, “a person is recognized as an individual whose needs and wishes are of unique value to another person” (Spiess 2007, 293). This type of recognition is important, because it sets the foundation for understanding the sanctity of life and the uniqueness and unrepeatability of each person. This type of recognition flourishes in friendships and families. Second, “a person is recognized as a subject of law and [is] endowed with moral accountability.” In this way, we can think of man as being a morally autonomous person subject to the laws and norms of his community (Spiess 2007, 294). Finally, “a person is recognized as an individual whose abilities are of constitutive value to a certain community” (ibid.). Here the emphasis is on a recognition of a common humanity. Spiess uses the word solidarity to describe the idea of common good.[159]

Using this framework, one can begin to craft a conception of a social contract that establishes communities that recognize and prioritize the unique contribution to community inherent in each person. What remains, then, is the process of coming and staying together in community. If the social contract is a metaphor for how and under what circumstances men come together, then it is important to recognize the terms under which this is done. The most fundamental consideration is the notion of consent. Through mechanisms of consent, man is contributing his affirmation to a shared vision of community.

3.5 CONSENT AND THE NEXUS TO CONTRIBUTION

Part of the establishment of a shared vision of community is the requirement for consent to what is agreed upon. Consent is the most basic of the contributions of citizenship. However, to have consent, there must be some reason or justification for agreement; this has always been the challenge for social contract theory. Like the argument that Socrates used to subject himself to the law of Athens, Locke

[159] Pope John XXIII, in MM, describes the common good as the complete development of all the people of the world, which includes “all those social conditions which favor the full development of human personality” (65). Four years later, the Second Vatican Council reaffirmed this idea in GS, 26: “the common good, that is, the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment, today takes on an increasingly universal complexion and consequently involves rights and duties with respect to the whole human race.”

argues that anyone who decides to stay in a community is ostensibly giving his "express consent" to its laws. Further, should he participate in the community and enjoy its protection, he is giving his "tacit consent" (Locke 1986, §119). However, using location and participation as proxies for consent introduces opportunities for exploitation and abuse in the form of either physical or economic coercion. The cost for exit may just be too high to be practical or meaningful for some.

Economist Michael C. Keeley cautions about using the notion of consent at all due to its inherent nexus to opportunities for coercion. Instead, he argues that social contracts are valid and reasonable to the extent that they *do no harm*—offering legitimacy to social contracts that have the qualities of a contract of adhesion.[160] These types of contracts are seen as a type of take-it-or-leave-it structure, where one party to the contract is more dominant and is able to set the conditions, because the weaker party is in no position to protest or negotiate.[161] Keeley (1995, 247) recognizes the nature of contracts of adhesion and warns about the assumptions inherent in the notion of consent. The safeguard he offers falls within what he identifies as the Sophist position that supposes that rules [social contract terms] are "arbitrary unless they satisfy some moral principle."

The basic moral principle inherent in social contract theory, according to Keeley (1995, 249), is the "impartial respect for persons—which cannot be denied in any matter, for any person, against any social system." Keeley does not suggest that this type of respect requires equal treatment or equal distribution of resources, but he does contend that each person deserves equal consideration in the construction of social institutions. It is in these institutions that society maintains the social contract.

David Gauthier (1986, 1) asks, "What theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show that all the duties it recommends are truly endorsed in each individual's reason?" If we

[160] Contracts of adhesion are contracts that are drafted by one party in a position of power where the weaker party is put in a position where he has no option but to accept.
[161] A contemporary example of this type of contract would be akin to that of a cellphone company and its users/customers. There is a contract that governs the service and relationship, but the users/customers have no say or input. They are just asked to take it or leave it (Keeley 1995, 247)

understand that reason is the process of consciously making sense of things, we can understand reason as the first principle of human contribution. This suggests that perhaps any new or revised social contract should be rooted in a shared human value—a value that is inherent in each human being: contribution.[162]

3.6 CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS THE MORAL FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

To gain insight into whether and how contributive justice could be assistive as a moral framework, it is helpful to consider the work in intuitive ethics of social psychologists such as Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph (2004) for laying the groundwork for understanding the psychology of moral communities. Moral foundations theory (MFT) builds on this work, and its authors contend that this theory has relevance within social psychology and also for other disciplines. MFT is rooted in four unique claims about morality and its development:

1. Nativism: This idea posits that there is a "first draft of the moral mind" that is "organized in advance of experience" (Graham et al. 2013, 7). This is such that the mind is "prepared to learn values, norms, and behaviors related to a diverse set of recurrent adaptive social problems" (ibid., 9).
2. Cultural learning: This idea posits that the "first draft [of the moral mind] gets edited during development within a particular culture" (ibid.). Although "the moral foundations are not the finished moralities … they constrain the kinds of moral orders that can be built" (ibid., 10).
3. Intuitionism: This idea posits that "[i]ntuitions come first [and] strategic reasoning second" (ibid.). The theory contends that "intuitions [are] shaped by the development within a cultural context, and their output can be edited or channeled by subsequent reasoning and self-presentational concerns" (ibid., 11). Nevertheless, the authors of this theory believe that "moral intuitions tend to fall into families or categories" (ibid.).

[162] It is important to make clear that the first principle of contribution is existence.

4. Pluralism: This idea posits that "[t]here [are] many recurrent social challenges, so there are many moral foundations" (ibid., 12). At this core, MFT is an evolutionary theory, and as such, it "encourages pluralism" (ibid.). This claim is anchored in the consideration of adaptive challenges identified in social psychology and supported by developments in "neuroscience and developmental psychology" (ibid., 14).

MFT suggests that there are at least five distinct and innate moral foundations based upon which societies around the world have developed their moralities: (1) care/harm, (2) fairness/cheating, (3) loyalty/betrayal, (4) authority/subversion, and (5) sanctity/degradation. These foundations were identified based upon what the authors conceived as a "method-theory co-evolution" with "theoretical constructs inspiring the creation of new ways to measure them, and data from the measurements guiding development of the theory" (ibid.). These are developed through (1) self-report surveys, (2) implicit measures, (3) psychophysiological and neuroscience methods, and (4) text analysis (ibid., 15).

The authors of this theory list five criteria for foundationhood under MFT. The authors note that the first two criteria relate to the common characteristic of "moral intuitive judgments" and the final three to the idea that a given foundation may be "innate but variably expressed" (ibid., 37). A description of each criterion follows:

1. Common Concern in Third-Party Normative Judgments. This criterion points to the intuitive reactions of people in community. The authors contend that these judgments stem from a deep-rooted idea about shared intentionality, and the authors suggest that people have a passion and innate capacity for enforcing moral norms—ranging from gossip to protest. As it relates to contributive justice, this criterion is recognized in our innate desire to play and

contribute.[163] It is judged through the lens of discrimination and inequality.[164] In these instances, it is often third parties that become advocates and activists for those who are marginalized.

2. Automatic Affective Evaluations. This criterion addresses the intuitive nature of MFT, and it contends that reactions are immediate and visceral: you know it when you see it—in a picture, a slogan, or even just a gesture. As it relates to contributive justice, this criterion is recognized when someone is excluded, just as it is recognized when someone fails to contribute. Consider the bumper stickers extolling the passion around the issue of the 99% versus the 1% seen after the 2008 financial crisis, Occupy Wall Street, era. "We are the 99" quickly encapsulates the passion around the ideas such as (1) 99% of the people contribute more than the most powerful and (2) the 1% are excluding 99% of the people from contributing and reaping the benefits of their contribution. Consider also the Me Too Movement that arose to empower women to identify and find solidarity with others whose contributions have been marginalized. Similarly, the Black Lives Matter movement, with its signs and symbols, captures the idea that society has a long way to go to show that it recognizes the contribution and value of black lives.
3. Culturally Widespread. The authors contend that being culturally widespread does not necessarily mean that it "underlie[s] morality in all human cultures" (ibid., 38). It suggests that a moral foundation is expressed "in some form in most human cultures" (ibid.). As they concern contributive justice, phrases such as *pulling your weight*, *taking a turn*, *adding value*,

[163] Psychologist William Crain (2010, 2) argues that "the urge to play [and be a part of a playful activity] is just as innate in the human child as in other animals."

[164] However, it can also be considered that this reaction not only derives from wanting to validate or recognize another's right to participate or contribute, but it can also be considered an emotional response out of a sense of care. This example suggests that there may be layering of motivation.

making your mark, *changing the world*, *how can I help*, and *lending a hand* are all common expressions of the value of contribution.

Cultural anthropologist Donald Brown (1991) has identified a variety of *human universals* consistent across time and space that are observed in human (and in some cases also animal) behavior. The human universals of cooperation, cooperative labor, status and role, and economic inequalities each relates to the values of contribution and marginalization, and they find resonance with the conceptualization of contributive justice discussed in the thesis. Cooperation and cooperative labor both denote action and contribution. Status is evocative of the resulting condition of a contribution—whether it is through labor or standing, and the notion of role suggests that there is a common idea that each has a contribution to make or a part to play in life. The universality of economic inequality is suggestive that contribution is recognized, and it is a concept that is universally challenging.

4. Evidence of Innate Preparedness. This criterion identifies where a behavior is found within a society at its earliest stages. The authors suggest looking for evidence in children or even in non-human primates. In explaining this criterion, the authors use the foundation of fairness, and they cite a 2011 developmental psychology study that documented children as young as three being able to share rewards equally, but only when both contributed equally in producing the benefit (Graham et al. 2013, 39). Although the authors use this example to suggest measures of the moral foundation of fairness, it could also be suggestive of elements of contribution. Also, there are widespread examples of childhood role-playing games. It could be argued that when a child takes on a role in these types of games, he/she is taking on an action of contribution as the activities of that role are acted out. It is quite common for children to role play as a teacher, doctor, fireman, mother, or father, because the contributions of these roles are accessible to the child's experience, whereas it would be more

unusual for a child to role play as a rock or a tree. Also consider the importance to early childhood development of the interaction with and attention of adults. For example, children without the participation (contribution) of the feedback loop through the process of attachment from caregivers suffer significant and life-altering development delays, disabilities, and pathologies. Child and adolescent psychiatrists Charles Zeanah and Neil Boris (2000, 366) note that "as [psychopathologists] unravel the secrets of how experience [contribution] impacts brain development in infancy, we hope also to uncover clues as to how disturbed relationships beget the kinds of behavioral problems that come to clinical attention."

5. Evolutionary Model Demonstrates Adaptive Advantage. This final criterion equates a moral foundationalism with an evolutionary adaptive advantage. This suggests that that the moral foundation in some way was assistive in the preservation and enhancement of mankind (or a given species) over the continuum of time. As it relates to contributive justice, it seems self-evident that action in the world is one of the most fundamental aspects of what it means to have life.[165]

In addition to a nexus to these five criteria, the authors of MFT also assert that any new moral foundation should be distinct from the existing moral foundations of (1) care/harm, (2) fairness/cheating, (3) loyalty/betrayal, (4) authority/subversion, and (5) sanctity/degradation (Graham et al. 2013, 67-69). This author argues that contribution could be seen as distinct from and in opposition to marginalization: the new foundation would be contribution/marginalization. This new foundation is rooted in the notion of contributive justice, and it asserts that a system of morality, and by extension a social contract, can be conceived in the notion that each individual has a right and duty to contribute to his own life and that of

[165] Life, by definition, includes action—even if for some its most basic representation is existence. In the context of this study, action is contribution.

the community, and that he is obligated to assist in helping to create (and/or not to hinder) those social institutions and conditions that enable the conditions and circumstances for others to contribute. To inhibit contribution, thus creating a circumstance of injustice, is to put another in a position of being marginalized.

3.7 AMERICA'S SOCIAL CONTRACT

If the social contract is understood to be the agreement that results when a people consent to form a government, then America's social contract can be found in the ideas inherent in its founding document—*The Declaration of Independence* (Jefferson 1776):

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

In this document, the Founding Fathers of the United States of America began their social contract with the acknowledgment that its entire premise is based upon self-evident truths: a common set of beliefs and values.[166] The first value identified is equality. This value is expressed as in terms not of economic value, but of ontological value. The second value is faith, as the Founders acknowledged and professed their faith in a Creator. The third value expressed is truth, as expressed by the acknowledgement of the idea of inalienability. Here the Founders expressly affirm that there are some absolutes, and that there are truths. By next specifically identifying three unalienable rights (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness), the Founders were acknowledging that certain values are so integral to what it means to be

[166] For purposes of this discussion, values are guiding principles, and human values are values that are core to what it means to be human. Self-evident truths are those truths that when denied are self-contradictory.

an American that they are to be expressly enumerated. The Founders affirm the sacredness of life. They express the value of freedom as expressed in a right to personal liberty, and they acknowledge the common goal and good of human flourishing, as they assert the entitlement of every man to seek happiness. Finally, it is the right and expectation that when government fails in its duties to uphold these values and rights, man is called to action—called to contribute to its reconstitution. As it is written, the American social contract can be understood as the proposal of the actualization of the values of equality, faith, truth, freedom, contribution, and human flourishing.

It could also be argued that other civic expressions could also provide insights into the American social contract. For example, there is the seal of the United States—the front of which expresses the motto *E pluribus unum*, and the reverse side offers the expressions *Annuit cœptis* and *Novus ordo seclorum*. With *E pluribus unum* (Out of many, one), there is the double meaning of the American nation as having been derived from many states and ultimately forming one union and the idea of the diversity of its people having come from many nations, races, and religions to form one people. The idea of out of many, one could also be understood to capture and infer the value of the common good. The expression *Annuit cœptis* ([Providence] favors our undertaking) suggests at a minimum a Deist orientation, but perhaps what some 200 years later Niebuhr called out as voluntarism and providence.[167] The Founding Fathers were acknowledging the importance of man's will and his vocation as a co-worker with the Creator. Finally, the expression *Novus ordo seclorum* (New order of the ages) represents the idea that the American experiment is new and as such unique, important, and exceptional. The American experiment is meant to be understood as purposeful, important, and an improvement of the human condition.

Libertarian political scientist Charles Murray (2012, 12) explains the "American project" as a demonstration "that human beings can be left free as individuals and families to live their lives as they see fit, coming together voluntarily to solve their joint problems." In his research, he identifies the values

[167] See the Niebuhr quote at the beginning of this chapter.

of religiosity, honesty, industriousness and the institution of marriage as the key elements that have sustained the American project (Murray 2012).[168] He contends that the social discord of our current age is the result of growing cultural inequality rooted in the diminishment of these key cultural values and the very important institution of marriage. He asserts that any remedy for social discord (i.e., a broken social contract) must include and understanding "that a life well lived requires engagement with those around us" (Murray 2012, 306). For Murray, the American social contract is rooted in freedom—freedom not to act as well as freedom to act. Murray's prescription for a broken society is action (contribution)—a civic "Great Awakening" (ibid.) It is in this awakening that Murray sees the hope for human flourishing as he describes happiness as "consisting of lasting and justified satisfaction with life as a whole" (254).

3.8 DISSATIFACTION, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, AND THE NEED FOR RENEWAL

Philosopher of history, Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) predicted at the turn of the twentieth century that the modern challenges of social and political deterioration were part of a broader pattern of cyclical decline.[169] Social commentators see challenges to the social contract rooted in three central dimensions—inequality and pessimism (Stiglitz 2012; Krugman 2007; Harrington 1997) and cultural/moral decay (Stivers 1994; Lasch 1991). Economic inequality can be measured fairly straightforwardly by evaluating quantitatively. The causes of quantitative inequality have largely been attributed to technological changes, globalization, and an erosion of general norms of fairness and equality. In *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, French economist Thomas Piketty analyzes income and wealth measures throughout the past 250 years. Piketty (2014) concludes that the earning power of capital has outpaced the earning power of labor, resulting in an unequal distribution of wealth that is the cause of social and

[168] Murray emphasizes the institution of marriage as having a stabilizing effect on society. In his view, stable communities provide a fertile environment for the growth of other positive community and social values.
[169] In the *Decline of the West*, Spengler (1918) asserts that all civilizations are subject to predictable phases of evolution. In a prophetic way, Spengler ends his analysis with the quote: "*ducunt fata volentem, nolentem trabunt"* (the Fates lead the willing and drag the unwilling). This sentiment is perhaps not all that different than the sentiments of Virgil in the *Aeneid* (Virgil, Fairclough, and Goold 1999, Book IV, 440): *fata obstant*–the Fates withstand.

economic instability. Social commentator George Packer (2011, 31) warns of the consequences of inequality even more generally. He argues that inequality "hardens society into a class system … divides us from one another … makes it harder to imagine the lives of others … corrodes trust among fellow citizens … provokes a generalized anger … saps the will to conceive of ambitious solutions to collective problems … [and] undermines democracy."

The other challenges to the modern social contract is derived from the linked notions of pessimism and cultural/moral decay. Cultural policy scholar Oliver Bennett (2001) studies cultural pessimism, and he sees it rooted in what could be understood as a culmination of perceptions of decline in the areas of (1) environment stewardship, (2) intellectualism, (3) morality, and (4) politics.[170] The challenge in grasping the magnitude of sentiment in these areas relates to the myriad of ways that culture and morality are expressed and understood. Sociologist Joe Bailey (2013, 122) argues, for example, that "[a] purely technical view of the environment [degradation] has been an important basis for environmental anxiety … [but] responses to the dangers have … deposited new layers of peril on the original problem … [casting environmental issues as not just environmental problems, but also] as political and economic problem[s]." Bailey argues it is the latter that causes the most documentable and profound concern (ibid.).

With both inequality and general cultural/moral pessimism, there is a common thread of discontent: a general sense that our social paradigm is frayed.[171] When considering a new basis for the social contract, it is important to look at the signs of current weakness. Both inequality and a general

[170] Humanist cultural critic Morris Berman (2000, 3) agrees with Spengler's thesis (see Note 161) about the evolution of societies. He also argues that social and moral decay are not top of mind for many people, because they are "seduced by noise, toys, and technology" (16). However, he notes that there are others in society who have different values and who see the signs of cultural and moral decay as they recognize the materialization and commodification of modern life (ibid.).

[171] Historian and moralist Christopher Lasch (1991, 248) offers the image of man's psychological homelessness as a way to understand this dynamic: "the feelings of homelessness and displacement that afflict so many men and women today, in their heightened vulnerability to pain and deprivation, and in the contradiction between the promise that they can 'have it all' and the reality of their limitation."

cultural and moral decline are both strong signals pointing to (1) a diminishment of contribution to the common good and (2) insufficient opportunity for contribution broadly within society. Cultural critic Henry Giroux (2001, ix) agrees, arguing in *Public Spaces, Private Lives: Beyond the Culture of Cynicism* that "public values are rendered invisible in light of the growing power of multinational corporations to privatize public space and disconnect power from issues of equity, social justice, and civic responsibility."

If we understand culture as the environment in which man draws resources to build his own capacity, the social contract could be understood as the codification of a given society's understanding of the social protections needed to do so.[172] Society builds institutions to guide and protect to guard and uplift the values it sees as most fundamental and necessary to promote flourishing and the common good.[173] In a sense, the prevailing culture of a society can be seen as the barometer of its values and the gauge by which to measure the performance of a society's social contract.

3.9 TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

Fundamentally, the social contract is an intellectual construct used to understand the relationship and agreement that people have between and among each other on how to live together in community. This concept can relate to as small a community as a family and to as large a community as a nation state, or even the broader global community. This chapter began with a warning from theologian and ethicist, Reinhold Niebuhr, who cautioned about the audacity of man to believe that he could construct a social contract, let alone a social contract without God. This author argues that man must decide on his community's common values to maintain order and harmony, but he must do so with principles rooted in

[172] Sir Edward Burnette Tylor, father of cultural anthropology, thinks of culture in terms of its broadest ethnographic sense. He defines culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (Tylor 1871, 1). In this way, Tylor considered the whole of culture as a universal human capacity (Scupin 2018, 245).

[173] Roman philosopher and statesman Cicero first used an agricultural metaphor of *cultura* or cultivation to describe what he understood as the teleological end of man: the cultivation of the soul, *cultura autem animi philosophia est* (philosophy is the culture of the soul) (Cicero 1854, Book 2, §5). Cicero contended that it was man's duty and vocation to cultivate his capabilities, and it was society's role to foster the environment to enable him to do so.

his nature as a co-worker with God. Using contributive justice as a tool affords space and authority for God to be at the center of social renewal. With a social contract rooted in contributive justice, the aspiration and motivation is embedded to provide each man the opportunity to develop his capabilities and to live in a society where his contribution is not only needed, but also welcome. This is the very valuable function of the social contract.

Chapter 4 examines the notion of using the contributive justice paradigm designed in this thesis as a means of creating the social conditions that propel action toward social change/renewal. This chapter discusses the preconditions that enable man to have the opportunity to develop fundamental/core capabilities to be nurture his capacity to flourish. The notions of self-development and self-determination are explored. These ideas are discussed in the context of the development of a contributing mindset that this author sees as key to the process of capability building. Issues of diversity and inclusion are discussed as mitigants to contributive injustice. The process of reinvestment is introduced as a means toward understanding the universal telos of flourishing. Finally, the chapter concludes by offering a vision of how contributive justice principles could be used to inspire change with the goal of improving man experience of life in the world.

CHAPTER 4

CONTRIBUTORY JUSTICE AND INSIGHTS INTO A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

> [C]ontributive justice would create social conditions enabling all to live well and to earn respect for their social contribution; each flourishes by advancing the flourishing of others.
>
> Paul Gomberg
> *Why Distributive Justice is Impossible but Contributive Justice Would Work* (32)

This study began by evaluating the theological nature of work and wealth in the Catholic tradition. As it did so, themes of justice emerged, in particular, themes of contributive justice. As previously discussed, the theory of contributive justice is still emerging. This work is intended as a mature consideration of the theory and has been the task of the first two chapters of this thesis. However, it is one thing to define, identify, and discuss this new dimension of justice, and it is another thing to imagine how this dimension of justice could be used as a moral foundation for a social contract; this was accomplished in Chapter 3 of this work.

In Chapter 4, contributive justice is more closely examined as a tool for social contract renewal.[174] It is examined as a normative theory with two primary dimensions—contributive justice as a right and contributive justice as an obligation. As a right, contributive justice principles suggest base preconditions, which are discussed. As key components of this dimension of contributive justice, themes of self-determination, flourishing, capacity-building, and inclusion are developed. This discussion culminates with a discussion of contributive justice in terms of what is due to the self. As an obligation, contributive justice is examined as it relates to the key components of what is due to others. This examination considers the concepts of investment/reinvestment, diversity, and flourishing. This chapter concludes with

[174] In this context, the social contract is understood as a metaphor of how a society finds collective agreement on a social, political, and cultural ethos.

consideration of how contributive justice can be imagined as a moral foundation for a social contract in the context of all the major domains of life: family, community, market, and religion (see Appendix 3).

Political philosopher Paul Gomberg (2007, 2010, 2016) has done extensive work in looking at principles of contributive justice as it relates specifically to discrimination, and he has been the inspiration for much of the enthusiasm of this project. His conclusion in *Why Distributive Justice is Impossible but Contributive Justice Would Work*, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, situates contributive justice as a catalyst for social change (and/or renewal). His analysis captures the human value of contribution, the importance of capacity building, and the powerful psychological forces that respect can unleash. Gomberg positions contributive justice at the center of a cycle of investment and reinvestment that culminates in personal and community flourishing.

4.1 PRECONDITIONS TO CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

For contributive justice to take root, the author contends that certain preconditions must be satisfied to establish the requisite environment for this dimension of justice to flourish. These basic preconditions are so fundamental that without them, contributive justice becomes either meaningless or irrelevant. These preconditions are paramount to the rights imbued by contributive justice. They include (1) life, (2) liberty,[175] (3) health and safety, and (4) access to education. Together, these preconditions mark the starting point from which all other aspects of the rights and obligations inherent in contributive justice are understood.

The precondition of life recognizes life in all its stages of development-- from conception to natural death. Life is the foundation of all human experience, and it should be held sacred regardless of

[175] In this context, liberty is understood within the classical framework of freedom offered by CCC 1730-38 and rooted in the theological notion of free will.

the circumstances.[176] Each human life has value and potential, as each life offers a unique and unrepeatable opportunity for contribution.[177] This notion relates to those most well-endowed by circumstance or ability, just as it relates to the most fragile and marginalized. If we are to understand contribution as action in the world, the most fundamental action is that of simply being.

The second precondition is the notion of liberty. As it relates to the operationalization of contributive justice, liberty should be understood in its natural law context. As such, liberty means each man's "self-determination with regard to fulfilling his natural final goal without interference" (Brogan 1951, 29). Natural law understands man's destiny as his return to God.[178] As such, man must use his intellect and will to engage with the world to evidence his agency as a human being. Liberty is a means to an end. "[M]an must be free and it is the duty of the State to preserve and protect that freedom" (ibid.).[179] In this way, we understand that liberty is not a right given by government; it is a right recognized by government. Government exists to serve man and society, and its laws reflect its role as promoter of the common good and the arbiter of the clashes between the wills of men. In this way, liberty does not

[176] The most fundamental source for this understanding is in the story of the origin of mankind found in Genesis 1:27: "So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them."

[177] Saint Paul, in his First Letter to the Corinthians, describes each man uniqueness as he explains that "Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it" (1 Corinthians 12:27). Using this metaphor, Paul explains that even the vulnerable and weak have important parts to play: "But as it is, God arranged the members in the body, each one of them, as he chose. If all were a single member, where would the body be? As it is, there are many parts, yet one body. The eye cannot say to the hand, 'I have no need of you,' nor again the head to the feet, 'I have no need of you.' On the contrary, the parts of the body that seem to be weaker are indispensable, and on those parts of the body that we think less honorable we bestow the greater honor, and our unpresentable parts are treated with greater modesty, which our more presentable parts do not require. But God has so composed the body, giving greater honor to the part that lacked it, that there may be no division in the body, but that the members may have the same care for one another. If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored, all rejoice together" (1 Corinthians 12:18-26).

[178] The CCC explains (1955) that the "'divine and natural law' shows man the way to follow so as to practice the good and attain his end [beatific vision]. The natural law states the first and essential precepts which govern the moral life."

[179] This understanding of liberty is in contrast to the utilitarian approach to liberty expressed by the political philosopher John Stewart Mill (1806-1873). In his seminal work, *On Liberty*, Mill (1947) posits liberty as absolute in the sense that "[t]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others" (9). This approach to liberty rejects any moral absolutes.

presuppose that man can simply do what he wants.[180] Liberty can also be understood in the context of the principle of subsidiarity discussed in Chapter 1. Within the spirit of subsidiarity, man is afforded the freedom of exercising his own agency to provide protections against discrimination or marginalization. This is the true spirit of contribution.[181]

The third precondition to contributive justice is health and safety. When the terms health and safety are used in policy discussions, they are associated with laws and regulations relating to the conditions in the workplace. The normative theory of contributive justice demands that health and safety considerations should also be included in the list of preconditions for contributive justice, because both health and safety are two fundamental qualities that directly affect every man's ability to function. This is to say that basic health care should be afforded to all. It is also to say that safety should include efforts and public policy priorities aimed at protecting all people from harm due to violence and negligence. These notions of health and safety should include efforts to maintain a sustainable environment.[182]

The fourth precondition is access to education. Education happens first in the family, and preservation and promotion of the family relates directly to a person's openness to other forms of education.[183] Education plays a central role as it relates to the obligations of contributive justice because it is through a well-formed conscience that a person is able to establish a mindset and capacity for contribution. Society then assumes responsibility for offering other options for continual education.

[180] The late New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice explains that "No one can in any lawful sense alienate all his rights, else he would no longer be answerable for his acts. Manifestly, it would not be possible for man to discharge his duties to God or his fellow man if his rights were turned over to civil society or the State" (Brogan 1951, 32).

[181] In this context, freedom is understood in the context of man as a rational being who can "initiate and control his own actions" (CCC 1730).

[182] This notion is rooted in the Public Trust Doctrine, which recognizes that the government is a trustee over essential (to life) natural resources placed in trust for all citizen (current and those of future generations). This argument is being asserted in a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals case in Oregon that was argued in June 2019. The plaintiffs in this case are 21 youths who assert that their 5th Amendment Constitutional rights to life, liberty, property, and public trust resources are being violated because the government is not taking action on the issue of climate change (*Juliana vs. United States*). For more on the Public Trust Doctrine see Sax (1970).

[183] The CCC explains that the "home is the natural environment for initiating a human being into solidarity and communal responsibilities (2224).

Under the paradigm of contributive justice, however, man also bears responsibility and is called to seek out continuous opportunities for education so as to continual build and sustain capabilities.

Each of these preconditions reflects the foundational capacities upon which all others will develop and grow. Each of these preconditions should be reflected in the personal approach to life of each person, just as much as they should form the pillars of just societies. These preconditions reflect the fundamental underpinning of understanding contributive justice as a right. Each person has a right to contribute, but he can only do so (or do so most effectively) if he is afforded these basic preconditions.[184] Then, once these basic preconditions are addressed, the next step is to begin to understand the foundational psychological elements necessary to recognize the opportunities to contribute and flourish.

4.2 SELF-DETERMINATION AS A MORAL IMPERATIVE

Positive psychologists Martin Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (2000, 5) explain that positive psychology developed because psychologists knew "very little about how normal people flourish under benign conditions." The field of positive psychology is a discipline tasked with studying the conditions under which humans flourish in the broadest sense that includes the biological, personal, relational, institutional, cultural, and global dimensions of life (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000). Out of this discipline, a theory developed called self-determination theory (SDT). This theory was first developed by positive psychologists Richard Ryan and Edward Deci (2017, 3), and it continues to be useful for those who seek to understand "the social conditions that facilitate or hinder human flourishing … [by examining] how biological, social, and cultural conditions either enhance or undermine the inherent human capacities for psychological growth, engagement, and wellness, both in general and in specific domains and endeavors."

[184] The concept of preconditions relates the rights side of the contributive justice paradigm. These can be seen as second order concepts—meaning that the fundamental right is the right to life/existence. Because the fundamental right is life/existence, the other rights under contributive justice are secondary because they enhance capacity. In this way there is a secondary nexus with distributive justice. This relationship is offered as an aspect of contributive justice theory to be more fully developed and explored by future scholars.

SDT is a helpful tool in understanding the basic internal needs of man. By understanding man's basic psychological needs, one can begin to understand another level of why contribution is so important. Not only can insights help to foster personal relationships rooted in contributive justice, but these insights can also be helpful in the development of public policies that are rooted in contributive justice. "Important within SDT is the idea that these active propensities for intrinsic motivation, internalization, and social integration are accompanied by, and indeed grounded in, specific phenomenal satisfactions. SDT posits that inherent in such pursuits are satisfactions in feeling *competence*, *autonomy*, and *relatedness*" (emphasis added) which make up the "essence of human thriving, and they predict any number of indicators of wellness and vitality"[185] (Ryan and Deci 2017, 5).

The first principle, or most basic or fundamental need, according to SDT, is autonomy. In this context, autonomy describes the need to "self-regulate one's experiences and actions. Autonomy is a form of functioning associated with feeling volitional, congruent, and integrated" (Ryan and Deci 2017, 10). Within SDT, autonomy is not to be confused with self-reliant independence. Rather, autonomy is to be understood as a "sense of voluntariness" (ibid.). This means that "one's behaviors are self-endorsed, or congruent with one's authentic interests and values" (ibid.). Autonomy is important as it relates to contribution, because when actions are autonomous, they are genuine and a full expression of volition.[186]

The second principle of SDT is competence, which relates to man's "basic need to feel effectance and mastery" (Ryan and Deci 2017, 11). This principle recognizes man's need to contribute, because

[185] "Like physical needs, these needs are said to be objective phenomena in that their deprivation or satisfaction has clear and measurable functional effects, effects that obtain regardless of one's subjective goals or values. Insofar as they are needs, thwarting or deprivation of any of them will lead to observable decrements in growth, integrity, and wellness, irrespective of whether they are valued by the individuals or their cultures" (Ryan and Deci 2017, 10).

[186] However, SDT understands that only "some intentional actions are truly self-regulated or autonomous—others are regulated by external forces or by relatively nonintegrated aspects of one's personality." This suggests that "a person may behave without a sense of volition or self-endorsement of her or his actions." SDT research shows that "much of people's behavior and expression of values can be initiated and/or regulated by internal or external pressures that either overrule or bypass true self-regulation" (Ryan and Deci 2017, 10-11). This phenomenon suggests a role for culture and socialization.

through contribution he is practicing, and practice leads to effectance and mastery. SDT recognizes that the "need for competence is evident as an inherent striving, manifested in curiosity, manipulation, and a wide range of epistemic motives" (ibid.). In addition, SDT finds that competence is self-reinforcing because of its energizing and motivational force. When people find that they can do something (and do it well), it can be pleasurable, rewarding, and satisfying.[187]

The third principle of SDT is relatedness, which is man's feeling of social connectedness. Ryan and Deci (2017, 11) contend that "[p]eople feel relatedness most typically when they feel cared for by others. Yet relatedness is also about belonging and feeling significant among others." Here is where contribution plays an important and pivotal role. In acting (contributing), man is relating himself in one way or another to a group. "[E]qually important to relatedness is experiencing oneself as giving or contributing to others" (ibid.). Relatedness also considers the importance of feeling a part of something larger than oneself. "[P]eople experience relatedness and belonging, for example through contributing to the group or showing benevolence" (ibid.).

In the context of contributive justice, we understand that to contribute, man must decide his action; this is autonomy. According to contributive justice, competence is the drive to want to do and to do well, and as a right, it is the understanding that man is owed opportunity (or practice) to contribute. Finally, in keeping with contributive justice principles, man is to be made to feel connected or related to his fellow man. Within a paradigm of relatedness, man can feel the impact of contribution; here is where man can hope to understand the part his work plays—whether in a leading or supporting role, or simply in the role of observer and appreciator. "SDT attempts to articulate the basic, vital nature of human beings—of how that nature expresses itself, what is required to sustain energy and motivation, and how

[187] SDT also recognizes the inverse phenomenon. Competence is, however, readily thwarted. When competence "wanes in contexts in which challenges are too difficult, negative feedback is pervasive, or feelings of mastery and effectiveness are diminished or undermined by interpersonal factors such as person-focused criticism and social comparisons" (Ryan and Deci 2017, 11).

that vital energy is depleted" (Ryan and Deci 2017, 24). Man is called to contribute and to flourish, and he does so through operationalizing his own motivation and in taking on a contributing mindset.[188]

4.3 THE CONTRIBUTING MINDSET

Psychologists understand mindset as the "underlying assumptions that shape a person's ability to perceive and understand the world" (Buchanan and Kern 2017, 2).[189] To use a metaphor, mindset is the set of glasses through which man focuses and sees the world around—affecting acuity and understanding. Some might even call this phenomenon in a broad sense a world view.[190] So it follows that a contributing mindset would be the mindset that recognizes the call to contribute as a right and a duty—the goal of which is individual and community flourishing. The important question is how does man develop, sustain, and benefit from a mindset.

Stanford University developmental psychologist Carol Dweck's work with motivation in children sheds light on the questions of the development and sustainability of mindset, and it offers insights into areas that can assist in the creation of a contributing mindset. First, Dweck (2017, 140) posits that "mindsets are an important part of personality in that they can create characteristic and recurrent patterns of behavior." Personality is naturally developed in the context of the family, thereby suggesting that a contributing mindset first must develop within the most intimate of personal relationships, and that socialization plays a key role. Second, Dweck concludes that mindsets are "somewhat stable, but [they] can change over time with exposure to new experiences and … with targeted interventions … these belief-

[188] In this sense, motivation refers to the activation of the will.

[189] Psychologists Ashley Buchanan and Margaret Kern (2017) explain the significance of this phenomenon by referencing the psychology literature to explain that mindset relates to (1) assumptions that affect perception, (2) the underpinning of complex personality, (3) the ability to learn, (4) a "self-fulfilling effect on reality," (5) the inability to escape subconscious influence, and (6) the inevitability of impact on ability to manipulate on the individual and collective levels (2).

[190] Cultural anthropologist Michael Kearney explains that anthropologists have long studied world view, and that their approach to the idea has evolved over time. He explains that cultural anthropologists are moving toward a more systematic approach that takes "greater concern to explore the kinds of dynamic relationships that integrate the various isolated propositions of particular world views among themselves, their social and geographic environments, and their associated cultural behaviors" (Kearney 1975, 247).

based parts of personality are malleable" (ibid.). This insight suggests that opportunities and expectations for contribution are self-reinforcing. Third, Dweck offers that people's mindsets are not necessarily domain specific: "People can indeed have different mindsets in different areas, and their dominant mindset in a given area will most strongly affect their goals, attributions, and behavior" (ibid.). This insight suggests that if a contributing mindset can develop in one domain of life, there is hope that it may also influence or take root in other domains. Finally, Dweck contends that a strong situation can prime a mindset. She notes that "a strong cue can push people into a given mindset." This finding suggests that a contributing mindset could be influenced by both socialization and culture.

As a way to illustrate the dynamics of mindset, Carol Dweck (2015)–in describing her research in *Mindset: The New Psychology of Success*–explains that how students *perceive* their abilities (their mindset in the learning context) "played a key role in their motivation and achievement … and students who believed their intelligence could be developed (a growth mindset) outperformed those who believed their intelligence was fixed (a fixed mindset)" (20). Using these insights about mindset, psychologists Buchanan and Kern have identified another, new mindset: the benefit mindset. Buchanan and Kern's (2017, 1) work identifies the melding of two areas of psychological research: "being well" from positive psychology and "doing good" from social psychology. This new mindset is explained as a "mutually supportive model for promoting wellbeing on both an individual and a collective level" (ibid.). Buchanan and Kern endeavor to capture (through this concept of a benefit mindset) the idea that "a new socially and environmentally focused mindset paradigm appears to be on the rise.… This emerging mindset and global movement is symbolized by people who believe in being well and doing good for our world" (1-2). It could be conceived that this benefit mindset captures aspects of what could be a contribution mindset: (1) being well

encapsulates the development of personal capacity, and (2) doing good encapsulates this notion of contributing to the common good.[191]

In creating a contribution mindset, it is important to recognize that contribution is both a right and an obligation. Elements of the contribution mindset include recognition that: (1) each person is unique and unrepeatable, (2) each person, no matter what his ability or disability, has something to contribute to life, (3) each person as a matter of justice should be afforded opportunities to develop his own capabilities to the fullest extent of his effort, (4) each person should understand that he has been endowed with certain gifts and capabilities and that by matter of justice they should be developed and shared with others, and (5) every community should have social institutions that respect and support each person's right and obligation to contribute to the development of his own life and the life of others. In this way, contribution can be seen as a catalyst for inclusion and as a remedy for discrimination and marginalization.

A contribution mindset is inspired by Buchanan and Kern's (2017, 1) conclusion that "[o]ne's mindset reflects personally distinguishable attitudes, beliefs and values, which influence one's ability to learn and lead, and to achieve and contribute." Therefore, in developing a contribution mindset, we must appreciate that opportunities and expectations are self-reinforcing. Contribution can transcend a single domain of life to have influences in other lives, and socialization and culture play important roles. Once a contribution mindset is established, attention must be put on the development of the capabilities of individuals to contribute, and equally important is the requirement that norms must facilitate the collective expectation that our social institutions are aligned with this contribution mindset.

[191] Buchanan and Kern (2017, 2) argue that the benefit mindset is "a purpose-driven, leadership-based mindset that is redefining success: not only being the best in the world, but also being the best for the world."

4.4 THE ROLE AND PROCESS OF CAPABILITY-BUILDING

To understand contributive justice, it is important to recognize that a person's ability to contribute to the development of his own life and to the life of the community is existentially linked to the basket of capabilities available to him. Psychologists recognized that "it is in our 'natures' (i.e., our evolved capacities and acquired propensities) to attain greater or lesser degrees of healthy psychological, social, and behavioral functioning and to more or less realize our human capacities and talents" (Ryan and Deci 2017, 3-4). This is capability building in the individual context, and it is facilitated through life in the family and in community.

Economist and philosopher Amartya Sen recognized this innate need to realize our human capacities and talents (Ryan and Deci 2017) when he described an alternative way to capture and understand human welfare. Sen's approach has come to be called capability theory. Sen (1999) constructed a system of measuring human well-being that takes into account what people are able to do and be. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum has operationalized this approach in what she calls a capability theory of justice; with specificity, she outlines a list of capabilities that she believes makes up a flourishing life (see the discussion in Chapter 2).[192]

To put this issue into perspective and to reiterate the point from Chapter 2, if the central values of contributive justice are contribution and human flourishing, it stands to reason that contributive justice is one further rung on the ladder just above that of capability; *it is the actualization of capacity with a call to action and reciprocity*. Contributive justice requires those same developmental capabilities, but it also calls on man to maximize the fruit of the functioning for himself and for others: man as both principal and

[192] Nussbaum (2002, 123-24) argues that "[t]he core idea seems to be that of the human being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her own life, rather than being pass shaped or pushed around by the world in the manner of a flock or herd animal. The basic intuition from which the capabilities approach begins, in the political arena, is that human abilities exert a moral claim that they should be developed."

agent. Man must seek to develop himself while working always for those conditions that encourage and enable others to do the same no matter what their stage of development (see Chapter 2).

However, just as the development of personal capabilities is a vital component of realizing contributive justice, these same principles are relevant to the development of contributively just institutions. In an institutional context, capability is often referred to as capacity. In this context, capacity building in the institutional context often refers to training (Potter and Brough 2004). However, contributive justice is more aligned in the institutional context with the broader approach developed in the fields of epidemiology and public health. Public health researchers Christopher Potter and Richard Brough categorize capability building as more systematic and part of the broader social dynamic of capacity building. To understand this process, Potter and Brough have identified a capabilities structure to guide institutional flourishing. They recognize "nine separate but interdependent components [performance, personal, workload, supervisory, facilities, support, systems, structural, and role capacities]" (Potter and Brough 2004, 340). For Potter and Brough, these form a "four-tier hierarchy of capacity building needs: (1) structures, systems and roles, (2) staff and facilities, (3) skills, and (4) tools." (336). These capabilities offer guidance on direction and goal fulfillment (institutional flourishing), and they are straightforward and measurable.

Unlike institutional capabilities, however, human capabilities can be difficult to measure. Even Nussbaum (2002, 135) agrees; however, she also notes that "anything worth measuring, in human quality of life, is difficult to measure." The hope is that as data-collection and analytical tools progress and as people embrace their obligation to *contribute their voice*, that human capabilities will continue to grow and develop, leading ultimately further along the progression of human flourishing.

4.5 DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION AS MITIGANTS TO INJUSTICE

As contributive justice has an affirmative call to contribution, it can be frustrated by injustice when man is not afforded the conditions for contributing or opportunities to contribute. The concepts of

diversity and *inclusion* are tools that can be used to guard against exclusion and marginalization—acts of contributive injustice.[193] In the context of contributive justice, *diversity* is the concept that captures the "who" in the question of who contributes? To be just, "who contributes" should be everyone.[194] In the same vein, *inclusion* is the concept that captures the "why and for what purpose" in the question of what is the purpose of diversity? Inclusion is the means to participation. To be just, not only should all be recognized as contributors, but all should also receive opportunities to contribute. As a matter of justice, no one should be excluded or marginalized.[195]

The late American feminist political theorist Iris Marion Young (2002, 6) explains that "[c]alls for inclusion arise from experiences of exclusion—from basic political rights, from opportunities to participate, from the hegemonic terms of debate." She contends that "[s]ome of the most powerful and successful social movements of this century have mobilized around demands for oppressed and marginalized people to be full and equal citizens in their politics" (Young 2002, 6). In the twentieth century, this is seen in the great movements for racial and gender equality. In the twenty-first century, these same movements continue, and they inspire new movements for economic equality and for equality relating to physical and mental disabilities and also to sexual orientation. If, as noted earlier, inclusion can

[193] The late University of Chicago feminist political theorist Iris Marion Young (d. 2006) identifies in *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (2011) what she calls the five faces of oppression. These are exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural domination, and violence. This list is more expansive than those discussed in this section (exclusion and marginalization). However, note that they are instructive to those wishing to explore the notion of contributive injustices further.

[194] In her work, organizational management scholar Genevieve Capowski draws on the definition of diversity offered by R. Roosevelt Thomas Jr., president of the American Institute for Managing Diversity and author of *Redefining Diversity* (1996) and *Beyond Race and Gender* (1991). Thomas defines diversity [in the context of a vocational setting] as including "age, personal and corporate background, education, function and personality. It includes lifestyle, sexual preference, geographic origin, tenure with the organization, exempt or nonexempt status, and management or non-management" (Capowski 1996, 14-15). Later, Capowski (1996, 15) points out that in *Redefining Diversity*, Thomas offers a clarification that is helpful: "[d]iversity is dealing with the collective mixture of differences and similarities along a given dimension."

[195] This is the important conclusion of the argument in support of contributive justice offered by the work of Paul Gomberg in *How to Make Opportunity Equal: Race and Contributive Justice* (2007). See the discussion in Chapter 2.

be understood as a means to participation, it could also be a concept that inspires the fight for the right to participate and contribute.[196]

The injustice of marginalization can be understood as the byproduct of exclusion. If exclusion is the process of pushing a person and/or a particular group or groups of people to the periphery of society, then marginalization is the process of not affording excluded people and/or groups an active voice, identity, or place in society. This phenomenon is also understood as *social exclusion*, meaning the process of relegating people to the margins or fringes of society by denying any or meaningful access to rights, resources, and opportunities. Individuals and/or groups of people are marginalized based upon some aspect of their identity such as race, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, ability, socioeconomic status, age, and/or religion. The issue of marginalization is further complicated by the fact that some are marginalized due to intersecting identities.

The ideas of exclusion and marginalization have important implications. Social psychologists Roy Baumeister and Diane Tice pioneered a new theory of anxiety in the 1990s called social exclusion theory. According to Baumeister and Tice (1990, 165), "one of the major causes of anxiety is exclusion from social groups—that is, the fact or threat of breaking of social bonds." Baumeister and Tice note that the reasons people are excluded can be categories relating to (1) incompetence or perceived incompetence, (2) deviance or immorality, and (3) unattractiveness (ibid.). Of particular relevance to the discussion of contributive justice is exclusion based upon incompetence which Baumeister and Tice conclude is done because individuals "fail to make adequate contributions to the group's survival or welfare" (168). This failure "to make adequate contributions" can be real or perceived. When based upon reality, it can be because a person truly fails to contribute. However, it can also be because the contribution that the excluded person makes is not recognized as valuable. Also, the lack of contribution (or adequate

[196] Young (2002, 6) explains that "[a]s an ideal, inclusion embodies a norm of moral respect. Persons … are treated as means if they are expected to abide by rules or adjust their action according to decisions from [which] determination their voice and interests have been excluded."

contribution) can be through no fault of his own. A man may simply have been deprived of the opportunity to develop a given set of capabilities. It could also be the result of some other disabling circumstances—and exclusion for this reason could be deemed contrary to the dignity of the human person. From a social psychological perspective, this process creates tremendous anxiety. This anxiety can be damaging on both individual and social levels (Baumeister and Tice 1990, 190).

Marginalization can manifest in both subtle and overt actions and omissions. These can range from outright discrimination to disinvestment. This can include the use of inflammatory or derogative language and assuming that a person's accomplishments are not based upon merit. It can also include having an expectation of how a person should/will act based solely on that person's identity, and in the same vein denying a person opportunities based solely on his or her identity; this is made manifest in cases of racism, sexism, and ageism. Along these same lines would be not providing equal access to certain resources based upon membership in a particular group and/or erecting systematic or institutional barriers to access or support that result in injustices such as chronic poverty.

In the spirit of promoting contributive justice, it is important to recognize and to value the contributions of everyone, as marginalization and exclusion diminish us all. The contributive injustice of marginalization and exclusion has serious impacts on the health and well-being of both individuals and societies. We must come to respect diversity as a way to understand the value of each individual as a contributor, and the principle of inclusion as the call to promote contribution. In the context of movements for social change, this is an important lesson. Contribution, as Young explains, has tremendous value in the context of promoting justice. She explains that "[d]emocratic political movements and designers of democratic processes can promote greater inclusion in decision-making processes as a means of promoting more just outcomes" (Young 2002, 17). We owe it to ourselves and to others to contribute as a means of improving our own lives and the lives of others.

4.6 CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: WHAT IS DUE TO THE SELF AND OTHERS

One of the hallmarks of Christian theology and ethics is the universal call to love God and love our neighbor.[197] Love of God represents our obligation as a creature; we owe this as a matter of justice, for He is responsible for our very existence. The obligation to love our neighbor is even more specific: *love our neighbor as ourselves*.[198] In this way, we see that the call to love neighbor implies action. *To love ourselves is to nurture, protect, and develop ourselves*; this is the same type of love we are called upon to express as an obligation to our neighbors. Scripture also notes that with this obligation comes responsibility, and that each of us will be held to account for what we have done and what we have failed to do. In Matthew 25:40 we are told that "[t]he king will answer them, 'Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me.'"Consider exactly what this means: man will be held responsible for how has loved himself and his neighbor when the measure of love is the promotion of flourishing.

Moral philosopher Thomas Scanlon (2000) offers a practical way to deal with this question by framing the question in terms of the moral judgments we make. Scanlon posits that what we really owe to each other is an explanation for what we do and what we fail to do: a type of calling to account. As a consequentialist, Scanlon stresses that once we have set out our best arguments in terms that cannot be reasonably rejected, then our judgments about actions are what Scanlon understands as necessary and right, and they make up what we owe to each other.

[197] Mark 12:30-31 and Leviticus 19:18. Also in 1 John 4:21: "And this commandment we have from him that he who loves God should love his brother also."

[198] It is explained in Romans 13:8-10 that *love fulfills the law*: "Owe no one anything, except to love one another; for he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law. The commandments, 'You shall not commit adultery, You shall not kill, You shall not steal, You shall not covet,' and any other commandment, are summed up in this sentence, 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.' Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law."

The Gospel according to Matthew gives what this author sees as the most elegant ethical theory in history—the golden rule: "[a]nd as you wish that men would do to you, do so to them."[199] This theory has also been adopted by secular philosophers, most notably the Prussian Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant gives his version of the golden rule in what he calls the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative comes from Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, and it states that one should "[a]ct only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law" (Kant 2012, 30). In relation to our consideration of obligation under the principles of contributive justice, Kant notes that we have an obligation to cultivate our talents. In addressing this issue in the context of the categorical imperative, Kant notes that "[f]or as a rational being he [man] necessarily wills that all his faculties should be developed, inasmuch as they are given him for all sorts of possible purposes" (ibid., 31).

Modern philosophers have endeavored to understand Kant's argument as a way to justify a moral obligation for self-improvement (Johnson 2011).[200] Moral philosopher Robert Johnson (2011, 14) argues that capabilities can be categorized as physical, emotional, and intellectual. He concedes that the aspiration of free and full capability development is not fully realizable for any one person. However, he posits that "some element of every kind of capacity can be fully developed" (ibid.). Johnson argues that from a Kantian perspective, "what makes it wrong to fail to develop yourself is not simply that you let others down or even that you make the world worse off.… Your primary fault consists in failing yourself" (1).[201] Johnson's understanding of Kant's categorical imperative leads him to conclude that "duties *to* a

[199] Luke 6:31. This same command is also noted in Matthew 7:12: "[s]o whatever you wish that others would do to you, do so to them, for this is the law and the prophets."

[200] This is the notion that everyone is called to make something of himself, "absent special circumstances" (Johnson 2011, 7).

[201] Johnson (2011, 6) reasons that if a person fails to develop himself, he has only himself to blame. Johnson contends that a failure to improve oneself is a moral failing. However he also recognizes that such a failure could be due to "oppressive social conditions," especially among the poor. He also concedes that there can be a meaningful difference between rich and poor as it relates to the resources available for self-development (12-13).

person arise once we intend to make use of their rational wills, and because we intend to make use of our own, duties *to* ourselves arise as well" (14; emphasis in original). Johnson argues that the obligation is to improve ourselves as persons, and he views this in a train of logic that begins as a process of self-improvement today to fulfill an obligation to a future self. For Johnson, this is an "agent relative obligation, between temporally distinct selves" (ibid.). For contributive justice, this is the *contribution* of the will.

4.7 CONTRIBUTION AS REINVESTMENT

When considering the importance of understanding what we owe ourselves and others, capabilities can be seen as the first investment in the development of ourselves. This is the first installment in what will be a lifetime of contributions, and it is the first step in the process of contribution and reinvestment. Once the process of developing capabilities and contributing is begun, it takes root in the individual, and it becomes the engine of growth that propels the process of human flourishing. As such, consideration must be given to the consequences of an individual's contribution. This is the process of thinking about the ripples made in the pond with the splash of a pebble—the proverbial ripple effect.[202] In the context of contributive justice, this is the process by which one can understand contribution as reinvestment.

In economics, the ripple effect is understood as a multiplier.[203] In economics, multipliers are quantitative ways of measuring the effect of an economic factor. As an example, when assessing gross domestic product, a positive multiplier would be an economic factor that causes the total output to be more than the cost of the change of the factor that caused the increase (in this case).[204] From a contributive justice perspective, reinvestment can be equated to the influx of positive factors whose net

[202] See Note 122.
[203] In 1936 in *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, British economist John Maynard Keynes first described this phenomenon in the equation Y = C + I (where Y is income, C is consumption, and I is interest).
[204] This process works the same in the negative. In the context of contributive justice, this could be a way to understand the cost of injustices.

effect increases the capacity of others. Said another way, reinvestment in the building up of the capabilities of others has a multiplier effect on the well-being and flourishing of others.

As an illustration of how to think about this, the Open Society Foundation (OSF) has developed a concept called justice reinvestment.[205] In the context of criminal justice reform, the OSF posits that if the resources (or some subset of the resources) used to incarcerate offenders could be diverted instead to improving communities and developing capability-enhancing opportunities, fewer offenses would occur and there would be a net benefit to society.[206] This idea has grown and become more prominent in criminal justice policy as policymakers seek to "move funds from the institutional corrections budget into the socioeconomic infrastructure of high-incarceration communities in ways that develop the capacity of those communities to become better places for people to live, work, and raise their families" (Clear 2011, 585). However, these programs are designed "to measure changes in prison populations and recidivism levels, rather than community well-being or community level changes in program availability and access" (Willis and Kapira 2018, 19). This means that while the approach may result in a contributive justice outcome, it is doing it for non-contributive justice reasons. The latter criteria of well-being and availability/access are more aligned with contributive justice principles.[207]

As another illustration, US policymakers have long sought to find ways to alleviate poverty and to lift up communities. One successful and sustained effort is the work that has grown out of the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). This legislation was first envisioned to compel lending institutions to invest in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. The idea was to stimulate a capital

[205] The Open Society Foundation (OSF) was created in 1979 as the Open Society Institute, endowed by the progressive entrepreneur George Soros.

[206] Susan Tucker and Eric Cadora of the OSF first wrote about this idea in 2003: "The goal of justice reinvestment is to redirect some portion of the $54 billion America now spends on prisons to rebuilding the human resources and physical infrastructure—the schools, healthcare facilities, parks, and public spaces—of neighborhoods devastated by high levels of incarceration" (Tucker and Cadora 2003, 3).

[207] The Australian Institute of Criminology has sought to compile insights from justice reinvestment programs in progress around the world. Their survey highlights early efforts in the United States in Texas, North Carolina, and New Orleans, and early efforts in the United Kingdom. The Institute also does an extensive survey of programs in Australia (Willis and Kapira 2018).

infusion into areas that have suffered from chronic disinvestment. Banking regulators, with the assistance of their supervised banks, were to track loans and investments and to categorize the community development banking activities of the institution. These statistics were to be considered when a financial institution was seeking to acquire or merge with other financial institutions to show that the bank was providing service to the communities it was given a charter to serve. The CRA was designed to create metrics for regulators to consider when trying to assess whether banks were providing service to their communities. The CRA requirements have been an important lever to push financial institutions to take on more of a role in community development. Similarly, CRA has spawned wholly new types of financial institutions whose mission is community development; these institutions are called Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs). CDFIs are regulated banks, credit unions, and independent nonprofit loan funds. These CDFIs, as well as non-CDFI financial institutions that are otherwise subject to the CRA requirements, are lending to and supporting institutions such as schools, community centers, job training programs, disability service providers, healthcare organizations, and economic development organizations.[208] These types of social institutions are key drivers in the process of capability building. All of these endeavors support non-governmental development.

However, the most significant inputs (or factors, as economists call them) come from or are supported by safety nets established by governmental institutions. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, the most fundamental contributive justice support offered by a governmental institution is its formal social contract. Beyond that, government has the duty to promote and protect the conditions whereby its

[208] Researchers from the University of New Hampshire report that 2003-2015 data from the CDFI Fund (the department of the US Treasury responsible for CDFI certification, compliance, and support) shows that CDFIs during this period "projected 63,249 permanent jobs and 47,866 construction jobs through the projects they funded, supported the development or preservation of 159,739 units of affordable rental housing and 23,302 units of affordable for-sale housing, increased educational facility capacity by 515,384 units, increased child-care facility capacity by 31,895 units, increased health-care facility capacity by 2,068,932 patient visits, increased community-arts facility capacity by 66,402 units, and supported the creation of 13.4 million square feet of office space, 4.7 million square feet of retail space, and 1 million square feet of manufacturing space" (Swack, Hangen, and Northrup 2014, 21).

citizens can thrive. This looks different in different societies. In some places, it means personal autonomy and safety, access to safe and healthy food, water, and shelter, and access to healthcare and education. The depth and degree of this type of governmental/social support depends upon the society of which one is a part. Societies conceived and governed by contributive justice principles see it as their role and responsibility to maximize the inputs into human flourishing.

4.8 THE FLOURISHING *TELOS*

In conceptualizing contributive justice, it is important to recognize how it relates to a broader and more systematic understanding of what life is all about (see Note 15). For the Christian theologian, life on Earth is a temporal journey designed to lead the soul to its eternal destination of being reunited with its Creator. The success of this endeavor (the manner in which man lives his life) is ultimately judged by God at the end of man's natural life. Man is given a rubric by God through the Church, and these lessons are for his guidance and benefit.[209] It is understood, then, that the *telos* (the goal or end to which man has as his aim) is the beatific vision.[210] This is attainable through faith and the living of a good and just life—flourishing in its fullest expression.

For the philosopher, the answer is understood differently. For the philosopher, the action of man is understood through the science of human action–ethics. Philosophers have come to determine and accept that the *telos* of human life is what Aristotle calls *eudaimonia*: happiness or flourishing.[211] This concept is not to be confused with the notion of happiness or pleasure associated with a psychological or

[209] This is understood as moral theology. Augustinus Lehmkuhl (1912), writing in New Advent, the Catholic Encyclopedia, explains that "moral theology includes everything relating to man's free actions and the last, or supreme, end to be attained through them, as far as we know the same by Divine Revelation; in other words, it includes the supernatural end, the rule, or norm, of the moral order, human actions as such, their harmony or disharmony with the laws of the moral order, their consequences, the Divine aids for their right performance." Lehmkuhl points to the second part of Saint Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*, as a work "still unrivalled as a treatise of moral theology."

[210] CCC, 163: "Faith makes us taste in advance the light of the beatific vision, the goal of our journey here below. Then we shall see God 'face to face', 'as he is.'" See also 1 Corinthians 13:12 and 1 John 3:2.

[211] Aristotle (1954), Book X, Chapter 6, 1176a32-33.

mental state. Rather, it is an understanding of happiness that is more associated with the notion of contentment, being a condition of sufficiency where nothing else is desired: an end in and of itself.[212] For philosophers, things are said to be done for a reason (instrumental purpose), and for Aristotle that reason or purpose is to promote happiness/flourishing.

In an effort to understand the scope and meaning of human flourishing, Aristotle outlined in the *Nicomachean Ethics* a framework of conditions that he sees as fundamental. These broad categories capture Aristotle's understanding of a full and flourishing life. First, Aristotle insists that man should live a virtuous life.[213] To do this, man should strive for what Aristotle understood as a golden mean between excess and deficiency of all of the virtues.[214] For Aristotle, man is aided in his efforts by both education and practical wisdom—*phronesis*.[215] Man is supported by his friendships,[216] and he is aided by the use of external goods.[217] Aristotle emphasizes that pleasure is not the same as happiness, but it is part of the experience of happiness (flourishing). True happiness is not a process, but a state, as it is always an end.[218] Aristotle also insists that man develop the right habits; these habits habituate the right kinds of activities, and these actions (contributions) lead toward flourishing.[219] [220] Finally, man must live under the right type of political conditions to foster the social conditions that enable him to be "good and capable of noble acts."[221]

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[212] Social philosopher Thomas Pogge (1999, 333) notes that "human persons are flourishing means that their lives are good, or worthwhile, in the broadest sense. Thus, the concept of human flourishing, as I understand it, marks the most comprehensive, 'all-in' assessment of the quality of human lives."
[213] Aristotle (1954), Book X, Chapter 6, 1176b38.
[214] Aristotle (1954), Book II, Chapter 6.
[215] Aristotle (1954), Book VI.
[216] Aristotle (1954), Book VIII.
[217] Aristotle (1954), Book I, Chapter 8, 1099a31-b8.
[218] It is also helpful to refer to the discussion about the choice to be happy versus the choice to do things to be happy found in Aristotle (n.d.), Book III, Chapter 2, 1111b20-29.
[219] Aristotle (1954), Book II, Chapter 1, 1103b24-26.
[220] Ethicist John Finnis (1983, 39) makes an important point on this issue when referencing what he calls the "neo-Aristotelian tag" which is in Latin "*omne ens perficitur in actu*." This is translated as "flourishing is to be found in action."
[221] The primary end of politics is to make "the citizens to be of a certain [noble] character" (Aristotle, 1954, Book I, Chapter 9, 1099b30).

This final condition, that of the quality and type of political condition, creates a nexus to the concept of a social contract rooted in contributive justice. For people of Christian faith, the call to flourish is embedded in the New Covenant in love offered by Jesus Christ. To all people of good will, the call to flourish is in the social contract. Under either paradigm, the *telos* of man is to flourish, and to do so he must contribute—his volition, his action, and his whole being.

4.9 CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: CULTURE AND CONTRACT

Once we have recognized that the *telos* of man is flourishing, we can understand the urgency and importance of ordering our lives and our society in ways that best promote this honorable and fitting end. This project has embarked on a journey to discover a way of doing this. This work has acknowledged, as a type of first principle rooted in Christian theology, man as a co-worker with God. The consequences of this leads to a deeper understanding of a dimension of justice called contributive justice. Contributive justice is understood both as a right and an obligation—the purpose of which is to facilitate human flourishing.

When the principles of contributive justice become a mindset, they can permeate the culture and society finds ways to effectuate changes and/or adjustments to its society's social contract. (see Appendix 3). However, inherent in this idea is the quintessential chicken and egg dilemma. Which shall we expect to transform first: the mindset, the culture, or the social contract? Intuitively, this author surmises that mindset will be the catalyst in any process of social renewal based on contributive justice. This is because mindset offers the closest nexus to the individual (the first agent of change).[222] As discussed earlier in this chapter, mindset is developed and set in response to a person's earliest, closest, and most trusted relationships. Also, mindset is malleable and transformative, offering promise both for the ability to

[222] In the discussion of moral foundationalism in Chapter 3, we can see that contributive justice is aligned with moral foundation theory, and, as such, it leads to the conclusion that mindset will be a very powerful motivator for social change, because its core principles are associated with deep psychological needs.

change and for that change to be impactful. With a contributive mindset in place, the question then reverts to where contributive justice principles will take root—or take root first: in the culture or in the social contract?

Cross-cultural psychologist Harry Triandis (2002, 3) offers some insight when he explains that culture is simply the "human made part of the environment." He points out that there are two distinct ways of thinking about culture: (1) material culture and (2) subjective culture. Material culture is all of those elements that make of the setting of our lives—fashion, cuisine, architecture, modes of transportation, gadgets, etc. In contrast, subjective culture is society's "characteristic way of perceiving its social environment" (Triandis 1972, viii). Subjective culture is of particular importance in relation to thinking about contributive justice, because it captures "ideas about what has worked in the past and thus is worth transmitting to future generations" (Triandis 2002, 3). Cultural anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn offers an elegant description of the phenomenon of subjective culture: "[subjective] culture is to society what memory is to individuals" (Kluckhohn and Kluckhohn 1954; Triandis 2002, 3). If contributive justice themes could be integrated into the language we use and our approach to formal and informal education, embedded into our economic structure, and adhered to in our social institutions–there could be the foundation for real social change through culture.[223]

Triandis also offers a map to understanding the constituent parts of culture so as to influence it. He posits that there are many different ways to study culture, and he identifies five key inflection points: (1) the categories that people use for a particular domain up to and including the process of creating stereotypes, (2) beliefs, (3) attitudes, (4) norms and roles, and (5) values (Triandis 2002, 4-6). Each one of these inflection points could be influenced by a contribution ethic that embraces the dignity of each person to contribute to the development of his own capacities and to assist in the development of his

[223] Language, education, economic structure, and social institutions are identified, because they represent the processes of formulating ideas and opinion and the process of how and under what expectations we interact with each other and the world.

fellow man. The goal is to influence culture at all these points to create a dynamic where not considering contributive justice principles would in and of itself be unjust.

Social change has been studied in a myriad of disciplines from anthropology, psychology, and sociology to political science, history, economics, and neuroscience. A discussion about the insights from these disciplines is beyond the scope of this project. However, perhaps future scholars will be intrigued by the notion of contributive justice, and they will seek to discover greater insights to inform future theories about how and why man may be seeking to improve the social conditions of his world. The approach of this project, however, is to begin by boldly positing that a first step should be to embrace contributive justice as a mindset. By doing so, contributive justice principles can influence culture so that changes to the social contract can be seen as both necessary and just. The answer this project offers as to how this is possible comes from the insights in Chapter 3 when discussing the insights of Jonathan Haidt in moral foundations: social contract renewal is possible through reliance on contributive justice principles, because they have moral authority. The grand idea of this project has been to consider how the social contract construct can serve as the mechanism for actualization of contributive justice.[224] Just as Nussbaum takes capabilities theory to an operational state,[225] the ideas developed in this work take contributive justice to an operational state by imagining contributive justice as the guiding moral principle that operationalizes a renewal of the social contract of a nation.

Within the moral framework of contributive justice, this author imagines a society with the moral courage to include all its citizens as full participants and beneficiaries in the rights and protections that exist in society—on the basis of our common humanity and our shared call to be co-workers with God. This includes providing equal rights for women. This foundational correction would aid in ameliorating important challenges related to issues of exclusion and marginalization for nearly half of the population.

[224] For more on the role and function of the social contract, see Chapter 3.
[225] For more on Nussbaum's Capability Theory of Justice, see Chapter 2.

This foundational issue highlights the importance of understanding the evolution of America's social contract and its promise to extend its reach to all its citizens. Political scientist John Courney Murray, S.J., reminds us that the founding of America as a new nation is anchored on the idea of "proposition":

> IT IS CLASSIC AMERICAN DOCTRINE, immortally asserted by Abraham Lincoln, that the new nation which our Fathers brought forth on this continent was dedicated to a "proposition."
>
> I take it that Lincoln used the word with conceptual propriety. In philosophy a proposition is the statement of a truth to be demonstrated. In mathematics a proposition is at times the statement of an operation to be performed. Our Fathers dedicated the nation to a proposition in both of these senses. The American Proposition is at once doctrinal and practical, a theorem and a problem. It is an affirmation and also an intention. It presents itself as a coherent structure of thought that lays claim to intellectual assent; it also presents itself as an organized political project that aims at historical success. Our Fathers asserted it and most ably argued it; they also undertook to "work it out," and they signally succeeded.
>
> Neither as a doctrine nor as a project is the American Proposition a finished thing. Its demonstration is never done once for all; and the Proposition itself requires development on penalty of decadence. Its historical success is never to be taken for granted, nor can it come to some absolute term; and any given measure of success demands enlargement on penalty of instant decline. In a moment of national crisis Lincoln asserted the [imperiled] part of the theorem and gave impetus to the impeded part of the project in the noble utterance, at once declaratory and imperative: "All men are created equal." (1960, vii-viii)

As evidenced by the American experience, this process is evolutionary—one only need look to the civil rights movement for example.

Just as it is important to have full inclusion in society, it is also important to seek remedy for the systemic factors that have and continue to prohibit the develop of capacities to contribute to one's own life and to the life of the community. Perhaps a renewal agenda within a contributive justice paradigm could begin by exploring ideas derived from the vision offered by Franklin Roosevelt in the process of creating the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, namely those derived provisions that derive from the principal of "freedom from want" (Roosevelt 1941, §§82-86). Such provisions would be akin to

Article 23 on the right to work, and Article 25 on the right to an adequate standard of living. The litmus test for contributive justice is whether the remedy for the contributive injustices is consistent with the promotion of the dignity of the human person, which includes the obligation that we all share in being a part of the solution to promote the common good.

We have inherited our Constitution, which is where our social contract resides, and the laws and norms of our society are what make the Constitution a living document. The goal of this thesis is to introduce away to see contributive justice as a moral foundation and inspiration.

CONCLUSION

> Somewhere we must come to see that human progress never rolls in on the wheels of inevitability. It comes through the tireless efforts and the persistent work of dedicated individuals who are willing to be ***co-workers with God***. And without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the primitive forces of social stagnation. So we must help time and realize that the time is always ripe to do right.
>
> Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
> *Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution*[226]

This work began with a journey to understand what Christian theology in the Catholic tradition has to say about the theological nature of work and wealth. What emerged was an understanding of man's destiny and call to be a co-worker with God in the transformation of the material world—in doing so transforming the world to be able to see God in all things.[227] This process requires an understanding first of the dignity of every human being and the universal call to live in solidarity with our brothers and sisters.[228] This solidarity, in respecting the dignity of each, must in turn respect the dignity of each person's contribution in light of the principle of subsidiarity.[229] Each man's contribution is facilitated through respect for the universal destination of all goods and the social mortgage placed upon the goods of the world. Together, these principles place an obligation on everyone to invest their time, talent, and treasure in the development of their own greatest capabilities, and in turn, it places an obligation to reinvest in building up the capacities of our fellow man to promote the flourishing of all.

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[226] This is the final sermon of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. It was delivered on March 31, 1968 at the Washington National Cathedral.

[227] *Seeing God in all things* is a central component of Jesuit spirituality. The expression is generally attributed to Jesuit theologian Jeronimo Nadal, a contemporary and close companion of Saint Ignatius of Loyola. From a theological perspective, *seeing God in all things* is human flourishing.

[228] "A just society can become a reality only when it is based on the respect of the transcendent dignity of the human person. The person represents the ultimate end of society. The social order and its development must invariably work to the benefit of the human person … not the other way around." (CCC, 132)

[229] The principle of subsidiarity requires that each be given the opportunity to participate and contribute to life at a time and in a manner consistent with his ability.

The author has argued that the right and obligation to contribute is governed by a dimension of justice called contributive justice. This conception of justice is understood as a normative theory that concerns the right and obligation of every man to contribute his efforts, resources, and talents toward his own flourishing and the flourishing of others to develop societies whose measure of justice is how they advance every member's ability to contribute and flourish within a social framework that enables such. To actualize this theory, the author proposes that contributive justice be integrated into effort to promote social renewal through the mechanism of the social contract—the guiding principles of life in community. In the social contract, man is recognized as a contributor by right and obligation. He gives his consent to this social contract through adhesion to the contract that seeks to do no harm and that conceptually is designed for his benefit and that of the greater society and common good. This conceptualization is aspirational, and it provides a moral foundation for a more just and inclusive society.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., in his final Sunday sermon before his assignation, entitled *Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution*, reminded us that we are indeed co-workers with God. King explained that our work is to contribute and to aid in the ability of others to contribute. In King's words, "human progress never rolls on the wheels of inevitability." What he insists upon is what God insists upon: action—contribution. Prophetically, King reminded us that the price for inaction is "social stagnation." At the beginning of his sermon, King anchored his remarks on the wisdom contained in the sixteenth chapter of the book of Revelation where Saint John writes: "Behold I make all things new; former things are passed away." King concluded his remarks with a poignant prayer: "God grant that we will be participants in this newness and this magnificent development [related to the elevation of poverty, racism, and war]. If we will but do it, we will bring about a new day of justice and brotherhood and peace." This indeed is human flourishing.

In this final sermon, King pointed to what he saw in 1968 as the "triple revolution." This triple revolution is (1) a technological revolution, (2) a revolution in weaponry, and (3) a human rights

revolution. Arguably, this triple revolution is just as relevant and real today as it was in 1968. He spoke of the technological revolution in terms of its power to develop a "world perspective." He admonished his listeners not to forget that "no individual can live alone, no nation can live alone." He challenges us to see the world as a neighborhood, but he reminds us that despite our ability (through the use of technology) to see the world as a neighborhood, we have not made the "ethical commitment to make of it a brotherhood." King understood the notion of solidarity and our common call to brotherhood. Contributive justice provides a framework to see our fellow man as co-worker.

The second revolution King discussed was the revolution of weaponry. He was preaching during the time of the Vietnam War. King warned of the fallout from America's warmongering status as resulting in "alienat[ing] ourselves from other nations so we end up morally and politically isolated in the world." He railed against the wasting away of resources used to support the military-industrial complex, and he reminded listeners of the advice of the late President John F. Kennedy: "[m]ankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind." Both were speaking of the apocalyptic end caused by nuclear conflict, but both also acknowledged the end that is destined for a great society should more not be done to invest in in each other--to avoid the continual impact of not investing in the capacity building of our fellow man. Contributive justice provides a framework to acknowledge the debt owed to our fellow man for our shared use of the resources of the world. The modern weaponry of indifference robs man of the dignity he shares in by being afforded the opportunity to contribute to his own development and that of the community in which he is a part.

Poverty was the third revolution that King discussed, and he did so in the context of the theme of human rights.[230] He called on us to bring to mind the parable of the poor man Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31). King explained that "Jesus never made a universal indictment against all wealth." He explained the role of

[230] The sermon explains the systematic disadvantages that created institutional obstacles to the development of the black man post emancipation.

Abraham, himself a very rich man, and the moral lesson that wealth is an opportunity. He explained that the rich man in the Lazarus story went to hell not because he was rich, but "because he allowed his brother to become invisible." King warned us that we will each one day meet our Maker, and He will say that we have not done enough. King explained that "America's opportunity is to help bridge the gulf between the haves and have-nots," and that this role is part of America's destiny. It is in this sermon that King sought to "arouse [and inspire] the conscience of a nation." Two generations later, we can look to contributive justice as the clarion call of the conscience that says that we are obligated to invest in each other, and that we should do so as if our very soul depended upon it.

In this his last Sunday sermon, King also identified two myths for the social stagnation that propels these three revolutions. He lamented that people will often dismiss their role and responsibility in the process of social change and renewal by relying on change just to happen over time. King called this out as a myth. He posited that "time is neutral," and it can be used either "constructively or destructively." He contended that this myth was responsible for the "appalling silence and indifference of the good people." Contributive justice is a call to action—not indifference. Contributive justice propels everyone to contribute their time, talent, and treasure to develop their own capacity, as well as to develop the capacity of others and the institutions responsible for the common good.

The second myth that King addressed was what he called the "boot-strap philosophy." In this way of thinking, man is lured into the idea that man can just rise out of his circumstances solely on his own initiative. It is certainly true that all life requires effort and initiative; however, this energy can only go so far if a man is not afforded or permitted a base set of tools from which to work. Contributive justice contends that there are a set of preconditions that should be afforded every man by virtue of just being human. These preconditions establish a base upon which rights (vis-à-vis opportunities) can be recognized, and obligations can be fulfilled.

As Americans, we do have a social contract. Its basic elements are outlined in our Constitution.[231] However, our social contract is in need of renewal, as evidenced by vast inequalities, discrimination, and marginalization. King reiterated those famous words of the US Constitution: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." Two generations ago and with admonition, King reminded us in his very last Sunday sermon: "[I]f a man doesn't have a job [work or purposeful action in the world] or an income, he has neither life nor liberty nor the possibility for the pursuit of happiness. He merely exists." Without meaningful contribution, man just exists.

This author contends that we are all called to much more than just mere existence. We are called by God our Creator to be his co-workers–to use and transform the goods of the Earth to His glory. We are called to flourish. We do this by cultivating and developing our gifts and capabilities. We do this by helping our fellow man to do the same. We do this by creating social institutions whose mandate is to develop and promote the common good. This work will not just happen with the simple passage of time. This work will not just happen by magically pulling ourselves up by our bootstraps. This work will happen when we recognize the gift of life and cherish the dignity of each man. This work will happen when we see each other as brothers and sisters. This work will happen when we develop a true sense of solidarity that spurs action, not just out of obligation, but out of brotherly love. This work will happen when we respect the role that each of us plays (however big or small); we do this by acknowledging our unique individuality and capacities. To do this is to be just—to give another his due. Contributive justice is a dimension of justice that calls on us to give *everything*, because through our action in the world what we really are giving is an expression of our self—which indeed is everything. We do this because this is our nature, our *telos*. Contributors are who we are. We are co-workers with God.

[231] The late New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas J. Brogan (d. 1965) reminds us that "[o]ur democracy based as it is on Natural Law principles was not intended as a form of government only, but a way of life, idealistic and in harmony with our nature" (Brogan 1951, 41).

EPILOGUE

> Justice stoops not from her lofty height, because Love's ardor all at once fulfils what he who dwelleth here must satisfy…
>
> Dante Alighieri, *Purgatorio VI*
> *La Divina Commedia*[232]

The day was April 3, 1968. Three days after delivering what would be his final Sunday sermon, King was in Memphis, Tennessee to bring the full weight of support of the Civil Rights Movement to the black sanitation workers in Memphis who were on strike for their right to be treated on parity with their white colleagues. People came, and they marched—just as they had marched with King in 1963 in Birmingham and Washington, DC and then in 1965 in Selma and 1966 in Chicago. And again they clung to his inspiration as he spoke truth to power at the height of the Vietnam war when he said that "a true revolution of values will soon look uneasily on the glaring contrast of poverty and wealth."[233]

On the night of April 3, 1968, King was tired and not feeling well. Andrew Young, one of King's closest companions, later tells the story of how King asked Ralph Abernathy, his closest friend and co-worker, to take his place and address the meeting of the Memphis supporters at Bishop Charles Mason Temple Church of God.[234] The story continues that Abernathy spoke to the crowd, but it became clear that King's presence was needed. In his weakened state, King gave an extemporaneous speech that would later be entitled "I've Been to the Mountaintop,"[235] he spoke of an imaginary conversation that he might have with God who offers him a panoramic view of human history and the choice of which age he would like to live. In this conversation, King recounts a world history of physical, moral, and spiritual deliverance, and he asks God for just a few years of life in the second half of the twentieth century. He acknowledges

[232] Alighieri 1920
[233] King 1967
[234] Young (2001) 201-05.
[235] King 1968b.

that this epoch may sound like a strange choice, but he remarks with great moral clarity: "only when it is dark enough can you see the stars."

This thesis has concluded that even fifty years later, American society is still in a dark place. The darkness today is in some ways is even more dangerous than the humiliation, intimidation, physical abuse, and murders of King's era: more dangerous because it is now more pervasive, institutionalized and insidious. In the era of King's struggle, man was oppressing man in ways that related to his outward appearance and his physical being, and today's civil rights struggle does just the same. However, in this era of the civil rights struggle, these same physical threats manifest, and they not only include, but also transcend race. In America today, the new civil rights struggle includes all those who feel excluded and marginalized from free and open participation in the society in which we share.

If the contention of this thesis is correct, each man has the capacity to be marginalized. Marginalization, particularly as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, is a negative value opposed to contribution; in this way, marginalization can be understood as a lever for "negative contribution." To be marginalized, a person is denied an active voice, an ability to express an authentic identity, and is prohibited and/or denied a dignified place in society. This is what sociologists understand as social exclusion. To be marginalized is to be on the periphery—whether that is in an inter-personal relationship, a workplace, a community, or broader society.[236]

Contributive justice is a dimension of justice that can help to bridge the divide between those who are marginalized and those who have the resources and power in society to do something to effectuate change. The strong want to have their strength acknowledged, and the weak want to have their capacity for strength enhanced. As men made in the image and likeness of our Creator—we are called to be co-

[236] This doctoral thesis is positioned at the societal level, but there is much room for future scholarship in other domains of life.

workers with God. This action is our *work*. Some are called to great public action and afforded the capacity to do so. Others are called to great personal action, which may be manifest by simply our existence. Either way and anywhere on the continuum-- each has our work to do. Our *wealth* is simply all the resources we have to do this work.

In Memphis, and in this last public speech, King implored us to develop "a kind of dangerous unselfishness." In this way, he invited all of us not to be "compassionate by proxy." He draws us into the story of the Good Samaritan on the Jericho Road. In recounting this story, the lesson King highlights is the difference in mindset of the men who encountered the man in need. King acknowledged that the Levite may have had any number of reasonable reasons for not stopping to help the man in need, but he posited that the difference between the response of the Levite and the response of the Sarmaritan was the difference between asking— *what will happen to me if I stop* versus *what will happen to the man if I don't*. These are important interior questions that manifest in both our personal and public lives and that relate directly to how we use our wealth.[237]

King also made an important point about power and what drives people to feel powerless to change.[238] King asked his listeners to recall the strategy of the Pharaoh who enslaved the Israelites for so long. King asked a simple question—how did Pharaoh do it? King explained that Pharaoh's "favorite formula" was to keep the slaves fighting amongst themselves. It may be easy to see in this story to see who is the Pharaoh and who is the enslaved. It may also be easy to see the Pharaoh and the slave in King's time—or even in our own. However, the lasting challenge of this thesis is to see who is Pharaoh and who is the enslaved through God's eyes.

[238] In this thesis, power would be considered a non-material component of wealth.

The French writer Charles Baudelaire, in his poem *The Generous Gambler* [239]offers important insight about the perennial power struggle of the will of man when he weaves the story of a young man smitten by the charms of a generous gambler who invites the young man for an evening of gambling and musings on life. The young man, however, grows suspicious and concerned as the generous gambler becomes more transparent:

> He [the generous gambler] complained in no way of the evil reputation under which he lived, indeed, all over the world, and he assured me that he himself was of all living beings the most interested in the destruction of Superstition, and he avowed to me that he had been afraid, relatively as to his proper power, once only, and that was on the day when he had heard a preacher, more subtle than the rest of the human herd, cry in his pulpit: ***"My dear brethren, do not ever forget, when you hear the progress of lights praised, that the loveliest trick of the Devil is to persuade you that he does not exist!"*** (emphasis added)

Through this poem, Baudelaire endeavors to show that there is evil in the world, and that the most devious trick played upon man is to convince him that evil does not exist. This is what makes evil so insidious. While King identifies the Pharaoh as a man, imagine what it would mean for the world if we could imagine that Pharaoh was not a man at all. What if Pharaoh was a snake whose plan was to find ways to (1) separate man from God, (2) separate man from himself, and (3) separate man from his fellow man?

Imagine now a way to reconnect man and to inspire him to invest in his interconnectedness with himself. The conceptualization of contributive justice in this thesis offers a moral foundation for ethics in every human endeavor. It builds bridges to give voice across the continuum of power. It expresses both rights and responsibilities, and it asks nothing more of us than to give of our whole selves (*contribution*) to inspire in each of us the greatest versions of ourselves. In so doing, we are morally obligated to put

[239] Baudelaire and Scott, 2006.

forth a genuine effort to reinvest in the institutions of society that enable the growth and development of each and every man. ***In this way, it is no longer man against man. It is man for and with man.***

This thesis situates contributive justice as a moral foundation theory that is rooted in Christian theology and Catholic social teaching, but it has also been tested in social psychology. As such, it has any number of contributions to offer. This author offers three significant areas for consideration. First, in the realm of Catholic social teaching and moral theology, this research offers insight into how to understand contributive justice more robustly in a way that bridges the concepts of distributive justice theory and social justice concepts. In this way, the author seeks to develop mechanisms for bridging an ideological divide in Catholic moral theology and to offer windows for ecumenical dialog. Second, there is tremendous velocity of discussion about the future of work. The past decade has seen rapid changes in the workplace driven by advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, machine learning and other advanced technologies. These technological advances penetrate all types and levels of work. Contributive justice theory offers opportunities for framing ethical norms in this new world of work that are rooted in the primacy of the dignity of the human person. Third, the last thirty years have seen a sea change in the understanding of the role of business in society. This change has been manifest in major movements in environmental sustainability, human rights and international development, corporate social responsibility, and responsible investing. Each of these major movements contains some elements of stakeholder theory.[240] At its essence, stakeholder theory recognizes the value created in diverse contribution. This author believes that contributive justice theory offers a unique contribution on why a stakeholder approach to organizational management is an ethical approach to management.

[240] Stakeholder theory was first developed by Ed Freeman, a management scholar from the University of Virginia (Freeman 1984). "Stakeholder Theory is a view of capitalism that stresses the interconnected relationships between a business, its customers, suppliers, employees, investors, communities and others who have a stake in the organization." (www.stakeholdertheory.org)

It is the hope of this author that the richness of these ideas will continue to inspire others in these areas and in all the scholarly domains from which this liberal studies scholar draws inspiration.

APPENDIX 1: SYSTEMATIC MODEL OF THE THEOLOGICAL NATURE OF WORK AND WEALTH



APPENDIX 2: THE IMPLICATIONS OF A THEOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF WORK AND WEALTH



APPENDIX 3: THE CONTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE PARADIGM



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